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vForeword
The idea of the present publication dates back to 2005, when the Local Government 
and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI), a program of the Open Society Institute, 
organized a regional South Eastern European policy forum on ﬁnancing education 
under its Fiscal Decentralization Initiative (FDI). LGI has since commissioned papers 
by regional experts on education ﬁnancing to provide oﬃcials responsible for local 
government ﬁnance reform with comparative information about the state of reform in 
the region and expert knowledge about policy options that were considered or imple-
mented elsewhere. 
As these studies demonstrate, each country in the region has walked its own way when 
it came to deciding to what extent and how to decentralize management and ﬁnancing 
of public education. There are no set rules and frameworks for such policies, rather one 
common direction: ﬁnding a ﬁscal and management arrangement that ensures that good 
quality education is equally available and provided eﬃciently. 
Guiding the direction of such policy reform requires the expertise, mobilization, and 
good will of governments, policymakers, and education professionals, and bringing all of 
them together to reach consensus, coordinate, and contribute to the reform process are 
not simple tasks. This volume presents the thinking and the paths chosen by ﬁve South 
Eastern European countries (and a comparison to Poland) in order to disentangle the 
knot of how to make the most of the education systems in the region. The studies may 
not necessarily present the best solutions, but they do open the door to stages where 
genuine eﬀorts were invested in providing a level of quality and satisfaction. 
I would like to extend my gratefulness to all the authors, who despite their preoccupations 
with governance and other important matters, dedicated their time and eﬀort to this 
volume and for their patience to make it happen after so much time elapsed: Sherefedin 
Shehu (Albania); Plamen Danchev and Stefan Ivanov (Bulgaria); Ivana Batarelo, Zeljka 
Podrug, and Tome Apostoloski (Croatia); Jan Herczynski, Jasna Vidanovska, and 
Nuri Lacka (Macedonia); Veaceslav Ionita (Moldova); and Casandra Bischoﬀ and Jan 
Herczynski (Romania). Special thanks to Jan Herczynski for the consistent and valu-
able advice and comments on the general trends in education in the region. I would 
like to thank Casandra Bischoﬀ, who shaped the conclusions and the major ﬁndings 
vi
into fruition and despite her new commitments at the moment, dedicated her time to 
this noble work. Thanks also to Ondrej Simek and Tímea Tóth who made this policy 
forum happen four years ago. And ﬁnally thanks to Tom Bass whose meticulous edits 
have made reading the studies a pleasure. 
Irina Faion
Senior Program Manager
Local Government and Public Service Initiative
Open Society Institute–Budapest
Október 6. utca 12
H–1051 Budapest, Hungary
Phone: (+36 1) 327 3104 / ext. 2078
Fax: (+36 1) 327 3105
vii
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3I n t r o d u c t i o n :  F i n a n c i n g  S y s t e m s  f o r  B e t t e r  S c h o o l s
Both centralized and decentralized systems can be good engines to deliver education, 
as both the experiences of France—at one end of the decentralization spectrum—and 
New Zealand—at the other—attest. 
Today, however, the vast majority of countries—and the ones we study in our 
report—use shared responsibilities among the various levels of government. Even in 
traditionally centralized countries like France, budget decisions have been recently 
devolved to a certain extent. On the other hand, in the United States higher levels of 
government are now assuming new responsibilities in ﬁnancing education. 
What seems to be important, therefore, is not deciding between decentralization 
versus centralization. The more important question is what kind of ﬁnancing system 
can eﬀectively attract the resources of the state, civil society, and the private sector to 
achieve national educational goals? What kind of ﬁnancing arrangement for primary 
and secondary education has a positive impact on quality, eﬀectiveness, and eﬃciency 
in education?
The report will examine the ﬁnancing choices of six countries: 
 • Albania, where the central government has retained most of the responsibilities 
in education, while recently delegating some functions in expenditure manage-
ment, such as maintenance, to the municipalities. 
 • Bulgaria, where a delegated budget system (DBS) has been implemented in 
more than 30 municipalities so far.
 • Croatia, where the education system for the most part is still centralized in terms 
of management and human resources of schools but where the decentralization 
of resource allocation has begun. 
 • Macedonia, which distinguishes itself as a champion in education reform in South 
Eastern Europe and is now ready to implement the second phase of education 
decentralization. 
 • Moldova, with complete centralization for all policy competencies, from the 
determination of policy standards in education to the execution of policy.
 • Romania, where eﬀorts to decentralize the education sector began as early 
as 1995, but where results of this sinuous reform process are still hard to 
measure. 
The ﬁrst section of this summary looks brieﬂy at the institutional framework of each 
country, both the school management and ﬁnancial arrangements The second section 
will assess the impact of these arrangements on the quality, eﬀectiveness, and eﬃciency 
of the education system and will draw some conclusions. 
4P U B L I C  M O N E Y  F O R  P U B L I C  S C H O O L S
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS
Several external factors—such as a consistent decline in the school population, changing 
demands in labor markets, volatile economic growth, and consequently an increase in 
the consumption of private education—seem to be at work in all the countries of our 
study. Other internal factors, such as a political environment conducive or constraining 
to reform, are important when considering whether to keep or to hand over the control 
of certain education functions. 
School Management
Albania
The main education functions stay with the central government, which enjoys hegemony 
in the education sector through two layers of deconcentrated oﬃces, at the regional and 
district level. These units decide on the school network, number of teachers, and also 
have the power to hire or dismiss school directors, teachers, and other non-teaching 
staﬀ. In terms of teacher salaries, local governments are paymasters and can hire security 
personnel who they pay from the local budget. 
The only fully decentralized function is maintenance. Municipalities are now given 
ownership over school buildings—although the plots where the buildings are located 
still belong to the central government. 
The Albanian government has given a lot of attention to decentralization policy 
in education. Notably, in 2004 the government issued a policy paper on education decen-
tralization, which unfortunately was not followed up with clear changes in legislation. 
A pilot project was implemented in Tirana and tested the decentralization of extended 
budget execution powers. As a result of this pilot project, extended powers in the budget 
execution were transferred to municipalities. The results remain inconclusive though. 
Bulgaria 
In 2006 the government empowered the school councils in 10 pilot municipalities. 
The councils include a representative of the regional inspectorate, one of the municipal 
administration, two representatives of the pedagogical staﬀ of the school, and two parent 
representatives. The council is responsible for evaluation of the performance of the 
school director; proposes the dismissal or appointment of the school director; and the 
proposal must be endorsed by the regional inspectorate. School councils are envisaged 
to be extended as a mandatory structure in all schools in Bulgaria in 2009.
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In the rest of the schools across the country the central government retains the major 
competencies such as hiring and dismissal of directors through the ministry and its 
deconcentrated units, the regional inspectorates. The director of the school can hire or 
ﬁre teachers and non-teaching staﬀ. However, the number of teachers and non-teaching 
staﬀ is decided by the center.
The same cannot be said about staﬃng, class sizes, salaries, and other operational 
education expenditure regulations, which have been relaxed starting in 2008. They 
are now mostly recommendations. This has had a positive impact on the powers of 
directors, who now can determine the number of staﬀ, speciﬁc salaries, or individual 
teaching hours of their teachers. Moreover, the director now can decide what portion 
of the school budget will go for maintenance and for labor costs.
The recommendation to open or close a school is made by the funding authority 
(local government for the municipal schools) and submitted to the regional education 
inspectorates. The latter checks the circumstances, prepares an opinion, and the recom-
mendation is submitted to a committee appointed by the Minister for Education and 
Science. The committee, composed of representatives of the ministry, considers the 
recommendations, examines the attached documents, and prepares a recommendation 
to open or close a school that the minister then approves in an order. 
The maintenance of school buildings and the current operating expenses are covered 
by the owner, i.e., the respective ministry for the state schools and the municipality for 
the municipal ones.
Croatia
Croatia started the process of decentralization of primary and secondary education in 
2001, when the central government transferred the responsibility for ﬁnancing educa-
tion, healthcare, welfare, and ﬁre departments to local governments. The main principles 
underlying the decentralization of ﬁnancing was the transfer of founding rights. School 
founders are commonly larger municipalities. 
In the municipalities that were given new responsibilities, the school council 
selects the school director. The school council has a fairly balanced composition, with 
four school representatives and three representatives of a local government unit. The 
ministry does not have any inﬂuence over the hiring or dismissal of the director. 
However, the ministry is currently contemplating the idea to change the composi-
tion of the school’s councils in such a way as to have a ﬁnal say in the appointment of 
the directors. 
The school council also elects the teachers and administrative personnel, subse-
quent to competition. Salaries are calculated on the basis of coeﬃcients regulated by 
the central government. 
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The establishment and closure of schools are regulated at the level of the town for 
primary schools or the municipal level for primary and secondary schools. The same 
legal regulations determine class size, namely 30 students (plus/minus two). Teaching 
plans and programs are determined on the central level. 
Macedonia
A fully centralized system before 2001, Macedonia undertook the devolution of 
signiﬁcant powers to municipalities in many sectors of public life, including educa-
tion. Decentralization of education was implemented in two phases. In Phase 1, the 
center transferred limited responsibilities—such as maintenance, repairs, and material 
expenditures. Salaries were excluded. 
The changes also included an important redesign of the school board, which now 
has the authority to select and dismiss the school director, to set the school budget, and 
to adopt the school statute. The new system also foresees the introduction of a system 
of licensing of school directors. 
Phase 2, planned for the period 2007–2009, includes the transfer of further func-
tions to those municipalities that fulﬁll certain conditions speciﬁed in the Law on Local 
Government Finance or LLGF. Starting in September 2007, around 50 municipalities 
entered the second phase of decentralization. 
Moldova 
A snapshot of the Moldovan system reveals an almost complete centralization of all compe-
tencies, from the determination of policy standards in education to the execution of policy. 
Local governments can only submit proposals for the opening, reorganization, and closing 
of schools. Further, the boards of education at the raion level analyze the documents and 
submit a proposed decision for approval to the Ministry of Education. Wages and social 
and medical insurance expenditures for education personnel are the responsibility of the 
deconcentrated departments of the Ministry of Education, at the level of the raion. 
The ministry is in charge of the overall management of the school, from the orga-
nizational chart to the selection of school directors and teachers. The director of the 
school can hire additional teachers if needed, but only with the approval of the raion. 
Inspection and monitoring of school performances and ﬁnances are ensured by the 
deconcentrated oﬃces of the Ministry of Education. 
Local governments are responsible for the maintenance of schools, while capital 
works are the responsibility of the central government. 
In 2002, the government transferred new powers and tasks to the raions and local 
governments, but it failed to provide the necessary ﬁnancing. An example of an unfunded 
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mandate would be housing for young teachers who settle in the rural areas. The Ministry 
of Education ensures the payment of their salaries. Obviously, since most local govern-
ment revenues were not high enough to cover this additional expenditure, the law was 
implemented starting in 2006, when the government allocated around EUR 600 per 
academic year for each young teacher.1 
Romania 
Romania is a country whose policy eﬀorts in education would be best described as stop-
and-go reforms. Unfortunately, the impetus for reform by various education ministers 
has often ended as a result of political power struggles. Alternatively, as soon as external 
pressures for reform—such as integration into the European Union in 2007—are 
discontinued, education seems to fall oﬀ the reform agenda. 
Attempts to reform education in 2001 were prioritized one more time in 2004, when 
the primary and secondary legislation was brought in line with what was intended to 
be decentralization to schools. The director of the school became the chairman of the 
administration council, the power of the administrative council was strengthened, while 
the role of the school director was changed from that of a teacher to that of a manager 
held accountable through a managerial contract signed with the inspectorate. School 
budgets with revenue and expenditure sides were introduced. 
However, the new framework summarized above was implemented in only eight 
pilot counties until now. In the rest of the schools across the country the inspectorates 
still have signiﬁcant powers. They nominate the teachers and set up public education 
units such as kindergartens, primary schools, middle schools, and vocational and appren-
ticeship schools. The director of the school signs his/her contract with the inspectorate, 
not with the local government, so the relationship between the school and the local 
community is considerably weakened. Furthermore, the administration council has 
only a consultative and advisory role.
Financial Arrangements
Albania 
Financing for primary and secondary education remains highly centralized, provided 
mainly by the central government. Local governments are responsible for the ﬁnancing 
of basic school maintenance. This includes heating, electricity, telecommunications 
(telephones, Internet connections), water, waste disposal, cleaning materials, small 
repairs (windows, drains, etc.), and painting. They do make a small contribution to 
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salaries, but only for the guards hired in schools. Since their own revenues are insuf-
ﬁcient to ﬁnance this function, local governments use part of a general grant allocated 
on the basis of a formula. But the issue of underfunding remains.2 Experience shows 
that local governments spend only around 16 percent of the general grant on education 
(or, excluding Tirana, only 12 percent). As a proportion of the total education budget, 
this is far below the average OECD level of over 19 percent.
The remaining responsibilities are delegated and receive almost 100-percent ﬁnancing 
each year through the annual state budget law. Furniture, didactic materials, and student 
transportation are ﬁnanced by the regional units of the ministry (Regional Directorates of 
Education or RDE). Similarly, the salaries for the staﬀ employed in schools are ﬁnanced 
entirely by the central government. These are calculated by the Ministry of Education 
based on actual employment levels in schools and on average salaries (by education level) 
for each municipality. The amounts allocated for salaries are then sent to municipalities, 
which pay the school staﬀ. Since 2006 the state has reimbursed 70 percent of the costs 
of textbooks for all primary education.3 
Bulgaria
Prior to 2002, schools were ﬁnanced through general budget revenues. Municipalities 
raised limited own revenues and received from the state shared taxes by origin and 
general subsidies. Like in many other countries in the region, the unclear division of 
responsibilities between central and local government in public service provision created 
some disincentives for eﬃcient and eﬀective ﬁnancial management. 
In 2003, as a result of a serious decentralization reform, municipalities were delegated 
education functions. The expenditures for activities delegated by the state are based on 
two diﬀerent standards (for maintenance and staﬀ salaries) and were generally funded 
from personal income tax receipts. In 2007, the previous expenditure standards were 
“uniﬁed” and converted to a single costing standard per student (quasi-voucher system 
implementing the principle “money follows the student”). The design of the new costing 
standard stimulates the ﬁnancing authority (ministries and the local governments) to 
adopt their own pattern for the allocation of funds across schools. 
In addition to the funds deﬁned through the costing standard, in the course of each 
year the municipalities receive subsidies from the Ministry of Finance for additional 
remuneration of teachers, subsidies to compensate costs incurred by the municipalities 
(such as transportation), subsidies for capital investments from the Ministry of Education 
and Science, and free textbooks for ﬁrst-grade pupils. 
In addition, Bulgaria introduced a pilot delegated budget system for secondary 
education in 1994. The state gave the school authorities the right to make independent 
decisions about administrative, organizational, and ﬁnancial aspects, and they were held 
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accountable for the results of these decisions. The powers and responsibilities of munici-
palities shifted from direct management of schools to coordination, methodological 
assistance, training, and supervision. Schools became secondary budget holders and 
are now able to compile their own budgets and have their own bank accounts. Schools 
have also the authority to manage property such as canteens, land, and vacant premises, 
and to raise additional revenues.
The delegated school budget system has been expanded nationally in 2008, thus 
further increasing the ﬁnancial and management autonomy of schools.
Croatia 
Croatia transferred the responsibility for ﬁnancing a part of the primary and secondary 
education functions to local governments that have suﬃcient ﬁscal capacity to do 
so. In municipalities with less revenues, the upper administrative level takes over the 
responsibility to ﬁnance the decentralized competencies. However, many smaller local 
governments have expressed an interest in being given further ﬁnancing rights.
Each year the government and the Ministry of Finance set minimum ﬁnancial 
standards or the cost of a certain function in cooperation with the ministry. In deﬁning 
minimum standards the ministry takes into consideration the expenditure needs of local 
governments. The needs estimation uses the number of enrolled pupils in a certain year 
multiplied by the average annual cost per pupil. 
The central government fully covers salaries and partially covers maintenance. For 
the functions that were transferred (transportation, remainder of maintenance), local 
governments can use two sources for ﬁnancing. One is a share of the income tax. The 
diﬀerence between additional income taxes collected locally in towns and municipalities 
and the approved minimal standard is received from an equalization fund, the level of 
which is decided in the budget law each year. 
Macedonia 
The main source of education ﬁnancing is the state budget (95 percent in primary 
education and 80 percent in secondary education). Extrabudgetary resources are used 
to compensate for a very limited level of budget allocations, especially maintenance. 
Schools have separate accounts for each source of income and are not allowed to transfer 
money from one account to another without permission from the ministry (since 2007, 
without the permission of the appropriate local government). 
About 85 to 90 percent of the education budget is generally spent on salaries, eight 
percent on goods and services, four percent on student transport, and two percent on 
investments. 
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During the ﬁrst phase of decentralization, transferred functions are ﬁnanced through 
categorical grants excluding salaries, and full ﬁnancing including salaries will start only 
in the second phase, through block grants. For the ﬁrst phase of education decentral-
ization, the ministry uses a per student allocation formula to municipalities. The main 
indicator in the formula is population density. The setting of budgets of individual 
schools became the responsibility of municipalities and is closely monitored by the 
ministry. For the second phase, a new allocation formula is to be designed, since the 
present distribution patterns of maintenance expenditures and of total school expen-
ditures are quite diﬀerent. 
Moldova 
Education ﬁnancing is fully centralized in Moldova. The main ﬁnancing source for 
education is the state budget in the form of shared revenues and transfers (grants) for 
local governments and shared taxes. The percentage of shared revenues is deﬁned in the 
annual budget law. The speciﬁc feature of this regulation is that the minimum percentage 
of shared revenues to be kept by respective local government should be no less than 
50 percent. The second important source is the transfer system. Moldova uses two: an 
equalization mechanism and conditional grants. Conditional grants are sent to raions, 
which reallocate them to local governments. 
Schools can also use own revenues of local governments (from local taxes and other 
revenues from renting local facilities) and they can build the own revenues of schools 
(i.e., the “school fund,” revenues from extracurricular courses, rental revenues). 
Between 1998 and 2003, the ﬁnancing of education was made through a block 
grant (general transfer) that was calculated on the basis of expenditure norms. Local 
authorities enjoyed signiﬁcant discretion over the allocation of the block grant for various 
local services. However, given that the need of local governments was constantly larger 
than the transfer received, one of the results was that teacher salaries became secondary 
in importance and in many cases teachers did not receive their salaries for three to 
six months. To address this issue, the central government went back to the system of 
categorical grants in 2003. 
In order to determine how much ﬁnancing is needed, the Ministry of Finance uses 
expenditure norms that are based on historical budgeting. Maintenance expenditures, 
for example, are calculated using the number of students. As a consequence small rural 
locations that have a reduced number of students receive less funding for maintenance, 
even if these are typically the largest maintenance consumers. 
Moldova has an interesting form of voluntary participation by parents in the educa-
tion system. Parents directly ﬁnance some functions that are severely underfunded by 
the central government, such as salaries of teachers, maintenance, and even capital 
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expenditures. This is by no means the result of a conscious decentralization policy, but 
rather an attempt to compensate for the state’s failure to ensure suﬃcient ﬁnancing for 
education.
Romania 
Romania’s ﬁnancing mechanism is a two-pillar system that includes global (proportional) 
ﬁnancing and complementary ﬁnancing. Global ﬁnancing covers staﬀ salaries, materials 
and services, and teacher in-training. This is ﬁnanced through conditional grants and 
comprises over 95 percent of recurrent school budgets. Remaining expenditures, such 
as dormitories and cafeterias, student assessment, scholarships and student transporta-
tion, medical check-ups for employees, school contests, investments, and major repairs 
are part of complementary ﬁnancing. 
The amounts to be allocated are calculated based on teaching inputs, the most 
important being teacher salaries. Despite the fact that a standard cost was introduced 
in the legislation in 2001, the main method used to ﬁnance primary and secondary 
education—with the exception of several pilot counties—continues to be historical 
budgeting. The main problem that prevented the implementation of the standard cost 
formula was the fact that the costs—calculated based on the legal norms governing 
the employment of teachers and non-teachers (including curriculum, class sizes, the 
national pay scale) as well as relevant norms (for instance, heating)—turned out to be 
unrealistically large. The standard costs resulting from those calculations came out 30 
to 40 percent higher than the historical costs of speciﬁc types of school, which made 
them unacceptable to the Ministry of Finance.
A new education management and ﬁnance framework introduced in 2004 was 
piloted in all school units of eight pilot counties, with the scope of testing the newly 
adopted regulations. The real eﬀect of the pilot project was to increase school autonomy 
regarding the employment of teachers and the participation of the school community. 
The pilot project is continuing, but there are no immediate plans for national replica-
tion. The second program included 50 school units in three diﬀerent counties selected 
from the initial eight pilot counties, with the main purpose of testing a per-student 
formula based on historical costs and transferred as a speciﬁc grant to local authorities. 
However, there was no oﬃcial decision regarding the per-student formula to be tested 
by the schools, and therefore, no applicable mechanism to test, monitor, and assess it. 
The second pilot ended inconclusively in December 2007. 
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EVALUATION 
This section will look at the impact of the ﬁnancial settings in the six countries from 
the point of view of three issues: 
 1) Eﬀectiveness in terms of stimulating the quality of teaching;
 2) Equity in the allocation of resources; and
 3) Eﬃciency in the allocation of resources and the use of resources by individual 
schools.
However, an important structural issue needs to be addressed beforehand, namely 
the underfunding of education. 
Looking at education expenditures as a share of the GDP, we can see that most of 
the countries spend around 3.5 percent of their GDP on education, which is signiﬁcantly 
lower than the ﬁve percent of GDP spent in OECD countries. 
Figure 1. 
Education as Percent of GDP
Source: Country reports in this volume.
In all the countries analyzed in this study the underfunding of education has an 
important impact on salaries. Teacher salaries as a percent of GDP range between 0.66 
percent in Romania and go up to 0.86 percent in Bulgaria, both signiﬁcantly lower than 
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OECD averages of 1.33 of GDP per capita for primary education and 1.37 of GDP per 
capita for secondary education (World Bank Education Policy Note 2007). Here, Croatia 
makes a special case, with 1.70 percent of GDP spent on salaries. This can be explained 
by the coherent policy of the government to align the increase in the number of teachers 
with an increase in the funds for salaries. It is also worth mentioning that teachers in 
Croatia have the status of public servants, which gives them a stronger bargaining posi-
tion. The government works within a framework contract with the teacher unions that 
regulate the beneﬁts for teachers working in special conditions (e.g., combined classes, 
work with students with special needs, schools in remote areas) as well as surpluses for 
each additional academic level. 
Low salaries have led certain categories of teachers in Romania to the limits of 
subsistence. In Bucharest, for example, the basic salary of a young teacher does not 
cover even basic expenses, such as rent and utilities. 
There are many consequences of inadequate payment. One of them is a loss in the 
motivation of teachers to perform at their best, which leads to a decrease in the quality 
of teaching. In other countries cases of corruption during national examinations or 
competitions for jobs in the academic system have become a worrying phenomenon in 
the last ﬁve years. Corruption is also reported related to promotions in higher education 
and the awarding of Ph.D. degrees.4
Another obvious eﬀect is that teachers search for alternative sources of revenue. In 
most of the countries in this report there are two main strategies: either migrating to 
wealthier countries or searching for alternative jobs in education. Albanian teachers, for 
example, are leaving for cleaning or gardening jobs in Greece, Italy, and Switzerland. This 
is, however, associated with a signiﬁcant loss of social prestige. The second option is to 
take more teaching norms in other public or private schools and, alternatively, provide 
private tutoring to students. Anecdotal evidence in Albania suggests that in Tirana up 
to 80 percent of all gymnasium students, and in other cities at least 30 percent, take 
private lessons, either with their own teachers or with teachers whom they recommend. 
Moreover, sometimes the pursuit of clients for private tutoring is rather aggressive, even 
in cases of talented students who do not need supplementary teaching at all. The situ-
ation is similar in Romania. 
Too much private tutoring distorts the dynamics of teaching and learning in schools. 
It shifts the focus and expectations of students away from the school while it also creates 
a strong incentive for teachers to neglect their school classes in favor of afternoon lessons. 
This increases social inequality, because poorer and rural students have less access to 
private lessons (Herczyński 2007). 
The second important eﬀect of the underfunding of education is a signiﬁcant decrease 
in the quality of school infrastructure. However, deﬁcient school maintenance is also 
due to the fragmentation of responsibilities among too many administrative levels, and 
it will be treated separately in the following sections. 
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Effectiveness 
One of the questions regarding eﬀectiveness is whether the volume of school ﬁnances 
reduces or increases when local governments become responsible for funding schools. 
A model of purely local government ﬁnancing is to be found only in a few places 
in the world—such as the United States, where local school districts raise their own 
revenues through a tax on private property,5 or some cities in Brazil. However, this 
model results in highly unequal spending per student across the municipalities, which 
leads most other countries to chose shared ﬁnancing. 
The experiences with shared ﬁnancing depend on how much responsibility was 
transferred to the local governments. In Bulgaria, studies show that local governments 
that adopted the delegated budget system allocated additional funds for education from 
their own revenues up to 2.6 percent of the total amount spent for schools. This may 
seem to be a low ﬁgure, but it is a signiﬁcant increase—almost double—if compared 
to the national average of 1.4 percent in municipalities that do not use the delegated 
budget system. 
In other words, when it is clear what is the minimum that local governments 
should spend on a certain function—and that minimum is ﬁnanced 100 percent from 
the center—the local authority tends to add even more from their own revenues. This 
conclusion could be supported by a contrast with countries where there is less clarity in 
terms of shared responsibilities and no expenditure standards are required. In Albania, 
for example, maintenance is fully decentralized. However, since local governments do 
not have suﬃcient own revenues to ﬁnance this function, they use a general transfer in 
order to ﬁnance maintenance—besides many other local services. What typically happens 
when maintenance competes for funding with other local services is that it becomes of 
secondary importance. Local governments spend less than they could spend—in the 
case of Albania around 16 percent of the general transfer on education.
Another question regarding eﬀectiveness is whether decentralization to local govern-
ments or school management increases creativity and responsiveness in terms of the 
syllabus and special subjects delivered according to local needs. There is insuﬃcient data 
to build on this argument from the countries studied in this report. However, where 
local ﬁnancial responsibility increased (Bulgaria), there is evidence that schools and 
municipalities have become more involved in acquiring new inventory and teaching 
aids better suited to their local needs. 
In the majority of the countries studied here personnel policies remain fully central-
ized and are exercised by the deconcentrated oﬃces of the Ministry of Education. These 
units decide on the number of teachers and also hire or ﬁre school directors, teachers, 
and other non-teaching staﬀ. Local governments therefore have no ability to eﬀect 
the recruitment and retention of eﬀective teachers. Two exceptions are Bulgaria and 
Romania, where some school councils6 in pilot programs appoint directors of schools. 
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However, teacher remuneration remains the responsibility of the central government 
in all the countries studied in the report. 
Moldova presents a rather unusual situation where parents are deeply involved in 
supplementing teachers’ salaries. This compensatory behavior does not help the central 
government to resolve the critical issue of underfunding. Another interesting program 
that Moldova put in place in 2002 is a ﬁnancing scheme to attract young teachers to 
rural areas, by providing them with housing or with housing subsidies. The central 
government would pay the salary of the teacher, while the housing subsidy would be 
ﬁnanced from local budgets. However, this scheme was never sustainable, since the own 
revenues were too insuﬃcient to make the program work in a sustainable manner.7 
Equity 
Four methods can be identiﬁed in terms of funds allocation in education (Ross and 
Levacic 1999): 
 • Historic funding or incrementalism, where a school receives funding for the 
current year that is the same as it spent the previous year modiﬁed up or down 
by a few percentage points. 
 • Bidding, where a school presents a case for funding based on known criteria and 
is awarded ﬁnance according to how well the funding agency considers that the 
bid meets the criteria. 
 • Discretionary, where a school receives funding according to the opinions and 
judgments exercised by the funding agency administrators. 
 • Formula funding, which distributes the funds to schools according to the needs 
of the speciﬁc students in each school. 
Obviously, the method that ensures equity in the distribution of funds—in both 
decentralized or centralized systems—is a formula. 
There are two forms of equity that can be included in the formula: 
 • Horizontal equity—which implies the like treatment of recipients whose needs 
are similar. 
 • Vertical equity—which implies the application of diﬀerential funding levels for 
recipients whose needs vary. 
Needs-based funding is an attempt to determine the learning needs of each category 
of student and the cost of resourcing that need (within budget overall constraints) so 
that both horizontal and vertical equity considerations are satisfactorily considered. 
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Formulae can be used to make the allocation of inputs more equitable or in an attempt 
to make the distribution of educational outcomes more equal. Giving schools the same 
basic allocation per-student diﬀerentiated by grade level is crucial in ensuring horizontal 
equity in the allocation of resource inputs to both schools and students. Adding diﬀer-
ential amounts to the basic allocation per-student—so as to fund students diﬀerentially 
accordant to their educational needs—is a step in promoting vertical equity. 
The experience from the countries where the allocation is based on the input costs 
of the existing network of educational institutions shows that the system is less fair than 
a formula-based distribution of funds taking into account objective needs for schooling. 
Fairness can be analyzed by looking at the regional discrepancies in per-student ﬁnancing. 
This is the case of Albania, where the regional variation in per-student maintenance costs 
is high in primary education, especially because maintenance is fully decentralized and 
there are no norms regulating maintenance expenditures. Tirana has by far the largest 
maintenance expenditures in the country, reﬂecting the relative wealth of the capital. 
It spends three times more than the Durres region on the coast. The same happens in 
Croatia, Moldova, and Romania. 
Before 2005 Macedonia showed the same 3.3:1 ratio in terms of maintenance 
variation between the capital and municipalities in the rural areas. The start of the ﬁrst 
phase of decentralization brought with it the transfer of maintenance management to 
the local governments, while the ﬁnancing was ensured from the central government. 
The allocation of the funds was done using categorical grants. A formula was put in 
place with three main elements: 
 1) The lump sum, allocated to each municipality irrespective of the number of 
students (for primary schools only). 
 2) The number of weighted students. 
 3) Lower and upper buﬀers. 
The current design of the formula protects the small municipalities (through the 
lump sum), provides more funds to the small schools with small classes where mainte-
nance costs per student are higher, and also protects the municipalities from excessive 
changes from previous year’s allocation.8
Bulgaria adopted a new mechanism for funding municipal education activities 
following the introduction of the quasi-voucher system in 2007. Local governments in 
Bulgaria were grouped in four general groups based on key demographic and geographic 
criteria. The costing standard was deﬁned for each of these four groups and mid- to 
long-term targets were set according to the implementation of tailored programs for 
each of the groups, with the ultimate goal to reduce the factors driving the diﬀerent 
levels of costs for education. The delegated budget system has been nationally expanded 
in 2008, further increasing the ﬁnancial and management autonomy of schools.
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Efﬁciency
Eﬃciency refers to two situations in the education sector. 
First, it refers to the allocation of available funds for education in a way that stimu-
lates the optimization of the school network and staﬃng. Local administrations need 
to be involved in the allocation process, as they are better positioned to assess the need 
for (especially primary) education and may also be in a better position to determine 
the need for staﬃng, as they balance their education expenditures with other parts of 
the local budget. The role of the central government here is to decide how to allocate 
the funds and manage the distribution mechanism. 
Second, it refers to the way in which individual schools use their resources and 
looks at how much discretion local governments (and schools) have to manage their 
own budgets. The starting assumption is that giving a higher authority to local govern-
ments to decide how to spend the allocated resources leads to higher eﬃciency because 
they will become aware of the scarcity of their resources—hence the need to use their 
resources eﬃciently—only when they are in charge of managing those resources. The 
role of the central government is to disseminate good practices that would help local 
governments use innovative methods to increase eﬃciency. 
Table 1.
Student–teacher Ratios (STR)
Country 2000 2003 2006
Albania — 19.56 —
Bulgaria 10.6 13.2 13.8
Croatia — 12.82 (primary)
12.20 (secondary)
11.5 (primary)
11.16 (secondary)
Macedonia 20.30 (primary)
16.91 (secondary)
18.80 (primary)
18.37
—
Moldova 14.90 13.60 12.30
Romania — 15.34 14.42
OECD — 16.30 (primary)
13.90 (secondary)
—
One way of assessing internal eﬃciency is by looking at student–teacher ratios 
(STR). Earlier research focused on primary education in the Visegrad countries (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) shows that the ratio has increased over the last 
decade. There are two main reasons to explain this. On the one hand, the drop in the 
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number of pupils causes an increase of the STR. At the same time, evidence shows that 
countries where salaries of teachers are paid by the state (Czech Republic, Slovakia) have 
also experienced a rise in the total teaching force. On the contrary, in countries where 
the local level is in charge of management and ﬁnancing of primary schools, the overall 
number of teachers has actually decreased.
All of the countries in this study face negative demographic processes; however, 
the policy eﬀorts to deal with them vary from country to country. At one end of the 
spectrum is Albania, with a high STR of 19.56 (2003), where government eﬀorts were 
surpassed by an important internal population migration from rural to urban areas 
and from the northern part of the country to the south. Between 2004 and 2007, the 
number of primary school students fell by nearly 10 percent. More than 16 percent of 
the total decrease in school enrollments occurred in rural schools, while the student 
population in urban schools in those regions grew by more than half. 
A diﬀerent case is Croatia, with a relatively low STR that is constantly decreasing. 
Besides the similar decrease of number of students in schools, there are several develop-
ments that make Croatia diﬀerent. The state continues to open new schools, given the 
return of refugees and the renewal of schools that were destroyed during the war in the 
1990s. As a result Croatia has a continuous increase in number of schools and teachers9 
and a tendency to reduce the number of students in the class. From 1994 until 2004, 
the average number of students in primary school classes decreased from 24 to 21. This 
would imply that the system provides higher-quality teaching to students; however, at 
a higher cost for the system. 
Macedonia has not adjusted the teaching force to the decreasing student population 
either, and the student–teacher ratio decreased by only 7.3 percent. At the same time 
the size of classes went down by about 5.2 percent. Still, the student–teacher ratio is in 
line with OECD averages of 16.5 students per teacher in primary education and 13.6 
students per teacher in secondary education. 
In order to deal with the change in the demographics, the Bulgaria government 
went for drastic school closures. In Bulgaria, 410 general education schools (of which more 
than 90 percent were in rural communities) were closed between 1999 and 2007. 
In Romania the number of students fell by three percent, but the number of 
teachers grew by two percent between 2003 and 2005. Throughout this period, the 
student–teacher ratio fell by ﬁve percent. This may be partially due to increased number 
of part-time teachers. Overall, the government has not been pursuing an active policy 
to improve the eﬃciency of the sector in a period of serious budget constraints. 
Moldova is in the midst of an important and diﬃcult process to transform old 
general schools in colleges and high schools. In addition, starting in 2004 there has 
been a signiﬁcant decrease in the number of schools, mainly as a result of the decreasing 
number of students. The government has found a solution that has a substantial nega-
tive impact on the quality of teaching. In rural areas with a lower number of students, 
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classes were amalgamated, meaning that children in the ﬁrst, second, and third grades 
are learning together. 
The school management system encourages eﬃcient use of resources in the case 
of delegated budgets in Bulgaria as well as in Macedonia, which uses elements in the 
formula that encourage eﬃcient spending of resources. For the rest of the countries 
eﬃciency in spending is left at the discretion of individual directors. Although they are 
unable to retain savings, they can decrease heating and electricity costs by simply turning 
oﬀ the heaters or replacing broken windows. They can increase their own revenues by 
organizing donor events and collect own revenues for the school, and they can rent 
school facilities, although schools never rely solely on this type of earning. 
The delegated budget system (DBS) in Bulgaria is a good illustration of a budgeting 
system that promotes eﬃciency. Within this system the municipality transfers the right 
to make independent administrative, organizational, and ﬁnancial decisions to the 
school authorities, and they are also held accountable for the results of these decisions. 
More speciﬁcally, the municipality and the school directors agree upon the mechanism 
of allocating resources among schools, while schools become secondary budget holders, 
compile their own budgets, and have their own bank accounts.
The experience of Bulgaria shows that delegating budgets to the schools and local 
governments is a good solution to regulate relations between municipalities and schools 
and increases eﬃciency overall. The total amount of resources and their allocation among 
schools are determined in a transparent and objective manner and it is no longer possible 
to make excuses for poor performance or blame others. Each director can calculate the 
amount he or she is entitled to, and the amount of the neighboring school. The formula 
includes adjustment ratios, buildings, and additional activities like dormitories and help 
reﬂect the speciﬁcities of schools at the local level. More funds are available because 
schools have incentives to increase their own revenues. 
DBS is a good tool for reducing costs, because spending becomes more eﬃcient. 
There are incentives to save because the savings are kept by the schools to be spent on 
the priorities the schools have identiﬁed. Expenditures are more eﬃcient. If in the past 
schools contributed to a municipality’s unpaid bills, now they end the year with carry-
over surpluses. 
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NOTES
1 This was done with the support of external assistance. It is not clear whether the program 
will be implemented further. 
2 For a more detailed discussion on the underfunding of Albania education, please see Jan 
Herczyński (2007).
3 With the exception of students of poor rural students, to whom the state budget reimburses 
90 percent of textbook price.
4 World Bank (2007). 
5 Even in the United States, levels of government are now assuming new responsibilities in 
ﬁnancing education
6 The school councils consists of one representative of the regional inspectorate, one repre-
sentative of the municipal administration, two representatives of the pedagogical staﬀ of 
the school, and two parent representatives.
7 The scheme was implemented four years later with external ﬁnancing. 
8 For a more detailed analysis of the formula, please see the Macedonia chapter.
9 The increase in the number of teachers is also due to the inclusion of two foreign languages 
in the obligatory school curriculum.
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Executive Summary
Albania has built a complete education system from preschools to postgraduate studies. 
The government assumes the bulk of the responsibility for ﬁnancing pre-primary, primary 
and secondary education, vocational and technical education, and training and tertiary 
education. Public funding covers 100 percent of the recurrent and capital expenditure of 
government schools while no funding is provided for private schools.
During its transition towards a market economy, Albania has shown different trends of 
education spending. Except for the three years of 1990, 1991, and 1995, public spending 
on Albanian pre-university education, as a share of GDP, has steadily decreased, a trend that 
repeated itself during the period 1999–2004. Public spending on primary and secondary 
education as a share of GDP at the beginning of the transition (1989) was four percent. 
At the end of 1998, the share fell to 2.8 percent. Since 1998, the share has also been 
decreasing—its lowest level was in 2002 (2.05 percent). Educational spending as a share 
of GDP has also been at a lower level than in other countries in transition. 
Education spending as a share of total public spending in Albania increased slightly 
between 1999 and 2004, except in 2002, when expenditures were lower than in 2000. 
This reﬂected the transition from communism to the market economy, which reduced the 
number of state functions, while increasing the government’s role in the social sectors. 
Education spending, when compared to total public spending during 1999–2004, was 
stable, indicating that education is considered less important than other sectors. 
Enrollment in pre-university education had decreased to 61 percent of its historical high 
by 1999, but increased to 73 percent by 2003. Since 1999, they have slightly decreased in 
primary education, and increased in secondary education. This might explain the low level 
of Albania’s government spending on education. The level of spending per student has 
been increased as a result of the decreased enrollments, but still remains low compared to 
other countries. This again shows the need for increasing the total spending on education 
in relation to GDP and general public spending. 
Local government law deﬁnes education as a shared function. Responsibilities, however, 
between central and local governments are not allocated based on a sectoral law as they 
should be. Because education is a public service involving both local and national beneﬁts, the 
size of local government should be taken into consideration when the new law for deﬁning 
local government responsibilities for the education service is drafted. Except for the large 
cities, the assignment of responsibilities for the remaining local governments should be 
based on the principle of cooperation between the different levels of local governments.
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Budgets for education and training were allocated to both the central and local 
government levels without a clear assignment of functions and responsibilities. There are 
also no national standards for education that would level out differences in the provision 
of education across geographic areas. These policies have resulted in an inefﬁcient and 
ineffective use of funds.
During 1999–2003, recurrent expenditures accounted for 76 to 90 percent of the total 
education budget, while capital expenditure accounted for the remainder. Of the recurrent 
expenditure, wages and social contributions were the largest component, accounting for 
96 percent, with only around ﬁve percent spent on teaching materials, utilities, and other 
maintenance expenditures. Moreover, they have been unequally allocated among districts, 
as evinced by the differences between the share of students and the share of budget alloca-
tions by district. In 2003, 21 out of 37 districts received a higher education funding share 
than their students’ share. 
Financial sources of education funding show that central government sources are 
dominant. This is explained by the high degree of centralization. The share of the earmarked 
transfers in education funding represents more than 90 percent of total funding. It provides 
ﬁnancing for wages, salaries, social contributions, and capital investments. Central govern-
ment funding allocation is not based on any formula or criteria, but on the sole judgment 
of the central government ofﬁcials. The remaining share of funding is provided by two 
sources of local government, a general transfer received from the center, as well as own 
revenues. Own revenues are insufﬁcient for the many local needs to be addressed, other 
than education. 
The central government has also exercised strong control of the education infrastructure, 
human resources, supervision, and school planning. Thus, local governments and schools do 
not have any say in how to spend the allocated resources. This calls for substantial changes 
in responsibility sharing, ﬁnancing schemes, and managerial autonomy. More speciﬁcally, 
school operation and maintenance, which are already exercised as a local government func-
tion, should be based on national standards, to ensure that students located in every area 
of the country receive the same minimum level of service. The allocation of funds should 
be based on the criteria aligned with these national standards. The pool for education 
investments should be determined based on situation analysis and education standards, 
or linked to speciﬁc national tax revenue sources. It should then be allocated by formula or 
investment proposals—their ranking based on the predeﬁned criteria and involving local 
government representatives in the proposal selection process.
The Ministry of Education (MoE) has developed a national education strategy which aims 
to improve the quality standards in education, increase education funding, and decentralize 
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education functions. Speciﬁc measures which require additional ﬁnancing include school 
investments, training of administrators and teachers, reducing student–teacher ratios, 
increasing teachers’ salaries, etc. This ambitious plan calls for a careful examination of educa-
tion policies, past and present patterns of educational ﬁnance, and overall performance of 
the system in order to assess the sustainability of the reform. The ﬁrst step was taken in 
the 2005 budget by providing sources for investment funds for schools in the larger cities 
and regions. However, more needs to be done, including the development of criteria for 
investment funding allocation and devolving more responsibilities to local government for 
school management. This will increase the transparency, equity, effectiveness, and efﬁciency 
of the national budget for education. 
26
P U B L I C  M O N E Y  F O R  P U B L I C  S C H O O L S
INTRODUCTION 
General Background
Modernizing education is essential in the transition to a market economy, and is particu-
larly important to social and economic development in Albania, where more than 45 
percent of the population is of school age. It also has been a challenge as Albania departed 
in 1990 from a communist system, which had fallen short of responding to changing 
economic structures, to an increasing labor market demand for new skills. 
The failure of the previous economic system was best reﬂected in the drastic decline 
in the demand for vocational education. While in 1990, when around 72 percent of the 
total student body were enrolled in vocational schools, one year later this dropped to 21 
percent, and in the following years many of these schools were closed or restructured 
into general secondary schools (Table 1).1
Table 1.
Student Enrollment in General and Vocational Secondary Education
School Year  Secondary 
Education 
Total
General Secondary Education  Vocational Education and Training
Number Percent Number Percent
1990–1991 205,774 57,589 28 148,185 72
1995–1996 89,895 71,391 79 18,504 21
1999–2000 102,971 88,470 86 14,501 14
2000–2001 107,435 90,960 85 16,475 15
2001–2002 117,623 99,006 84 18,617 16
2002–2003 126,652 106,361 84 20,291 16
2003–2004 134,702 112,793 84 21,909 16
OECD — — 48.3 — 51.7
Enrollment in primary and secondary education saw a dramatic decrease during 
the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the transition. Secondary education enrollment decreased by 56 
percent between 1990 and 1995. Starting in 1999, the trend continued, however, only 
for primary education, mainly as a result of demographic changes (Table 2). However, 
for secondary school education, the trend reversed, given the restructuring of vocational 
schools into general secondary schools, as explained above. 
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Table 2.
Public Education: Changes in Student, Teacher, and School Numbers, 
2001–2004 by Percent
Education 
Levels
2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 
Students Teachers Schools Students Teachers Schools Students Teachers Schools
Pre-primary –2.18 –5.39 –7.49 –3.21 –0.06 –8.75 –0.54 –0.06 –0.71
Primary –2.15 –2.29 –1.21 –3.77 –2.97 –3.00 –2.47 –2.39 –1.32
Secondary 9.48 –0.69 0.54 7.68 2.40 –2.40 6.36 4.71 2.19
Total 0.27 –3.94 –4.05 –2.52 –0.24 –5.59 –0.68 –1.02 –0.71
The main provider of primary and secondary education remains the government. 
In the academic year 2004–05, there were 689,215 students in the public system, as 
compared to only 27,989 in private schools. However, in terms of changing tenden-
cies, the number of students attending private schools is going up at rates between nine 
percent and 88 percent, despite high fees charged by private schools, and a general sense 
that public schools provide better education (see Table 3).
Table 3. 
Student Numbers in Private Schools and Growth Rates
Academic Year 1997–1998 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
No. of students 1,311 10,605 14,952 18,060 25,450 27,989
Growth rate 88 29 17 29 9 9
Source: Education Sector Public Expenditure Review, The World Bank.
The education system of Albania is organized into four levels:
 1) Preschool (non-compulsory) education for children three to six years old.
 2) Primary (compulsory) education for children six to 14 years old, organized into 
two cycles (lower for ages six to 10, and upper for ages 10 to 14). Beginning in 
2004, compulsory primary education was extended to nine years.
 3) Secondary education, which includes two types of education: general and 
vocational. Graduates from four-year general secondary education are eligible 
for university education. The vocational schools oﬀer two types of programs: 
a three-year course that prepares qualiﬁed workers, as well as a ﬁve-year one 
that prepares technicians (managers). Only the graduates from the managerial 
track of vocational education can be admitted further into tertiary education 
programs. 
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 4) Tertiary education can be undertaken by students who graduated from general 
secondary schools or vocational schools of the second level. 
A few technical schools provide so-called secondary social and cultural education, 
which includes foreign languages, ﬁne arts, music, sports, and pedagogy. These are, 
however, only a few schools in the country, mainly a hold-over of the previous four-year 
secondary education system.
Enrollment is free of charge for primary, general secondary education, and 
some vocational schools. In some vocational schools students are selected through 
competition. 
The Status of Education Functions and Responsibilities
Responsibilities in the pre-university education are deﬁned by: 
 • the Law on Pre-university Education, which provides equal rights to all Albanian 
citizens for accessing education at all levels, and describes the primary and general 
secondary education system;
 • the Law on Secondary Vocational Education and Training, which supports the 
development of a common educational system in response to social, economic, 
and technological changes, and labor market needs. The law provides for the 
right to receive lifelong education and training;
 • government decrees and regulations that support the implementation of the 
above laws.
The main institutions responsible for the system of education are at the central level 
the Ministry of Education (MoE), Regional Directorates of Education (RDE) in 12 
regions and in Tirana, District Oﬃces for Education (DOE) in 25 districts,2 as well as 
four agencies subordinated to Ministry of Education.3 The RDE and DOE are decon-
centrated oﬃces of the Ministry. Local governments are also involved in the delivery of 
some functions within the system (maintenance). 
The 1998 Law on Pre-university Education deﬁnes education as the sole responsibility 
of the central government. At the same time, the additional Law on Local Governments, 
adopted in 2000, deﬁnes pre-university education as a shared responsibility between local 
and central governments, and created confusion over the allocation of responsibilities. In 
an attempt to clarify this and speed up the decentralization process, a National Strategy 
for Pre-university Education Development was adopted in June 2004. This mandates the 
MoE, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), and the Ministry of Interior (MoI), to clarify the 
transfer of education responsibilities from central government to the local governments. 
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Little has been done in this regard, however. The provision of education remains highly 
centralized, with its confused ﬁnancing schemes, as described below. 
The only function fully decentralized to local governments is school operation and 
maintenance. The property rights, however, have not been transferred to local govern-
ments. Given the fact that own revenues are insuﬃcient to ﬁnance maintenance, local 
governments use part of a general transfer (allocated through a formula). The remaining 
responsibilities are delegated and are ﬁnanced annually through categorical grants 
provided for in the annual state budget law. 
In Tirana in 2004, based on the national strategy for education, the central govern-
ment piloted the transfer of ﬁnancial competences to local governments. This process 
proved successful, despite the fact that the city had management capacity problems. 
Using the experiences of the pilot program, the central government extended, in 2005, 
the ﬁnancial competences further to the Regional Directorates of Education and munici-
palities. As for smaller cities across the region, the responsibility was taken over by the 
Regional Directorates of Education. The MoE retained the responsibility to develop 
national standards for education expected to ensure quality in school operation and 
maintenance. The results of the past two years show that the delegation of the responsi-
bility should have been preceded by an eﬀort to build the capacity of local governments 
in order to increase the rate of success. However, even if the context was imperfect, the 
exercise provided a good opportunity to distinguish between the content of education, 
now driven by the deconcentrated units of the MoE, and the ﬁnancial management of 
education, which remained the responsibility of local governments. 
Personnel policies remain fully centralized and are exercised by the deconcentrated 
Regional Directorates of Education. These units decide on the number of teachers and 
also hire and dismiss school directors, teachers, and other non-teaching staﬀ. Local 
governments are simply the paymasters of the wages and salaries for schools,4 while 
the level of salaries is deﬁned by the central government. The Regional Directorates of 
Education inspect and monitor school performance within the region. 
Regarding the school network, there are no national standards, either for the size 
of a school or the establishment or closure of schools. This is made on a case-by-case 
basis by the Regional Directorates of Education, based on their assessment of local 
demographic developments. 
Schools have no authority or discretion over the budget. The only role they play 
is the submission of their budget requests in the early stages of the budget process, and 
later lobbying or unoﬃcially negotiating with local governments and Regional 
Directorates of Education in order to obtain needed funds. This situation reduces 
the participation of the communities in the governance of education, while limiting 
the involvement of schools boards in minor issues, most often with no impact on the 
quality of education.
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In conclusion, the slow progress of education decentralization in the last decade 
shows that the beneﬁts of decentralization were accepted mainly in principle. Most of 
the functions still belong to the central government. One lesson from the devolution 
of investment expenditures is that the transfer of education responsibilities should 
be done asymmetrically, respecting the diﬀerences in size and capacity among local 
governments. 
FINANCING PRE-UNIVERSITY EDUCATION 
Financing Arrangements in Education
Government spending on education depends on the country’s spending capacity, total 
public spending, the size of the education sector, and the type and cost of resources 
used for the education. During its transition towards a market economy, Albania has 
shown a ﬂuctuating evolution in its education expenditures. 
Table 4.
Share of Pre-primary, Primary, and Secondary Education to GDP (in millions of ALL)
Items 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Adjusted 
2004 Budget
Percent of GDP 2.43 2.32 2.34 2.05 2.15 2.35
Pre-primary and Basic 2.34 2.27 2.28 1.64 1.60 1.80
Secondary (General) 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.27 0.30 0.40
Secondary (Vocational) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.23 0.14
Training 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the MoF.
At the beginning of the transition (1989), primary and secondary education expen-
ditures were four percent of GDP. The ratio fell dramatically to 2.8 percent at the end of 
1998, and further to 2.05 percent in 2002. Constantly lower than the OECD average 
of 5.4 percent, these ﬁgures led experts to the conclusion that education in Albania is 
treated as a “luxury good” (Palomba and Vodopivec 2001).5 
Generally, the transition to a market economy substantially reduces the involve-
ment of the state in the private market, while it increases its role in the social sectors. 
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Education was an exception to this rule in Albania. Unlike other sectors, education 
expenditures, as a share of the total public spending, increased by only one percent 
between 1999 and 2004, with the exception of 2002, when the level of expenditures 
fell below that of 2000 (Table 5). 
Table 5.
Pre-university Education as a Percent of Public Spending
Pre-university Education as a 
Percent of Public Spending
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Adjusted 
2004 Budget
General Government Spending 
(in mil. ALL)
165,692 170,620 186,049 192,517 201,152 240,360
Percent of Public Spending, 
of which:
7.16 7.51 7.69 7.22 7.95 8.18
Pre-primary and Basic 6.89 7.33 7.49 5.77 5.93 6.26
Secondary (General) 0.23 0.15 0.18 0.95 1.13 1.38
Secondary (Vocational) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.45 0.84 0.48
Training 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the MoF.
The level of spending per student in nominal terms increased as a result of the 
decreased enrollments but remained low compared to other countries (Table 6). 
Table 6.
Spending per Student in 2003
Indicators Spending per Student (ALL)
Minimum 16,313
Maximum 46,441
Average 27,030
Standard Deviation 7,150
Coefficient of Variation (Percent) 26.45
Sources of funding for education pre-university education remain highly centralized, 
with funding provided mainly by the central government. 
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Table 7.
Financing Sources in Pre-university Education (Percent)
2001 2002 2003
Pre-primary, Primary, and Secondary Education, 
of which:
100.00 100.00 100.00
Earmarked transfer from the central government 88.45 91.23 92.15
Own local government revenues 0.14 0.70 2.39
General transfer from the central government 11.41 8.06 5.47
The earmarked transfer in education funding is spent by the central government on 
school investments, salaries, and social contributions. The general transfer is an uncon-
ditional grant used by local governments to fund school operation and maintenance. 
Table 8.
Structure of Total Education Expenditures by Budget Categories 
(ALL and Percentage of Each Item of Total Expenditures/Year)
Wages and Social 
Security Contribution
Operating and 
Maintenance
Investments Total Education 
Expenditures
2002 12,066,175 498,176 1,329,801 13,894,151
86.84% 3.59% 9.57% 100%
2003 12,947,901 602,748 2,433,800 15,984,449
81.00% 3.77% 15.23% 100%
Adjusted 2004 14,144,850 726,000 4,787,000 19,657,850
71.96% 3.69% 24.35% 100%
Education expenditures are heavily biased towards wages, which is typical of countries 
in transition. About 80 percent of the education budget is generally spent on salaries, 
around three percent on operating and maintenance, while a higher 10–20 percent are 
funds for investments. 
A more detailed picture by level of education is shown below:
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Table 9.
Structure of Education Expenditures by Budget Categories: 
Pre-primary and Primary Education
2002 2003 Adjusted 2004 
Wages and Social Security 9,836,114 10,302,331 15,036,000
Operating and Maintenance 251,332 218,753 11,330,000
Investments 1,012,072 1,405,741 306,000
Total 11,099,517 11,926,826 3,400,000
Table 10.
Structure of Education Expenditures by Budget Categories: Secondary (General)
2002 2003 Adjusted 2004 
Wages andSocial Security 1,600,006 1,920,960 2,020,000
Operating and Maintenance 30,060 40,850 40,000
Investments 204,308 307,679 1,250,000
Total 1,834,373 2,269,489 3,310,000
Table 11.
 Structure of Education Expenditures by Budget Categories: Secondary (Vocational)
2002 2003 Adjusted 2004 
Wages and Social Security 602,041 696,344 763,000
Operating and Maintenance 159,213 274,364 260,000
Investments 113,401 720,208 137,000
Total 874,656 1,690,916 1,160,000
Table 12. 
Structure of Education Expenditures by Budget Categories: Training
2002 2003 Adjusted 2004 
Wages and Social Security 28,014 28,265 31,850
Operating and Maintenance 57,571 68,781 120,000
Investments 20 172 0
Total 85,605 97,218 151,850
34
P U B L I C  M O N E Y  F O R  P U B L I C  S C H O O L S
The criteria for the allocation of funds from each category vary depending upon 
each speciﬁc budget category and will thus be described separately. As a general rule, 
the central government allocates the funds through categorical grants without using 
cost standards or any other allocation criteria in the process. 
Investments
Looking at the overall trends in investment expenditures, it is diﬃcult to identify the 
main direction of the investment ﬁnancing policy in Albania. Capital expenditures are 
increasing and the growth rates are signiﬁcant (around 50 percent per year). While 
primary and secondary schools receive increasingly larger investment budgets, the 
funds for vocational schools are decreasing signiﬁcantly. In 2004, the capital spending 
of vocational secondary education declined by 80 percent. 
Initially, the decision for both the level and allocation of investment funds stood 
with the MoE. In the early stages of the budget process, local governments submitted a 
proposal for school investment needs within their localities. Accordingly, they summa-
rized the existing requests and submitted a ﬁnal list to the MoE. The MoE centralized 
all the lists, and then submitted and negotiated the ﬁnal proposed amount with the 
MoF. Once the budget law was adopted, the Ministry of Finance sent the investment 
appropriations to the Ministry of Education, which ﬁnally allocated it to speciﬁc proj-
ects. Upon budget approval, the list of individual projects to be ﬁnanced across the 
country was prepared. Finally, the list of allocations for speciﬁc schools was sent to the 
Regional Directorates of Education; these started the bidding and selection process of 
the company to undertake the works. 
In 2006, the MoE changed the investment policy, aligning it closer with local needs 
and priorities. A decentralized system was put in place, where the MoE allocates invest-
ment funds to municipalities. The investment pool was thus divided into very small 
pieces, which precipitated the emergence of political pressure to ensure that every munici-
pality received some part of the pie, regardless of their size. This has also narrowed down 
the range of capital works to be undertaken, in some cases to just minor repairs. 
In 2007, the Ministry of Finance again changed its approach, and switched to a 
system of competitive grants. The new system is based on the idea that municipalities 
submit investment projects to a competitive selection process by the central government. 
Only the best projects would then be selected for funding. The system was introduced 
to cover all sectors, not just education. The Ministry of Finance has also imposed a 
uniform set of general criteria for the selection of investment projects. Those criteria are 
not suitable for education, and the Ministry of Finance had a hard time applying them. 
In 2007, however, the process ended up with a small number of substantial projects, 
rather than hundreds of minor-repair projects, as in 2006. 
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The current allocation of investment funds creates large disparities among districts. 
Indicators calculated for 2003 show that the allocation of investments does not follow the 
number of students enrolled by districts. A comparison between the share of students by 
district with the share of investments shows that there are big diﬀerences among them. 
The maximum for those who received less than their students share is –5.85 percent 
and the maximum for those who received more is 2.58 percent. Twenty-one districts 
received higher funding as compared to what they should have received according to 
the number of students. Sixteen districts were allocated less funds as compared to their 
entitled amounts given the number of students served. Even if the percentages look 
small, they are very high if we consider that the highest share of students (11 percent) 
is in but one district while the other largest districts have less than 6.3 percent of the 
total number of students. 
During 2002–2004, total spending on education in Albania and the relative share 
of investments to total spending increased (Table 6). The increase of the share of invest-
ments is also a result of foreign ﬁnancing. In various years, donors have provided up to 
40 percent of total public investment expenditures for education. Thus, international 
donors have played an important role in redirecting the national priorities in Albanian 
education. 
Among diﬀerent levels of education, there is no regularity in the share of invest-
ments and recurrent expenditures. Investment spending in Albania only appears to be 
concentrated on primary education but, in fact, investment at this level has not been a 
priority for Albanian authorities. During 2002–2004 the share of investments ﬂuctu-
ated between 76 percent to 58 percent. Moreover, the share of investments for primary 
education in 2004 is lower than in 2002. 
Teachers Salaries and Social Security Contributions
True decentralization implies that local governments have the authority to hire and 
dismiss school staﬀ within national professional requirements for diﬀerent categories 
of teachers. In practice, however, because funding for salaries is generally large, and 
impacts the whole economy, it usually remains centralized or is delegated to local 
governments. 
Regardless of the degree of decentralization of the function, what is important is 
the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of its use. In case it remains centralized, the function 
should be delegated based on speciﬁc rules, which means that, at a minimum, local 
governments should be compensated for the costs incurred from the service. The central 
government can control and decide the level of salaries by teachers’ categories, but local 
governments should be allowed to make allocations among the education expenditure 
items. Another incentive could be the inclusion of salaries in a general transfer pool, 
which allows more local government discretion over spending.
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The Albanian education sector is supportive of these good practices, but the central 
government retains the responsibility on wages. Local governments are simply the 
paymasters, holding no authority for the hiring or dismissing of teachers. The admin-
istrative cost for local governments is not compensated by the central government. 
Salaries are calculated on the basis of actual employment levels in schools and on 
average salaries (by education level) for each municipality. Funds for salaries are then sent 
as a categorical grant to municipalities, who pay the school staﬀ, but are not recorded 
either as revenues or expenditures of local governments, though they do appear in 
municipal treasury accounts. There is also a small fraction of wage expenditures that is 
covered by the local governments. This is mainly due to the employment of an additional 
guard or cleaner in some of the schools.6 
The main problem of the underfunding of salaries remains. The salary of a primary 
school teacher with 15 years of service is about 10 percent below the public sector 
average. There is low variation in the pay among teachers. Quality is measured by the 
years of experience only, the highest category having over 25 years’ experience. On the 
other hand, there is a bonus of up to 30 percent for teachers as an incentive to work in 
rural areas. This bonus has contributed to retaining staﬀ living in or close to rural areas, 
but has not attracted young and qualiﬁed teachers to those regions. Another indicator 
of the low level of teacher salaries is their share of total expenditures (Table 8). 
The compensation of education staﬀ in Albania accounts for the largest share of 
recurrent expenditures. In 2002–2004, 95–96 percent of recurrent spending went to 
wages and social contributions (Table 6). The other four to ﬁve percent was divided 
moderately among utilities, maintenance, teaching materials, scholarships, etc. Also 
included are welfare services, which really belong to social protection and not education. 
They absorb, on average, over one-ﬁfth of non-staﬀ resources.
The proportion of current expenditures going to salaries is much higher in Albania 
than elsewhere. The high share spent on wages is related to a very “tight” educational 
budget and not to broad economic ineﬃciencies. As mentioned above, the number 
of teachers is based on rates determined by the MoE, not on the analysis of diﬀerent 
conditions across the country. Taking into consideration the salary level of teachers, 
which is lower than other civil servants, and relatively high student–teacher ratios, we 
can conclude that the Albanian education sector is subject to severe budget constraints. 
The latter can be explained by the low share of non-staﬀ spending. Inadequate ﬁnancing 
has forced administrators to reduce spending on “not immediately necessary” items like 
maintenance, utilities, and teaching materials. This strange budget rule has damaged 
the quality of education, because within goods and services the priority should be given 
to utility bills and small repairs. 
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Maintenance 
Most of Albania’s school structures date back to the 1960s and 1970s in urban areas 
and to the 1970s and 1980s in rural areas. Although schools in rural areas were built 
later, they were equipped with fewer gymnasiums and laboratories, and many lack even 
bathrooms. In urban areas, the situation is diﬀerent because their facilities are somewhat 
better. Many physical facilities in Albanian education are in urgent need of reconstruc-
tion and maintenance. Many schools also lack primary services—and when provided, 
they are often of poor quality. 
Maintenance is an important education expenditure item. In Albania, by law, mainte-
nance is a shared responsibility. The deconcentrated oﬃces of the Ministry of Education, 
the Regional Directorates, ﬁnance the acquisition of furniture, teaching materials, and 
student transportation. Local governments cover the ﬁnancing of heating, electricity, 
telecommunications, water, waste disposal, cleaning, minor repairs, and painting. 
Funding for this function by local governments is ensured through the general 
transfer made from the central government. This unconditional grant is allocated to 
municipalities on the basis of three criteria: population (70 percent), surface area (15 
percent), and urban population (15 percent). Local governments have the necessary but 
diﬃcult decision as to how they divide the grants among local priorities. But because 
local governments do not have property rights for the schools, there is no incentive for 
them to invest in maintenance, which means that often they only allocate a minimum 
budget, just enough to keep the school open. Obviously, this is insuﬃcient for an envi-
ronment nurturing quality education. Albania spends typically less than four percent 
on maintenance (see Table 8), which is almost ﬁve times less than the OECD average 
(over 19 percent). 
Some researchers argue that a tight education budget not only transfers the cost to 
future generations, but is likely to cost the current generation as well. This is supported 
by the argument that reducing the government commitment to ﬁnancing education 
has often led to the increase of private coverage of educational costs. Thus, lower public 
ﬁnancing usually implies shifting costs to families. In Albania, this is manifested in the 
high growth of private education during 2002–2004, though not by its share of total 
education, which remains low due to the low level of income and lack of direct support 
from the government. 
In conclusion, the ﬁnancing system lacks an overall strategic vision and includes 
several ﬁnancing mechanisms that are not coherently linked with each other. Central 
government ﬁnancing does not provide any incentives for local governments and schools 
to save or spend eﬃciently. Local government funding exists but is insuﬃcient. Overall, 
local governments and schools have a reduced role in the management of their own 
budgets. 
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Private Funding 
Increasing demand for private education would suggest dissatisfaction with the free 
public sector schools, a particularly important factor in transition economies. Albania 
is no exception. Since private schools operate as private businesses, they do not receive 
state funding; however, based mainly on the fees they charge (fees established at market 
rates), private education displays growth rates of up to 40 percent in terms of student 
enrollment, totaling more than three percent of the total number of students in Albania 
in 2003. 
Table 13.
 Private Education, Changes in Student, Teacher, and School Numbers, 2001–2004 
Education 
Levels
2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 
Students Teachers Schools Students Teachers Schools Students Teachers Schools
Pre-primary 75.96 66.37 82.76 10.18 9.57 15.09 15.89 11.65 39.34
Primary 30.23 64.89 50.00 24.84 33.06 20.37 40.95 26.06 36.92
Secondary 40.91 34.2 68.42 21.42 21.67 18.75 59.42 37.29 34.21
Total 40.99 52.75 65.48 20.79 25.50 17.99 40.92 28.03 37.20
The development of private education alternatives has the advantage to rapidly adapt 
to the needs of students and is an opportunity to broaden consumer choice. Private 
schools can initiate and increase the pressure on government for innovating curricula 
or make better use of teachers and provide them with better conditions. In Albania, 
the competition in education between private and public schools is still in its infancy, 
and thus there is little space for improving the quality of education. An example is 
the preparation and printing of textbooks used in private schools, which are now the 
responsibility of the MoE. The schools cannot even inﬂuence the quality of the books 
they will buy for their students, because of the ministry’s elusive standards and rules. 
THE EXISTING FAMEWORK FOR EDUCATION FINANCING
The Impact of Financing on the Quality of Education 
In the long term, decentralization tends to beneﬁt the quality of education, and most 
western European countries involve local governments in the provision of this service 
to a signiﬁcant degree. 
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A thorough analysis of education in Albania shows that that the central government 
is still at the beginning of its eﬀorts to decentralize the sector. Local governments, 
however, seem to be ready to become a more important participant in education, 
judging by the increasing level of own revenues allocated to this sector, up from 0.14 
percent in 2002 to 2.39 percent in 2004. Not only do they allocate more within the 
responsibilities they are assigned, but in some cases, they are also using their own 
revenues to ﬁnance functions that are still managed by the central government, such 
as school investments.7
School operation and maintenance is the only function fully decentralized to local 
governments. Because maintenance is ﬁnanced through a general transfer, local govern-
ments can now freely decide on what and how much to spend. Frequently, smaller local 
governments have nothing left to allocate to maintenance. This does not exclude, at 
the same time, positive experiences after the decentralization of the function. Some 
larger local governments not only allocated more to maintenance, but also introduced 
innovations in the process of the assessment and prioritization of maintenance needs. 
For example, some included in the assessment a survey of parental satisfaction.8 With 
the involvement of the stakeholders, local oﬃcials made decisions that eventually led 
to a more eﬃcient use of the sources for school maintenance. 
The deﬁnition of the transfer pool through a percentage of local taxes collected 
creates a problem for small cities which have less buoyant tax bases. Such areas are in a 
rather constrained ﬁnancial situation, where they need to allocate less funds to expensive 
public services. This frequently forces them to reduce operating and maintenance costs 
which, in turn, leads to a faster deterioration of the school infrastructure. The Ministry 
of Finance has improved the allocations for secondary schools through RDE (teaching 
equipment, school furniture), but has no ﬁscal instruments to motivate local govern-
ments to increase their share of education funding. 
Unfortunately, the centralized ﬁnancing schemes do not involve school management 
in the process. The director has the sole responsibility to manage the teaching process. 
Schools do not have any budget authority, so they cannot play any role in providing better 
teaching conditions, materials, or methods. 
Low and centrally controlled salary levels do not promote the quality of education. 
Local governments have no incentive to attract and retain good teachers, given that the 
level of their salaries is outside their authority. Additionally, there is no bonus policy 
left at the discretion of local governments to reward good performance, which could 
support local governments in attracting and retaining good teachers. 
Declining student enrollment was not matched by a similar decrease in the number 
of teachers. One cause is the incremental budgeting approach used to ﬁnance educa-
tion. This is focused more on inputs (hours of teaching) rather than outputs (results). 
In such a system, the opportunity is missed to support real competition among schools 
and deliver higher-quality teaching. 
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In the larger cities there are more chances for increasing competition among schools, 
and thus strengthening parents’ choices. The coexistence of private and state schools 
is an opportunity for competition in more developed areas. However, the number of 
private schools is still low and parents’ choices relies upon their level of income. In the 
future, this could be an area worth considering for an alteration in state policies regarding 
support for private education. One aspect for consideration might be the provision of 
subsidies for private schools based on the cost per student.
An educational system in which salaries are low and falling, and working conditions 
unattractive, cannot be sustainable in the long term. Teachers are aging, the number 
of qualiﬁed teachers in rural areas is declining, and the low salary level has diminished 
teachers’ morale. All of these trends call for substantial changes in the education 
ﬁnancing system through the local governments’ involvement and a more motivated 
school management. 
Equity in the Allocation of Education Funding
A funding system is equitable if it deals with disparities in cost and income. First, the 
cost of providing education varies across schools, depending on factors such as the class 
size, geographic location, ethnicity, and special education needs. Equitable ﬁnancing 
may involve higher per-student allocation for students in rural schools with smaller 
classes, for example. Second, income is an issue because local government revenues are 
a marginal resource for education. Because state funding remains a dominant source of 
income, through direct expenditure or intergovernmental transfers, the way in which 
its contribution is distributed is fundamental to equity.
The Albanian funding system uses historic costs and incremental adjustments. 
Clearly, this system cannot ensure equity in the distribution of funds for education. 
Another aspect of inequality in the system is the variation in providing services. 
New schools built mostly in larger towns and cities have sports facilities, libraries, or 
oﬀer extracurricular activities. Old schools usually do not oﬀer such facilities, and in 
rural areas extracurricular activities are very limited. 
In regards to school operation and maintenance, variations in the services provided 
among regions are a natural consequence of decentralization without a concrete set of 
standards. The absence of national standards forces local governments to provide the 
service according to their priorities. This would not be a constraint if they had enough 
resources. However, as described above, school maintenance is low on the list of local 
priorities. Additionally, with no property rights over school facilities, local governments have 
little incentive to be motivated and responsible for maintaining education facilities. 
Inequalities in funding should be considered an important issue in the process of 
decentralizing school responsibilities. The transfer of responsibilities should be followed 
by adequate and transparent school ﬁnancing schemes. As mentioned above, the general 
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transfer pool’s determination and distribution variables do not take into account the 
special needs of diﬀerent geographic areas. Thus, the decentralization and delegation of 
current functions in education are based on the principles of shifting the administrative 
burden from central to local governments.
Efﬁciency in the Allocation and Use of Education Resources 
The economic idea of eﬃciency represents the ratio between what is brought and invested 
into the system, and its results. This concept, however, must be redeﬁned in the area 
of education. A more eﬃcient redirection of the existing sources of ﬁnancing, and the 
expectation of educational institutions to provide greater value for money, represent 
the reality of the majority of the modern education systems. An education system may 
be called “eﬃcient” if it attains the maximum level of results using a minimum level 
of resources. 
From this point of view, a distinction should be made between internal and external 
eﬃciency. Internal eﬃciency looks at student–teacher ratios and dropout rates, while 
external eﬃciency refers to the education outcomes as they are produced by given educa-
tion resources (or less education resources are used in producing the same amount of 
education outcomes). 
Internal Eﬃciency 
The main question, when discussing internal eﬃciency, is how good is the system in 
retaining the students in the schools once they enroll. In Albania, the student–teacher 
ratio has been decreasing, from 20.22 in 1990, to19.56 in 2003. These changes, however, 
are not policy driven but the consequence of an important internal population migra-
tion from the rural to the urban areas, and from the northern part of the country to 
the south. 
The migration dramatically aﬀected student enrollment which, subsequently, aﬀected 
the student–teacher ratios. Between 2004 and 2007, the number of primary school 
students fell by nearly 10 percent. More than 16 percent of the total decrease in school 
enrollment occurred in rural schools. In some regions, the decline was much higher, 
such as the rural schools in the Diber and Tirana areas, where one in four students 
left the school. On the contrary, the student population in the urban schools in those 
regions grew by more than half.9 
The initial result was overcrowding in schools and an increase in class sizes above 
accepted OECD ratios. The average class size for primary education in Albania is still in 
line with OECD average of 21.9. The average class size, however, for secondary education 
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is 35, which is well above the OECD ratio of 24. There is also signiﬁcant variation due 
to migration patterns. For primary schools, the average class size at the level of regions 
varies from 16 students to 33 students. For secondary schools, this variation is from 29 
students to over 40 students.10 
Table 14. 
Student–teacher Ratios
Education Levels School Year OECD 
2003–04
1990–91 1997–98 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04
Public Education
Pre-university Total 20.22 18.36 19.11 19.95 19.50 19.56 n/a
Pre-primary 22.95 19.54 21.46 22.18 21.49 21.38 15.50
Primary 19.34 18.58 18.90 18.93 18.77 18.76 16.30
Secondary 21.22 16.48 18.65 20.56 21.62 21.96 13.90
Private Education 
Pre-university Total  7.05 12.95 11.95 11.50 12.66  
Pre-primary  4.44 16.35 17.29 17.38 18.04  
Primary  7.02 15.78 12.47 11.70 13.08  
Secondary  24.15 8.55 8.98 8.96 10.41  
The limited number of students in rural schools has made it impossible to increase 
the class size by combining classes. In rural areas, there are also other speciﬁc factors 
that impede class consolidation, such as large distances between villages, poor school 
infrastructure, and unsuitable transportation. Under these circumstances, the ability 
to reduce the costs in the rural areas  is severely constrained. On the contrary, in urban 
areas, over half of primary schools and close to 30 percent of upper secondary schools 
operate with multiple shifts, compared with only 20 percent of rural schools who use 
shifts. This suggests an intensive use of physical resources and lower per-student costs.
School size is another indicator of how eﬃciently schools adjusted to reduced enroll-
ment in the 1990s. Small schools—in some cases with just one class per grade—have 
classes below the norm in size and, in some cases, adopt multi-grade teaching, which is 
appropriate for the ﬁrst cycle of primary education. Pre-primary schools are smallest, 
both in number of students and number of classes, ranging from an average two to 
four classes per urban school, to just one class in rural schools. Primary schools tend to 
be larger, about twice the size of secondary schools. The average school size also varies 
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greatly across districts, with schools in the rural north and south being much smaller 
than elsewhere in the country.
Although the number of students has fallen, the average school size has not signiﬁ-
cantly changed—except for rural and secondary schools, which have fewer classes. 
Secondary schools in the rural areas with only one class per grade allow few eﬃciency 
improvements from combining classes. Moreover, they are expected to have future 
reductions in enrollment, which will reduce the student–teacher ratio and increase 
costs per student. 
External Eﬃciency
The current Albanian school system does not have mechanisms to control spending in 
schools. First, because both school directors and local governments have practically no 
ﬁnancial authority, they do not make any relevant contribution in the eﬃcient use of 
resources. The involvement of management and teachers in developing national and local 
policies and allocations is occasional and comes only in the form of sharing experiences 
or debating in oﬃcial forums. 
In regards to population migration and demographic changes, local initiatives may 
have a signiﬁcant impact on external eﬃciency. One workable approach might be the 
mutual cooperation of local government units in sharing school facilities or providing 
other school services. 
Another approach—in terms of ﬁnancing arrangements—could be ﬁnancing the 
local government via block or general grants rather than earmarked funds. Worldwide, 
there has been a move towards this approach.11 It is recognized that ﬁnancing by general 
grants leads to a more eﬃcient use of resources. and requires less in terms of centralized 
supervision of particular tasks. Albania is far behind other countries in this respect, as 
the power of local governments to use resources based on their own priorities in educa-
tion is almost nonexistent: 92 percent of their revenues are earmarked transfers, 5.5 
percent are general transfers, and 2.4 percent are own local revenues. Consequently, 
local governments in Albania are much more dependent upon transfers from the central 
government, and education is subsequently aﬀected. 
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CONCLUSION
Summary of the Strengths and Weaknesses 
of the Overall System for Financing Education
Real resources allocated to education have been decreasing. Tight restrictions on educa-
tion resources have seriously slowed down students’ participation in schools, as well as 
the schools’ capacity to provide quality education. Education spending, as a share of 
GDP, fell to 2.8 percent in 1998, then climbed to a little below 3.1 percent by 2006. 
With this degree of underfunding, higher quality in education is a challenging target. 
Most of the educational functions remain with the central government, while 
most of its ﬁnancing is made primarily through earmarked transfers. The only clear 
decentralization step is the provision of school operation and maintenance services by 
local governments. This is problematic because of the severe underfunding and exces-
sive regional diﬀerences. Some of the causes include: school ownership, which remains 
with the central government, and the weaknesses of the general transfer distributed by 
formula, which is not serving its intended purpose. As a result, in local governments 
with low revenue capacity, the share of the local budget allocated for school operation 
and maintenance is decreasing. 
The ownership of school facilities is another diﬃcult issue. While it has been oﬃcially 
decided that all municipalities will own the facilities of the public schools within their 
territory, the actual transfer of ownership is extremely slow, and most of the facilities 
are still owned by the central government. Moreover, this transfer is restricted to the 
buildings. The land on which school buildings are located will remain the property of 
the republic. This means that after closing a school, the municipality will be unable to 
sell the property.12 
The investment policy has improved gradually in the last three years. However, 
there are still some areas that need improvement: adjusting the criteria for the selection 
of investment projects that would accommodate the needs of the education sector, 
improving the quality of the investment projects, and better controlling the investment 
eﬀorts funded by diﬀerent donors. 
The restructuring of the education sector during the transition to a market economy 
has not addressed the demographic shifts in Albania, which, in turn, aﬀect school 
enrollment. The drop in enrollment reduced the number of teachers, the number of 
classes, and the number of schools, though the reduction in number of teachers was less 
than proportional to the reduction in number of students. The student–teacher ratio 
declined, but only in rural schools. Conversely, in the urban schools, this ratio remains 
much higher than similar ratios in developed economies. We can draw the conclusion 
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that consolidating schools and reducing the number of teachers are two key objectives 
for Albanian schools. Several constraints, such as the geography of the country, poor 
physical infrastructure, and the lack of incentives for local governments and school 
management are serious constraints to contend with. 
Some Recommendations for Improving Education Financing 
No reform of education will ever have an impact unless the level of public spending on 
education increases. Aside from spending more on education, better and clearer priori-
ties should be identiﬁed, such as:
 • The school network should be adjusted in order to cope with demographic 
changes.
 • More ﬁnancing sources should be allocated and spent on non-wage expenditures 
(including maintenance and teacher training) and investments. This is vital to 
increasing the quality of education as a whole. 
 • More education responsibilities should be transferred to local governments 
and schools. The Ministry of Education should be dealing only with education 
development policies and national standards, and should provide adequate 
funding across the country. More discretion on expenditure management should 
be left with the lower administrative levels in education. Decentralization will 
bring decisions closer to the users of education services, thereby better adapting 
allocations to local needs. It will also empower and create a sense of ownership 
among school-level stakeholders, and increase transparency and accountability 
at all levels. 
 • The small size of local governments in Albania suggests that the assignment of 
responsibilities should be done asymmetrically. Except for the large cities, the 
assignment of responsibilities for the remaining local governments should rely 
on the principle of cooperation between cities and regions. The good results 
from previous decentralization attempts show that partnerships work. 
 • The transfer of functions should be coupled with changes in education ﬁnancing 
policies, so that decentralized responsibilities are fully covered ﬁnancially (or at 
a minimum, negotiated with local governments). School operation and main-
tenance should be provided by local governments, based on national standards, 
which should take into account special needs for diﬀerent geographic areas 
and categories of population. Per-student costs should be calculated and used 
in the design of the allocation formula. This method of allocation was already 
introduced in a number of transition countries, such as Serbia, Poland, Hungary, 
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and Macedonia. The allocation to individual schools can be adjusted based on 
speciﬁc local factors such as: diﬃcult climatic conditions, poor environment, 
the existence of small rural schools, etc. The allocation should be made to the 
local governments and the latter should be required to involve school manage-
ment during the budget allocation decision-making. 
 • The allocation of funds to each local government should be made based on 
the criteria which assure the implementation of national standards, to ensure 
equity. 
 • The investment pool and its appropriation should be treated separately from 
recurrent spending, and determined based on clear rules created in consultation 
with local governments. Options to be considered for determining the pool 
for education investments could be: (1) listing priorities based on a situation 
analysis by school categories and geographic areas; (2) listing priorities based on 
the strategy for achieving national education standards; or (3) linked to speciﬁc 
national tax-revenue sources. The distribution could be made by formula or 
investment proposal rankings based on predeﬁned criteria, and involving local 
government representatives in the proposal selection process.
 • Wages and salaries are the largest component in education funding and should 
be treated carefully. In Albania, the allocation should remain with the central 
government, but some marginal powers could be delegated to the local govern-
ments. These powers might include the reallocation of wages and salaries funding 
(within limits), the delegation of authority to local governments for changing 
the number of teachers, and their hiring based on the national professional 
requirements. 
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NOTES
1 This explains the sudden increase in the number of students attending general secondary 
education, from 28 percent in 1990–91 to 79 percent in 1995–96.
2 In fact, there are 37 districts, though for the regional capitals the directorate plays the role 
of the district oﬃce. 
3 Namely, the Institute for Curricula and Standards, the Center for Training and Qualiﬁcations, 
the National Center for Assessment and Examination, and the Accreditation Agency.
4 Funds for salaries are allocated by the MoE through a categorical grant, thus local govern-
ments have no discretion over spending. 
5 Education expenditure as a percentage of GDP for other countries: 7.5 percent for Slovenia; 
5.8 percent for Greece; 4.3 percent for Bulgaria, and 3.6 percent for Macedonia. Source: 
country reports at the conference on education ﬁnance in South Eastern Europe, organized 
by OSI/LGI in Soﬁa, Bulgaria in March 2005.
6 For a more detailed discussion, see Herczyński (2007). 
7 In the case of smaller governments, however, the fact that investments are selected and 
ﬁnanced by the central government continues to be a strong disincentive to local govern-
ments to invest their own resources in the maintenance of capital assets.
8 The assessments were generally ﬁnanced through foreign technical assistance.
9 For a more detailed discussion on internal migration, please see Herczyński (2007).
10 Herczyński (2007).
11 Article 9 of the European Charter of Local Self-government states that, as a general rule, 
block grants are to be preferred to earmarked ones.
12 Based on discussions with an expert of a USAID-funded LDGA project in Tirana. 
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APPENDIX
Table A1.1
Indicators of Spending per Student and Teachers Salaries
Indicators 2002 2003 2004
Spending per student/GDP per capita 0.09 0.10 0.11
Teachers salaries/GDP per capita 0.93 0.91 0.83
Table A1.2
Share of Secondary Education Enrollments to Graduates 
from Primary Education (Percent)
Categories 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Secondary Education Total 61 63 64 66 71
General 50 52 52 55 57
Professional 11 11 12 11 14
Table A1.3
Class Size in 2003–2004 (Student/Classes)
Primary Education Albania OECD
Primary Cycle 22.3 22.1
High Cycle 26.0 23.6
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Executive Summary
National education policy in Bulgaria is formed and implemented by the Ministry of 
Education and Science (MoES) and is supposed to respond to the demands of the economy 
and other sectors of society as well as students themselves. But several areas of education 
need assistance and modernization, including equal access to ensure the integration of 
disadvantaged groups, tightening the gap between the legal and practical spheres of educa-
tion, management of ﬁnancial models, teaching and infrastructure, and the development 
of a new approach involving all the stakeholders in the education system. The Bulgarian 
system is striving to place students at the center of the education system by giving them 
more choices. 
Many goals are within reach and do not require a complete redesign of the education 
system like: updating curricula and new methods of training to develop skills (languages, 
information technology) for application in a rapidly changing workplace; improving the 
structure and effectiveness of the education sector by making more teachers available to 
students and enforcing the obligation to compulsory education; invigorating local schools 
through the decentralization of education management and more opportunities for teacher 
training; and implementing a ﬁnancing policy whereby funds follow the student in a bid to 
eliminate the unfair economic advantages of some economic groups. Despite these achiev-
able goals outlined in MoES policy, Bulgaria faces severe budgetary constraints and hopes 
to design solutions that empower schools without bankrupting its treasury. 
The latest data indicates that Bulgaria has seen a 14-percent fall in the number of primary 
and secondary schools since 1999 as economic restructuring and a declining number of 
students has led to closures across the education system. Schools for children with special 
needs and rural schools have been especially effected, though the mix of general education 
and vocational schools has remained much the same. Despite this trend to integrate and 
close schools, whatever their type, the student–teacher ratio has remained fairly constant, 
at around 13 students per teacher for general education and just under 11 students per 
teacher in vocational institutions. 
Typically, school directors have been appointees of the MoES and its regional inspec-
torates and this has an impact on their efﬁcacy and responsibilities, but a pilot program in 
ten municipalities has appointed school directors through a new body, the school council, 
composed of fewer central government ofﬁcials and more local administrators, teachers, 
and parents. The expansion of this program across Bulgaria is expected for 2009 and school 
directors’ discretion has also been extended to decisions about labor costs, maintenance, 
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teaching hours, speciﬁc salaries, and number of staff—decisions previously made by the 
central government. Own source local funding has also been set aside to improve teachers’ 
salaries and accountability to the local community. Local authorities may also open or close 
a school, while enrollment is subject to the rules of MoES. Curriculum development falls 
into the brief of the Regional Inspectorates, along with oversight, and school ownership 
remains with the central government, but school maintenance is paid by local authorities. 
Who administers what in the Bulgarian education system is not always clear and school 
management is a mismatch of local and central responsibilities that often lead to decisions 
being made without sufﬁcient funding to implement them. 
Bulgaria lags behind other EU countries in terms of education spending as a percentage 
of GDP (3.9 percent compared to 5.1 percent, respectively). Since 2007, Bulgaria uses a 
quasi-voucher, per-pupil expenditure standard that gives schools more leeway in how they 
allocate funds. In addition to the funds received from the budgets of several ministries, they 
may also raise money through rentals, services, and donations to spend at their discretion. 
Central government funds are allocated for salaries, some maintenance, scholarships, and 
capital investments. Further funding is made available through subsidies for teacher remu-
neration, student transport, capital investments, and textbooks for ﬁrst-graders. 
This has been matched by a signiﬁcant change to the budgeting system, whereby the 
budget is delegated to local authorities, and has lead to a more transparent and fairer 
distribution of funds. Nonetheless, Bulgaria lacks a coherent quality-monitoring system, has 
no external evaluation system of students nor schools, does not stress accountability, does 
not encourage competition among schools, has not fostered much in the way of continuing 
teacher training, and still suffers from a poor graduation rate for secondary students.
Fiscal decentralization in 2004 brought about a broad range of government reforms 
aimed at regulating the relationship between the central government and local governments 
in Bulgaria. A Delegated Budget System (DBS) has been implemented in over 30 municipali-
ties, with more slated to join the new program. Within this system, the municipality transfers 
the right to make independent decisions about administration, ﬁnance, and organization 
to the school authorities and they are held accountable for the results of these decisions. 
Local governments, once direct managers, now are coordinators, trainers, and supervisors 
to schools. Within DBS, the municipality and school directors agree on the mechanism of 
allocating resources among schools; schools become secondary budget holders, compile 
their own budgets, and have their own bank accounts; and schools have the authority to 
manage property such as canteens and vacant premises and to raise additional revenue. 
As a consequence, schools have reported better performance, deeper involvement by local 
stakeholders, more transparent funding, better equity, reduced costs and more funds, 
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better efﬁciency, autonomy to purchase innovative teaching supplies, and a better and 
more efﬁcient relationship with the local authority. An assessment of the true impact of 
this budgeting innovation has yet to be in place to answer whether savings are the result 
of poorer service quality or core teaching has been cut to expand business opportunities. 
Despite these positive outcomes of education ﬁnance reform in Bulgaria, some further 
steps are recommended, for example, expanding the pilot programs decentralizing respon-
sibilities to local schools, no matter their type; increasing own revenue sources (like local 
fees and taxes) for municipalities to fund education; and transferring more powers from 
the central to the local level in the areas of re-allocating ﬁnancial transfers from the state 
received on the basis of the costing standard. 
The main conclusions of this chapter support the idea that the results of reform towards 
ﬁscal decentralization indeed will be a clearer distribution of responsibilities between 
different authorities, a more fair allocation of ﬁnancial resources between municipalities, 
and a higher degree of sustainability and stability. At the same time, reforms generate 
new problems, for example, by taking away from the municipalities their power to allocate 
ﬁnancial resources according to local priorities. Also, reform at this stage is unable to stop 
the declining quality of education.
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INTRODUCTION
Principles, Aims, and Priorities of the 
National Education Policy3
National education policy in Bulgaria is formed and implemented by the Ministry 
of Education and Science. Ensuring a high quality of education is a national priority 
that requires the concerted eﬀorts of Bulgarian society. Education policy is responsive 
to changes in the external environment, the needs of the economy, and other sections 
of society. Its ambition is to preserve the traditional values that support the education 
system and, at the same time, encourage its advancement.  
Several principles underpin the process of modernizing Bulgarian education such 
as: equal access to the education system to ensure the integration of all disadvantaged 
groups; quality of education reﬂecting the quality of the legal framework; the manage-
ment and ﬁnancing models; teachers and infrastructure; active partnership between 
all stakeholders like governmental institutions, teachers, parents, trade unions, and 
nongovernmental organizations; competition between schools and the quality of the 
teaching they oﬀer regardless of their form of ownership; and the openness needed to 
transform education into a ﬂexible and forward-looking system responsive to changes 
in the economy and the requirements of the labor market in the EU.
The main policy directions in modernizing Bulgarian education include quality 
education for all, based on the assumption that the education system must preserve 
traditional values while, at the same time, seek to align itself with European and interna-
tional standards. Concurrently, a link should be established between education, science, 
and economic development priorities in Bulgaria. Equally important is long-term 
planning and resourcing to ensure a sustainable development of the education system. 
Nevertheless, focusing on the student is the highest priority; therefore, an important 
goal is to design the educational process in such a way as to teach students the skills 
they will need for professional and personal fulﬁllment. This is, in other words, placing 
the students at the center of the education structure as a way of giving them more ﬂex-
ible choices.
According to the same policy document, in order to achieve the above goals, the 
following measures need to be taken in a few priority areas: 
 • Improve the quality and eﬃciency of the learning process through:
  – Updating curricula;
  – Introducing new methods of training which assign an active role to 
students;
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  – Foreign language learning as a priority;
  – Introducing early computer training and information technology in the 
teaching process at all levels;
  – Introducing modern and objective methods of assessing students at the end 
of each stage and level of education;
  – Making it possible to apply acquired knowledge and skills in a professional 
environment.
 • Improve the structure of the education system through:
  – Linking the constitutional requirement for compulsory education until the 
age of 16 with the respective education level;
  – Allowing choice of specialized or professional education, or entry into the 
labor market after completion of compulsory education;
  – Establishing the transition from one level of education to another, and from 
one school type to another after covering uniform education standards;
  – Designing ﬂexible forms of teaching to limit the number of students who 
drop out early or are not covered by the education system;
  – Promoting and encouraging life-long learning.
 • Develop the education management system through:
  – Regulating the main relations in education by means of legislation;
  – Decentralizing the education management system by delegating to schools 
authority in ﬁnancial matters, human resource management, and innova-
tions in the education process;
  – Developing viable partnerships in school management by granting rights 
and responsibilities to parents and businesses;
  – Ensuring training opportunities for teachers and linking good teaching 
results with moral and ﬁnancial rewards as a means of raising the economic 
and social status of Bulgarian teachers.
 • Link ﬁnancing with the quality of the education product through:
  – Applying a three-component model of ﬁnancing secondary education based 
on uniform standards of maintenance per student, program ﬁnancing, and 
co-ﬁnancing by the school owner;
  – Introducing the principle of the “money follows students” as a means 
of reducing and gradually eliminating the correlation between a family’s 
economic status and access to quality education;
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  – Long-term link between resourcing the system and the quality of educa-
tion;
  – Introducing a system of quality assessment indicators, comparable to the 
system used in the EU, to ensure that the public and the labor market are 
informed about the quality of the education oﬀered by each school.
Changes to School Structures in Recent Years
The Bulgarian education system consists of primary (ﬁrst to fourth grade), pre-secondary 
(ﬁfth to eighth grade), and secondary education (ninth to thirteenth grade). Pertaining 
to the type of education, there are general education and vocational training schools. 
Education is compulsory until the eighth grade and is free in the public schools for all 
13 grades.
Table 1.
Number of Public General Education Schools, Students, and Teachers
School Year Total Schools Teachers Students Student–teacher Ratio
1999–2000 3,011 65,885 887,213 13.47
2000–2001 2,843 63,792 867,354 13.60
2001–2002 2,812 63,261 839,518 13.27
2002–2003 2,720 61,354 825,668 13.46
2003–2004 2,696 60,338 795,919 13.19
2004–2005 2,663 60,099 787,120 13.10
2005–2006 2,635 58,483 778,747 13.32
2006–2007 2,601 56,084 771,505 13.76
In the 2006–2007 school year there were 2,601 public general education schools, or 
14 percent (410 schools) less than the number of 3,011 registered in 1999–2000. Their 
distribution by level of education is determined by the age structure of the students, 
which accounts for the diﬀerences in the levels of education they cover. As Table 2 shows 
for 2006–2007, there were 252 primary schools, 20 pre-secondary, 1,768 medium 
(grades one to eight), and 154 secondary (grades nine to thirteen). Some schools cover 
diﬀerent levels—22 are for students from grades ﬁve to thirteen and 385 from grades 
one to thirteen.
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Table 2.
Public General Education Schools by Type
School Year 1999–
2000
2000–
2001
2001–
2002
2002–
2003
2003–
2004
2004–
2005
2005–
2006
2006–
2007
Total 3,011 2,843 2,812 2,720 2,696 2,663 2,635 2,601
Primary i–iv 438 374 368 321 311 295 277 252
Medium i–viii 1,947 1,845 1,829 1,783 1,778 1,772 1,769 1,768
Pre-secondary v–viii 23 23 22 22 22 21 20 20
Secondary ix–xiii 158 163 160 161 165 162 159 154
Schools v–xiii 47 43 40 34 31 27 25 22
Secondary schools i–xiii 398 395 393 399 389 386 385 385
There were 97 public special schools for children with chronic illnesses and perma-
nent disabilities in 2006–2007, or 49 less compared to the 146 special schools that 
existed in 1999–2000.
Table 3.
Number of Public Special Schools, Students, and Teachers
School Year Total Schools Teachers Students Student–teacher Ratio
1999–2000 146 2,597 15,984 6.2
2000–2001 138 2,268 16,346 7.2
2001–2002 136 2,333 15,631 6.7
2002–2003 132 2,229 15,252 6.8
2003–2004 127 2,079 14,366 6.9
2004–2005 114 2,070 13,530 6.5
2005–2006 108 1,812 12,241 6.8
2006–2007 97 1,628 10,365 6.4
In 2006–2007 the total number of students in the general education school system 
was 771,505, of which 35.8 percent were enrolled in the primary level, 36.9 percent in 
the pre-secondary level and 27.3 percent in the secondary level.
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Table 4.
Students in Public General Education Schools
School Year 1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
Total 887,213 867,354 839,518 825,668 795,919 787,120 778,747 771,505
Primary I–IV 385,288 366,421 341,963 325,885 307,691 298,729 292,662 276,122
Pre-secondary V–VIII 356,938 355,918 348,974 338,912 321,233 301,566 294,260 285,068
Secondary IX–XIII 144,987 145,015 148,581 160,871 166,995 186,825 191,825 210,315
The number of teachers in the general education school system in 2006–2007 was 
56,084 with a 13.8:1 student–teacher ratio compared to a ratio of 13.2:1 in 2003–2004 
and 13.5:1 in the 1999–2000 school year. 
Table 5.
Average Number of Students per Teacher across Stages of Education
School Year Preschool 
Education
Primary Education Pre-secondary 
Education
Secondary 
Education
1999–2000 11.30 16.80 12.10 11.60
2000–2001 11.40 17.70 13.00 11.30
2001–2002 11.40 16.80 12.80 11.70
2002–2003 11.80 17.20 13.30 11.90
2003–2004 11.50 16.80 12.90 12.10
2004–2005 11.77 15.10 11.28 11.77
2005–2006 12.40 15.26 11.40 12.10
2006–2007 12.61 15.30 11.50 12.70
Public vocational training and education is provided by 454 schools distributed as 
follows: 19 applied and ﬁne arts schools; 430 vocational training schools (technicums and 
secondary technical schools); and ﬁve professional schools. The total number of students 
was 197,984 and teachers was 18,893. The student–teacher ratio in 2006–2007 was 
10.5:1 compared to 10.9:1 in 2003–2004 .
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Table 6.
Number of Public Vocational Schools, Students, and Teachers
School Year Total Schools Teachers Students Student–teacher Ratio
1999–2000 545 17,792 192,550 10.8
2000–2001 516 18,006 191,246 10.6
2001–2002 506 18,129 191,328 10.6
2002–2003 504 18,809 202,512 10.8
2003–2004 496 19,362 211,386 10.9
2004–2005 457 18,906 198,765 10.5
2005–2006 443 18,714 196,322 10.5
2006–2007 454 18,893 197,984 10.5
In the 1999–2007 period the number of students fell by 13 percent in the public 
general education schools and rose by three percent in the vocational training schools. A 
similar tendency may be observed for teachers—a 15 percent drop in general education 
and a six percent increase in vocational training. Given the rising number of students 
in vocational schools, there is obviously a process of school integration underway. The 
number of students per vocational school has risen by 20 percent since 1999. The 
vocational schools dedicated to economics, accounting and management; tourism and 
catering; architecture and construction account for the majority of student enrollment 
in vocational schools and are perceived as a good choice for secondary education by 
students and parents alike. This explains, to great extent, the upward trend in enroll-
ment ﬁgures for the last 10 years. 
However, the above changes account for a less favorable student–teacher ratio in 
the general education schools and its preservation, even some improvement, in voca-
tion training.
Schools are divided into public and private by forms of ownership. The public schools 
are state and municipal. The majority of general education schools are municipal while 
the vocational ones are owned by the state. There are, however, exceptions. For example, 
the municipalities own and fund 10 vocational training schools, and the Ministry of 
Education and Science is responsible for six general education ones, of which two are 
secondary general education schools, three are state high schools for the eighth to twelfth 
grades, and one is a middle school. The state schools are mainly under the umbrella of 
the Ministry of Education and Science, but there are also secondary schools under the 
Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the Ministry of Youth 
and Sport. 
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Private education in Bulgaria is a relatively new concept that started to develop in 
1992–1993 when the ﬁrst private general school appeared. In 1994–1995 the ﬁrst private 
vocational and professional schools were established. In 2006–2007 the number of private 
general schools in Bulgaria stood at 60 (2.5 percent) and the students enrolled were only 
0.8 percent of all students. For vocational training these ﬁgures are slightly higher—52 
private vocational schools (10.3 percent) and 1.8 percent of students.
In terms of structure, there has been a stable upward tendency of student enroll-
ment in the private preschool, primary, and middle schools (by 42 percent, 22, and 
21 percent, respectively) and a modest increase in private secondary schools (by 11.1 
percent) over the period 2004–2007. 
Tables 1 to 5 show that the negative demographic processes that are responsible 
for the reduction in the number of students and school closures and that have eﬀected 
general education as well. The worst eﬀected is the municipal education system. As 
can be seen, the period from 1999–2007 has seen the closure of 410 general education 
schools, 361 of them in rural communities. Typically, the closed schools were the only 
ones in the village. Children have no other option but to attend what is referred to as 
“regional schools.” On the one hand, this means that students have to commute or live 
away from their families. On the other hand, they have access to better school facilities 
and more qualiﬁed, competent teachers. 
However, even though students may receive better education, and despite the signiﬁ-
cant number of school buses procured by the Ministry of Education over the last three 
years, ensuring children’s travel on unpaved rural roads is problematic and usually leads 
to the migration of whole families. That is why the closure of rural schools is contrib-
uting to the depopulation of villages. In 2007, such schools were given the statute of 
“protected schools,” providing they meet certain criteria. The protected schools are not 
subject to closure and are funded using a speciﬁc funding allocation standard. In 2007, 
the number of protected village schools was 75.
Allocation of Responsibilities between Central and 
Local Authorities 
The allocation of administrative powers and responsibilities for managing schools can be 
analyzed from the point of view of: staﬀ—payment and qualiﬁcation; schools—opening 
and closing; maintenance; student enrollment; choice of curricula; and oversight and 
monitoring. 
Directors of state schools are appointed by the Minister of Education and Science 
(with the exception of the applied and ﬁne arts schools which are under the Ministry of 
Culture). The directors of municipal schools are appointed by the head of the Regional 
Inspectorate on Education. The regional inspectorates are deconcentrated structures of 
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the Ministry of Education and Science. The appointment is made through a compe-
tition that is organized by the ministry. The selection panel typically consists of ﬁve 
members—two from the Ministry of Education and Science, two from the Regional 
Inspectorate, and one from the municipality. Clearly, the municipal representative is 
little more than an observer. It is not uncommon for that person to be designated by 
the Regional Inspectorate. 
As of 2006, based on an agreement between the Ministry of Education and the 
National Association of Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria, the directors of all 
schools in 10 pilot municipalities are appointed according to a new procedure and by 
a new structure—the school council. The school councils consist of one representative 
of the regional inspectorate, one representative of the municipal administration, two 
representatives of the pedagogical staﬀ of the school, and two parent representatives. 
The school council is responsible for evaluating the performance of the school director; 
it proposes the dismissal or appointment of the school director, and the proposal is 
endorsed by the Regional Inspectorate. It is envisioned that the school councils become 
mandatory structures for all schools in Bulgaria in 2009, after adequate analysis of the 
outcomes from the pilot phase and amendments (if necessary) to the structures and 
their functions are made.
Teaching and non-teaching staﬀ are hired and ﬁred by the director of the school 
within the approved numbers. The central level sets the number of staﬀ by municipali-
ties and the latter allocate it among the schools.
The power to determine salaries is established in regulations on salaries in secondary 
education set by the Minister of Education. The ﬁnancing authority sets an average gross 
salary for the school and this becomes the framework in which the director negotiates 
individual salaries of teaching and non-teaching staﬀ. An individual salary may not be 
less than the salary for the position established in the regulations. For state schools, 
the ﬁnancing authority is the respective ministry, and for municipal schools it is the 
municipality that receives the subsidy for education activities from the central budget as 
part of the intergovernmental transfer system. Average gross salary growth is determined 
annually under the Central Budget Act. 
As of 2008, the strict central regulations on staﬃng, class sizes, salaries, and other 
operational education expenditure determinants have been relaxed to the extent that 
they have mainly an advisory nature. A new upper limit for class size has been intro-
duced—32 students per class instead of the old maximum level of 25 students per class. 
These changes have given extended powers to the school directors, who determine the 
number of staﬀ, the speciﬁc salaries, and the individual teaching hours of the teachers. 
Thus, the school directors are mandated to determine what portion of the school budget 
will go for maintenance and what for labor costs.
The Ministry of Education funds the teacher training required by changes in the 
curriculum. The municipal councils may also vote on the ﬁnancing of teacher training 
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to the extent permitted by the municipality’s own revenues. Since 2005, additional 
funding for teacher training, equivalent to 0.8 percent of the total amount of their 
salaries, is provided under the Collective Labor Contract for secondary education in 
state and municipal schools.
Schools are licensed or registered by an order of the Minister of Education and 
Science. This rule does not apply to the applied and ﬁne arts schools under the Ministry 
of Culture.
The recommendation to open or close a school is made by the funding authority 
(local government for the municipal schools) and submitted to the Regional Education 
Inspectorates. The latter checks the circumstances, prepares an opinion, and the recom-
mendation is then submitted to a committee appointed by the minister for education 
and science. The committee, composed of representatives of the Ministry of Education, 
considers the recommendations, examines the attached documents, and prepares a 
recommendation to open or close a school that the minister then approves in an 
order. 
The maintenance of school buildings and the current operating expenses are covered 
by the owner, i.e., the respective ministry for the state schools and the municipality for 
the municipal ones.
Student enrollment is subject to an order by the minister of education, who coor-
dinates with the line minister. The minister of education also approves the number of 
students in the municipal schools. Student enrollment in the arts schools is regulated by 
the minister of culture. The Ministry of Education and Science regulates the maximum 
number of students in a class. This mandate extends to the municipal schools as well.
The curricula for compulsory and specialized education courses, and for compul-
sory vocational training are approved by the minister of education and science. The 
curricula for elective courses are coordinated with the experts in the Regional Education 
Inspectorates and then are approved by the director of the latter. The curricula for 
optional courses in a school are also approved by the director.
The powers of schools in setting the curriculum are limited to elective and 
optional courses. Whether a course will be taught depends on the interest of students 
and the ability of the school to provide the necessary human and material resources. 
These courses are used by schools to promote students’ interests in science, arts, 
and sports.
Schools are overseen and monitored by the Ministry of Education and Science and 
the Regional Inspectorates (deconcentrated structures of the Ministry of Education). The 
oversight functions of the municipalities are directly related to compulsory education 
until the age of 16, and school ﬁnancing and property. They exercise a preventive and 
follow-up control of school expenditures, and oversee the use and lease of municipal 
property. Until the introduction of the school councils, they had limited control over 
the hiring of staﬀ. The school councils now ensure equal participation of municipalities 
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and regional inspectorates in the decision-making process related to issues of staﬀ 
recruitment and the hiring or ﬁring of school directors.
The municipality has control over staﬀ employment. It has a stronger preventive 
and follow-up control over spending, and the use and lease of municipal property.
Despite the signiﬁcant progress in the transfer of responsibilities from the central 
to the local level, the current distribution of administrative powers described above has 
several disadvantages:
 • There continues to be a mismatch between administrative subordination and 
the ﬁnancial responsibility of the directors of municipal schools. As the mayor 
of the municipality is not the employer of the municipal school director, the 
latter cannot be held responsible for the ineﬀective management of municipal 
budget funds by the ﬁnancing authority (the municipality).
 • Central authorities frequently make decisions without ensuring that the costs 
of implementation are covered.
 • There is no national and local system for measuring and monitoring the quality 
of education services. The education process is still based on planning and inputs, 
i.e., numbers of schools, teachers, and students. 
FINANCING FOR SCHOOLS
As can be seen in Table 7, Bulgaria is currently lagging behind other countries in the 
EU in the share of education of GDP. In 2006, Bulgaria spent 3.9 percent of its GDP 
on public education as opposed to the EU25 average of 5.1 percent.
Table 7 shows a relative decrease in the share of education in GDP and an increase 
of its share in the Consolidated State Budget. This is mainly a consequence of the expen-
ditures for education rising at lower rates compared to GDP (most notably in 2001, 
2005, and 2006) and at higher rates in relation to public spending as a whole. There 
is also an overall upward trend in the share of local education expenditures, which is 
partially accounted for by the transfer of some education activities from central to local 
funding (e.g., funding of special schools). One can draw the conclusion that Bulgaria 
has managed to reach a relative amount of stability in the sector and the public services 
provided by the central and local authorities.
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Table 7.
Main Financial Characteristics of Education in Bulgaria
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GDP (BGN million) 26,752.8 29,617.7 32,335.1 34,410.2 38,822.6 42,797.4 49,090.6
Consolidated state budget 
(BGN million)
11,334.3 12,096.5 12,732.5 14,068.8 15,199.0 16,657.3 18,275.6
Public expenditures for 
education (BGN million)
1,130.4 1,191.4 1,353.4 1,504.7 1,635.8 1,814.8 1,941.1
Including local 
spending on education 
(BGN million)
626.2 652.9 782.1 852.2 942.2 987.3 1,085.4
Share of local expenditures 
in the public expenditures 
for education (percent)
55.40 54.80 57.79 56.64 57.60 54.40 55.92
Share of expenditures for 
education in GDP (percent)
4.23 4.02 4.19 4.37 4.21 4.24 3.95
Including local 
expenditures for 
education (percent)
2.34 2.20 2.42 2.48 2.43 2.31 2.21
Share of expenditures for
education in the consoli-
dated state budget (percent)
9.97 9.85 10.63 10.70 10.76 10.89 10.62
Including local 
expenditures for 
education (percent)
5.52 5.40 6.14 6.06 6.20 5.93 5.94
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Role and Methods of Government Financing
In 2004, new rules on the standard annual maintenance of children and students in 
the state and municipal kindergartens, schools, and support units were adopted. These 
rules introduced two separate expenditure standards. The ﬁrst one deﬁned the overall 
maintenance expenditure level for the school system in each local government, using 
formulae with objective criteria and adjustment factors to reﬂect diﬀerences in the 
school system among municipalities. The second standard deﬁned staﬀ expenditures 
and mainly replicated the complex methodology for staﬃng stipulated in the regula-
tions of the Ministry of Education. While the maintenance-cost standard provided some 
built-in incentives for higher eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness, the staﬃng standard deﬁning 
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the larger portion of education spending legitimized the overstaﬃng patterns typical 
of the ministerial regulations.  
2007 saw the adoption of a new quasi-voucher system that uniﬁed the existing two 
separate standards (for maintenance costs and for staﬃng and labor costs) into a single 
per-pupil expenditure standard with no mandate regarding the staﬃng level. The design 
of the new costing standard stimulates the ﬁnancing authority (ministries and the local 
governments) to adopt their own pattern for the allocation of funds across schools and 
the existing examples of formula funding of schools in local governments with a delegated 
budget system appeared to be an appropriate model to follow. The only centrally imposed 
limitation related to the application of the new standard is that the local formula for the 
allocation of funds across the schools in the individual municipalities be based on the 
number of students in the school with mandatory weight of 80 percent. The remaining 
20 percent should be allocated according to criteria and factors agreed upon by the local 
administration and the local union of school directors. 
Financing for State Schools
State schools are ﬁnanced from the annual budgets of the Ministry of Education and 
Science, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Culture, and the 
Ministry of Youth and Sport. 
The state schools are secondary budget holders (with the respective ministry as the 
primary one) and they have their own budgets. The sources of revenue are:
 • renting out state or municipal property;
 • renting out teaching or sports facilities, machines, and equipment owned by 
the kindergarten, school, or support unit;
 • agricultural lands and forests;
 • disposal of compensation vouchers or bills;
 • sale of products and services produced in the course of practical training;
 • training and creative work, educational, and other services laid down in an order 
issued by the minister of education and science;
 • donations, bequests, fees, and other sources.
Own revenues are generally used by the school for maintenance or the upgrade of 
school infrastructure. 
State school expenditures are allocated on the basis of the approved education budget 
of the ﬁnancing authority, as well as a set of criteria. The main criteria, built in a fund 
allocation formula for each type of school (vocational, professional or special), are:
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 • for salaries and related social security payments—the approved staﬀ size and 
the average gross salary of the schools, additional remuneration of staﬀ and the 
income policy for the year;
 • for maintenance—the type of school, organization of its work, number of 
students, cost diﬀerences between professional areas, type of heating, etc.;
 • for scholarships—number of receiving students and types of scholarships like 
social welfare, disabled students, orphans, outstanding performance;
 • for capital investments—depending on the needs identiﬁed by schools and the 
priorities for the year: roof repairs, repairs of heating, electricity, and sewage 
systems, amongst others. The ﬁnal prioritization and decision on the schools’ 
capital improvement projects is made by the respective ministry responsible for 
the state schools. 
The state schools have freedom in spending the revenues they raise. It is for them 
to decide whether to spend them on maintenance or capital costs. For capital costs 
covered by their own revenues the municipalities must coordinate their inclusion in 
the investment program with the ﬁnancing authority.
Financing for Municipal Schools
Prior to 2002, the municipalities funded schools from general budget revenues. They 
raised limited own revenues and from the state received shared taxes by origin and 
general subsidies. There were no special revenues for the full or partial funding of 
education. Widespread ﬁnancial diﬃculties resulted in the chronic underfunding of 
schools with the consequent deterioration of school infrastructure. Delayed payment 
of teacher salaries was a cause of frequent social tension. With local authorities having 
no direct control over the running of schools, the rising shortfalls put a lot of pressure 
on the municipal budgets. 
The absence of rules for allocating resources among the municipalities caused 
widespread resentment, even in those for whom the system was relatively favorable. 
A contributing factor was the practice of the Ministry of Finance to provide partial 
ﬁnancing to the municipalities at the beginning of the year and later grant additional 
subsidies as it saw appropriate or under combined pressure from municipalities. The two 
most visible features of the system were the absence of a clear division of responsibilities 
between central and local government in public service provision, and disincentives for 
eﬃcient and eﬀective ﬁnancial management. 
At the beginning of 2003, the process of ﬁscal decentralization started in Bulgaria. 
Radical changes were introduced in the ﬁscal relations between the state and the 
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municipalities covering shared taxes and subsidies, and the methods by which they were 
determined and allocated among municipalities. 
The services provided by the municipalities are divided into two groups: services 
delegated by the state and local services. The sources from which they are funded are 
clearly established. The expenditures for activities delegated by the state are based on 
standards that are used for a more accurate estimation of the required resources and for 
their allocation among municipalities. These expenditures are funded from personal 
income tax receipts and, if they are insuﬃcient, from a general top-up subsidy. 
Municipal schools are a service delegated by the state. In 2007, the previous expen-
diture standards were “uniﬁed” and converted to a single costing-standard per student 
(quasi-voucher system implementing the principle “money follows the student”). 
In addition to the funds deﬁned through the costing standard, in the course of the 
year the municipalities receive:
 • speciﬁc subsidies from the Ministry of Finance for additional remuneration of 
teachers;
 • subsidies to compensate costs incurred by the municipalities, e.g., transport for 
students and teachers;
 • speciﬁc subsidies for capital investments from the Ministry of Education and 
Science;
 • free textbooks for ﬁrst-graders. The costs are covered from the budget of the 
Ministry of Education and Science, which purchases and distributes them among 
schools on the basis of their estimated needs. 
The capital investment subsidy and the own revenues set aside for investments are 
the framework in which the local authorities allocate ﬁnancing among schools. There 
are no limits on the size of the funds earmarked for education. An exception to this rule 
was in 2004 when the State Budget Act set a 60:40 ratio in favor of all delegated tasks, 
schools included. This limit proved ineﬀective and later was removed. 
The expenditure standards are used only for the purpose of allocating resources 
among municipalities. The latter can plan for individual activities only according to these 
standards and have limited powers to reallocate funds among items during the ﬁnancial 
year. They are not allowed to transfer funds from one activity to another. 
The local authorities are not expected to apply the standards in allocating resources 
among schools. The budget of every school is included in the municipality’s budget. 
Unused resources at the end of the year may be freely transferred to fund other services, 
local services included.
In 2005, the Ministry of Education and Science established limits on the ability of 
municipalities to allocate resources among schools on the basis of the diﬀerences between 
them. A regulatory act required that each school receive a minimum of 80 percent of the 
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funds paid under the maintenance per-student standard. The municipality could redis-
tribute the remaining 20 percent among schools to respond to their special needs. 
In 2007, a new mechanism for funding municipal education activities was adopted 
following the introduction of the quasi-voucher system. The local governments in Bulgaria 
were grouped into four general groups based on key demographic and geographic criteria. 
The amount of the costing standard was deﬁned for each of these four groups. Mid- 
to long-term targets were set according to the implementation of tailored programs 
for each of the groups with the ultimate goal to scale down the factors driving the 
diﬀerent levels of costs for education. In a parallel development, the detailed and strict 
regulations on staﬃng have been relaxed and the responsibilities for deﬁning the 
number of staﬀ and class sizes have been shifted to the school directors and the local 
administrations. In addition, the delegated budget system (DBS) has been nationally 
expanded in 2008, thus further increasing the ﬁnancial and management autonomy 
of the schools.
The implementation of the new system of allocating ﬁnancial resources among the 
municipalities, until 2007, showed that, as a whole, the resources are suﬃcient. However, 
the municipalities lost the right to transfer funds from one function to another, from 
one activity within the function to another, and from one item to another. As a result, 
the municipalities found themselves in the absurd situation of ending the year with 
surpluses in some activities and, at the same time, shortfalls in others. This situation is 
likely to remain unchanged even after the quasi-voucher system has been introduced, 
as these limitations have been preserved.
However, the positive results from the implementation of the reforms should not 
be underestimated. First, the school ﬁnancing responsibilities are now clearly allocated 
between the state and the municipalities. Second, there are smaller diﬀerences in school 
costs between municipalities. The variation in maintenance costs dramatically and 
immediately reduced, from 26 times in 2001 to 1.6 in 2003. Obviously, resources are 
allocated in a clear, transparent, and much fairer way; and lastly, there is a long-term 
certainty about the funds municipalities will receive from the state. 
Looking at long-term reforms, Bulgaria will need to tackle several problems:
 • Currently there is no system for monitoring the quality or evaluating the perfor-
mance at various levels. All well-performing school systems place considerable 
importance on monitoring and evaluating the quality of the school system as part 
of the strategy to secure strong performance. In contrast to most modern educa-
tion systems, Bulgaria does not yet have an objective and transparent framework 
to monitor standards against national and international benchmarks. Results 
from international comparative studies (for example, PISA) have not been used 
for system monitoring or improvement. Bulgaria also lacks a national testing 
and evaluation system to measure quality at various levels of the system, and the 
planned external assessment, at the end of grades four, seven to eight, and twelve 
to thirteen (matura), had yet to be implemented nationwide in 2008.
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 • There is no external evaluation system of students or schools based on results. 
The absence of a reliable system of external evaluation of schools contributes to 
the inability to objectively understand the causes of diﬀerences in performance 
between schools and to target assistance to underperforming schools. A Center 
for Control and Quality Assessment was established in 2005, and could play 
an important role in moving forward, but the challenge—as in the past—will 
be to establish the needed expertise and to overcome traditional practices and 
public/social opposition that have proved formidable in the past.
 • Currently, there is no focus on accountability for quality. In part, a result of the 
lag in developing an external assessment system, there are no agreed targets at 
the national or local levels for teaching and learning results, and no mechanisms 
to hold the Ministry of Education, municipalities, or schools accountable for 
improving results. 
 • There is insuﬃcient competition among schools. There are no incentives or 
mechanisms to encourage and enable poorly performing schools to improve or 
to learn from other schools. Funding mechanisms do not yet link to quality or 
equity objectives. Information on school outcomes and good practices is lacking. 
Even after the national expansion of the delegated budget system, which ensures 
some competition, mechanisms to improve quality and equity have yet to be 
developed.
 • There is still work to be done on increasing the quality of teachers. Teacher 
quality is a key determinant of educational outcomes. The move towards 
modern, student-centered curricula imparting basic skills requires a shift in the 
paradigm of a teacher—from the traditional role of imparting subject matter to 
one of adaptability and innovation regarding curricula and pedagogy. It poses 
new challenges and expectations for teachers to work together and to be more 
open to productive relationships with parents and local communities. Despite 
overstaﬃng at the aggregate level, there is a shortage of teachers with skills 
in speciﬁc areas such as foreign languages. Pre-service and in-service training 
structures only recently have begun to adequately address the practical needs 
of teachers and school staﬀ on the ground. Important recent developments 
on this front, however, include the recent adoption of a law to reform teacher 
education and the establishment of a National Pedagogic Center, which is to 
have a major role in in-service development.
 • The participation and completion rates for upper-secondary education need 
to be raised, as they are low in comparison with the original EU-10 states. 
Completing upper-secondary education is a prerequisite for a dynamic and 
competitive European economy: it is the minimum needed to improve the 
prospects of individuals in the labor market, to enable their further education 
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and training, and to prepare them for lifelong learning. Bulgaria’s share of its 
young population completing upper-secondary school—although comparable 
to the EU-25 average—is substantially below the Lisbon target of 85 percent 
in 2010. Importantly, it is below that in most of the EU-10 as well as EU-15 
countries such as Sweden, Ireland, and France. In part, this reﬂects the substan-
tial discontinuation after basic education: over a ﬁfth of young Bulgarians aged 
18–24 have only lower-secondary education and are not participating in further 
education and training. This is high compared to a Lisbon target of no more 
than 10 percent by 2010, an average for the EU countries of 15.9 percent, and 
particularly the average of 7.5 percent in the EU-10 states. It is of particular 
concern for social cohesion and integration into the work force.
Table 8.
Trends in Net Enrollment Rates in Schools
1994–1995 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
Pre-primary 59.7 66.8 73.6 74.2 74.6 73.6
Primary 92.8 96.3 98.5 99.8 100.3 99.7
Lower Secondary 79.0 82.4 83.1 84.0 84.2 84.2
Upper Secondary 61.4 64.7 68.3 74.9 77.1 77.3
Source: National Statistics Institute.
Bulgaria has made tremendous progress over the past decade in increasing participa-
tion rates among the school-age population. Net enrollment ratios at pre-primary, basic, 
and upper-secondary levels are all higher today than they were 10 years ago. Nevertheless, 
a key challenge is the still lower than desired net enrollment ratio in lower-secondary 
education—at 84 percent—and the relatively small gains in the net enrollment rate at 
this level. The sharp fall in net enrollment rates between primary and lower secondary, 
still a part of compulsory education, is of concern. Upper secondary shows impressive 
increases, although to some extent this reﬂects the recent increase in the duration of 
some programs. Despite this progress, participation among students of upper-secondary 
age is still lower than the average for the EU-25 and the EU-10.
 • Attract the interest and support of local community in resolving the problems 
of schools. The piloting of the school council structure would probably bring 
parents closer to school life and the issues of school management and quality. 
It is important that the ﬁrst steps to introduce these structures in the 10 pilot 
municipalities be followed by adequate analysis and that quick further steps are 
taken towards a national expansion of the concept. 
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 • Finance private schools with public funds. From the taxpayers’ perspective it is 
reasonable to consider the option for allocating state funds to private schools 
at equal footing with the public schools. The new quasi-voucher system should 
facilitate the implementation of that concept and will further enhance competi-
tion among all schools in Bulgaria.
THE DELEGATED BUDGET SYSTEM IN 
MUNICIPAL SCHOOL FINANCING 
The purpose of the reform towards ﬁscal decentralization is to transfer resources, deci-
sion-making authority, and service provision responsibilities to the lower levels of local 
government. The most appropriate institution for the provision of a given service is 
determined on the basis of the principle of subsidiary. This is the criterion of allocating 
service provision responsibilities among the diﬀerent levels of public institutions. 
The ﬁrst stage of the reform involves regulating relations among central and local 
authorities. At the second stage the same principle is applied within the municipality to 
the relations between local government and its structural components, i.e., mayoralties 
and the service providers.
The Delegated Budget System (DBS) is a practical illustration of the extension of 
this reform towards ﬁscal decentralization. It has been implemented in more than 30 
municipalities. Within this system the municipality transfers to the school authorities 
the right to make independent decisions about administrative, organizational, and 
ﬁnancial aspects, and they are also held accountable for the results of these decisions. The 
powers and responsibilities of municipalities shift from direct management of schools 
to coordination, methodological assistance, training, and supervision.
The main characteristics of DBS are:
 • The municipality and the school directors agree on the mechanism of allocating 
resources among schools.
 • Schools become secondary budget holders, compile their own budgets, and 
have their own bank accounts.
 • Schools have the authority to manage property such as canteens, land, and 
vacant premises, and to raise additional revenues.
A survey of local governments and schools in 10 municipalities about the imple-
mentation of the delegated budget system, conducted in 2004, leads to the following 
advantages:
 • DBS is a tool to regulate relations between municipalities and schools. The two 
sides have clear powers and responsibilities. The total amount of resources and 
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their allocation among schools are determined in a transparent and objective 
manner. It is no longer possible to make any excuses for poor performance or 
blame others.
 • A broader range of stakeholders are involved in the decision-making that eﬀects 
schools.
 • The allocation mechanism is clear and transparent. Each director can calculate the 
amount he or she is entitled to, and the amount of the neighboring school.
 • More fair allocation and equal treatment of schools is achieved. The formula 
used takes into account the speciﬁc needs of small schools and schools in rural 
communities. The inclusion of adjustment ratios, buildings, and additional 
activities like dormitories also help reﬂect the speciﬁcities of schools at the 
local level.
 • More funds are available because schools have incentives to increase their own 
revenues.
 • DBS is a tool for reducing costs. Spending is more eﬃcient. There are incentives 
to save because the savings are kept by the schools, to be spent on the priorities 
they have identiﬁed.
 • Expenditures are more eﬃcient. In the past, schools contributed to a munici-
pality’s unpaid bills, now they end the year with rollover surpluses. 
 • More resources and eﬃcient spending have allowed schools to purchase more 
and better products needed for their core teaching activities. Because they 
have been given greater decision-making powers, school authorities are able 
to make decisions about infrastructure maintenance, purchase of teaching aids 
and facilities, and oﬀer additional services like computer rooms, participation 
in competitions, study visits, and others.
 • The ﬁrst diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of operations between schools have emerged. 
The diﬀerences are caused by two factors: (1) school staﬀ, its capacity, and 
leadership; and (2) the local environment in which the school exists. The type 
of income that is raised depends on aspects of this environment; for example, 
schools in rural communities own land, while urban ones can oﬀer additional 
services like foreign-language courses, other specialized courses, and rent out 
vacant space.
 • The municipal administration itself has also become more eﬃcient. Instead 
of wasting their time on useless paper work, processing of applications, and 
other documents, the experts are focusing more on analyzing, monitoring, and 
supervising the performance of schools. 
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The question is: how do these aspects of eﬃciency aﬀect the quality of services? This 
is a relevant question because:
 • Savings could be a result of poorer service quality;
 • The drive to raise more revenues might result in the cutting of core teaching 
activities and expanding business ones.
Eﬀectiveness, seen as the extent to which a desired aim has been achieved, can be 
assessed by the performance of the education system. More speciﬁcally, this requires 
the following:
 • Assess the adequacy of the educational system to the needs of the labor market. 
It is not clear whether the schools are using the opportunity to tailor their 
curricula to the needs of the local and national labor markets. 
 • Ensure equal access to school for all children of the same age. Parents have the 
right to choose a school for their children, which results in strong competition 
between schools. Competition for students is a competition for jobs and should 
be a matter of survival for the particular school. Despite these incentives, school 
authorities give rather vague answers to the question whether this aim is being 
achieved. Rather, there is a sense that schools are more interested in stealing 
each other’s students than trying hard to attract students who have never been 
to school or who have dropped out. With the drive to make the school network 
more eﬃcient by closing schools in communities that have no alternatives, i.e., 
when the only school is closed, entire areas are becoming depopulated and 
children’s access to school is limited.
 • Design and introduce a quality assessment system, i.e., criteria and measurement 
indicators. There is still no system of recognizing and rewarding excellence. If 
average grades and the success of students are considered as one of the indicators 
for education quality the following picture is disclosed in Tables 9 and 10. 
Table 9.
Changes in the Average Grades of Students after DBS (Percent)
Higher Lower No Change Don’t Know
All schools 20 1 39 40
Including:
• Urban 28 2 35 35
• Rural 7 0 45 48
Including:
• Director 26 2 45 26
• Accountant 12 0 30 58
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Table 10.
Changes in Children’s Success in Admission Tests (Percent)
Higher No Change Don’t Know
All schools 19 35 47
Including:
• Urban 24 39 37
• Rural 10 28 62
Including:
• Director 26 38 36
• Accountant 9 30 61
Unfortunately, there is no information for the assessment of other indicators for 
the quality of the educational system. 
The analysis of the results of implementing the delegated budget system in educa-
tion is the basis on which recommendations for taking the reform process further have 
been made. 
These recommendations are as follows:
The delegated budget system is an outcome of the decentralization process, whose 
goal is to raise the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of the system. This can only be achieved if 
the necessary conditions are in place. There is no doubt that the external factors which 
inﬂuence the relations between the municipalities and schools have become more favor-
able. The new national standards have ensured a fairer allocation of resources among 
municipalities. 
The idea behind transferring powers and responsibilities to schools is to shift decision-
making to the level that has the strongest interest in providing certain services and can 
oﬀer cost-eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, and the highest quality. If no measures are taken to 
make it possible to achieve this goal, the end result will be a simple replacement of one 
set of oﬃcials (the municipality) with another (the directors). The school councils, 
introduced in 2007, involve teachers and parents in decision-making at the school level 
and the outcomes of this pilot are yet to be analyzed. 
Schools have an incentive to attract children but not to achieve better results. A 
national external assessment system, as well as a system of monitoring and assessing of 
the quality of education services are needed. One possible solution is to build into the 
national standards, and the formulae used in allocating funds among schools, quality 
criteria, e.g., improved access, higher grades, continuation of education in secondary 
schools/universities, etc. 
75
F i n a n c i n g  P u b l i c  E d u c a t i o n  i n  B u l g a r i a
CONCLUSIONS
Several strengths lie within the Bulgarian education system. First, Bulgaria has a fairly 
well-preserved national tradition of education as an important means towards success 
in life. This clearly explains the success in achieving a certain stability in the ﬁnancial 
responsibilities of authorities to ﬁnance the education services provided by the munici-
palities. The introduction of the delegated budget system in municipalities, where a 
portion of the money follows the student, is a successful ﬁrst step towards full decen-
tralization, and has proven a more eﬃcient use of resources. However, these successes 
should be carefully analyzed. But it is not very clear whether the cost savings came at 
the cost of—or were accompanied by—improved quality and equity. Little information 
on outcomes, and limited checks and balances on school directors through participation 
of local stakeholders in decisions, are among the constraints that need to be addressed. 
Last, Bulgaria has successfully undertaken the necessary steps for establishing private 
education. 
While acknowledging signiﬁcant progress, several weaknesses remain to be addressed. 
First, municipalities are faced with responsibilities for ﬁnancing schools that in some cases 
are incommensurate with their powers. Second, schools need incentives for increasing 
their eﬃciency and performance. Currently, schools do not have a proper system of 
monitoring and assessing the quality of education services. 
Obviously, the development of opportunities for schools are dependent upon several 
external factors. Decentralization cannot progress without committed government eﬀorts 
to implement the national education strategy and to scrutinize quality through a proper 
monitoring and evaluation system. Reforms towards decentralization should continue 
and should involve more local stakeholders. The latter could, for example, evaluate 
the impact of decentralization and could support the dissemination of good practices 
extracted from the pilot phase of the introduction of the school council structures.
The main threats to the system of education that should be taken into account are: 
potential lack of political goodwill to implement changes, unequal access to education 
and, lastly, a declining quality of education services. 
The results of the analysis lead to the conclusion that public education faces a large 
number of problems. The steps taken in the last few years have led to an increased 
decentralization of education service delivery, though they are only a precondition for the 
achievement of the broader goals for higher quality, more equality, and better participa-
tion rates in school education. Assistance from outside the sector is still needed.
The main lever for change is the continuation of the reform towards ﬁscal decen-
tralization in education. Several recommendations could be outlined in this respect. 
Firstly, the central government needs to renounce the behavior that impedes a coherent 
development of reform. For example, it should align secondary legislation with primary 
legislation in a way that enhances local powers. Often, norms in the secondary legisla-
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tion block the transfer of powers regulated in primary legislation. Also, the Ministry of 
Education and Science, and other central government bodies need to stop bypassing 
municipalities and providing ﬁnancial resources directly to schools (such as resources 
for repair works allocated by the Ministry of Education). Last but not least, the level 
of funding for delegated services should be increased. The state seems to think that 
by adopting the standards it has fulﬁlled its responsibilities and this explains the poor 
ﬁnancial management at the level of municipalities. A more dangerous tendency is the 
attitude, even among municipal structures, that the centralization of activities is the 
only way to solve problems (some examples are the maintenance standards of 2005, 
the wish of directors to be ﬁnanced directly by the Ministry of Education and Science, 
or the wish of municipal ﬁnance oﬃcers that kindergartens become a service delegated 
by the state).
In our opinion, ﬁscal decentralization in education will require the following next 
steps:
 • Decentralize further responsibilities from the central to the local level, for other 
types of schools. A useful step that is already in the pipeline for implementa-
tion in 2009 would be to transfer the management and ﬁnancing of vocational 
training schools from the central level, where they are now, to the municipali-
ties.
 • Increase the level of own revenue sources for the municipalities to enable them 
to fund a higher proportion of education services. Constitutional amendments 
adopted in 2007 signiﬁcantly increased the ﬁscal autonomy and the taxing 
powers of local governments, though the initial results are yet to be seen.
 • Transfer powers from the central to the local levels in the areas of reallocating the 
ﬁnancial transfers from the state received on the basis of the costing standard.
 • Overall, allocate more ﬁnancial resources to the education sector.
NOTES
1 Paper prepared by the Local Government Initiative, Soﬁa, April 2005. The Local Government 
Initiative is implemented by RTI under USAID Contract Number EEU-I-00-99-00014-00, 
the Local Government Assistance Initiative Services, IQC, Task Order 802.
2 The conclusions and opinions expressed in this report are personal and do not necessarily 
coincide with the oﬃcial position of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education and 
Science, and the National Association of Municipalities. The authors would like to thank: 
Elisaveta Panyovska and Mariana Lambova (Ministry of Education and Science); Mariana 
Moteva (Ministry of Finance); Ginka Chavdarova, Daniela Ushatova, Sava Popov, and Rositsa 
Georgieva (National Association of Municipalities) for their advice and information.
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3 The main policy document asserting the main principles, aims, and priorities of the national 
education policy is the Strategy for Modernization of Bulgarian School Education System, 
developed by the Ministry of Education. This policy document was replaced in 2006 by 
a new policy document adopted by Parliament, the Program for Development of School 
and Preschool Education for the Period 2006–2015. The latter has a philosophy oriented 
towards the decentralization of both funding and decision-making to municipal and school 
levels and contains speciﬁc measures and a schedule for implementation.
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Executive Summary
Fiscal decentralization of the education sector in Croatia began in 2001 with changes to 
three key laws on primary schools, secondary schools, and local government ﬁnancing. This 
reform has involved a breadth of local and state actors, most notably the Ministry of Science, 
Education, and Sport (MoSES), its regional units, its agencies, city halls, and schools, in 
addition to reforms passing ﬁnancial responsibility to local governments for other sectors 
like healthcare and welfare. In the matrix of the reform of education ﬁnancing, MoSES 
retains overall responsibility for all levels of the education system and MoSES is the main 
policymaking body with the most ﬁnancial responsibility and control. 
However, the reform entailed the central government withdrawing its total ﬁnancing for 
material costs and expenditure while continuing to pay salaries in full. The remaining ﬁnancial 
obligations were taken by local governments, newly empowered to have a percentage of 
income tax within their authority in addition to grants from a national equalization fund for 
municipalities requiring a top-up in the ﬁnancial capacity to fund their schools. Qualiﬁed 
local governments that could take this burden stood to gain a 10 percent increase in income 
tax revenues: 2.9 percent of this ﬁnanced primary education and two percent secondary 
schools. Since 2007, the rate has increased to 3.1 and 2.2 percent, respectively. 
Each year, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, MoSES sets the minimum ﬁnan-
cial standards, taking into consideration the expenditure needs of each local government. 
This allocation is based on the number of enrolled pupils multiplied by the average cost per 
pupil. An average cost is determined for each local government. An equalization fund also 
has been designed to absorb the excess funds from those local governments that report 
outperforming ﬁnancial results. In 2006, only one town had excess revenue for the fund. 
The decentralization of primary and secondary school ﬁnances is based on the transfer 
of the founding rights to the primary and secondary schools, which include the obliga-
tion for the partial ﬁnancing of educational programs. School councils choose the school 
director, elect the teachers and administrative personnel, but teachers’ salaries are regulated 
and determined by the central government and a contract with the teacher’s trade unions. 
Expenditure for teachers’ salaries declined from 3.28 to 1.70 percent of GDP between 2001 
and 2006, in contrast to a 20.8 percent growth in GDP in the same period due to the end of 
the Balkan wars and the return of tourism revenues. Training is almost exclusively the domain 
of the Education and Teacher Training Agency, a leading nonproﬁt public institution.
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Amendments to the laws of 2001 allow local governments to open and close schools, 
determine class size, while central government determines the curricula. Most local govern-
ment also use additional income taxes, collected locally, to meet the gap between types of 
education expenditures that are met by the central government and those that are not, like 
the transport of children who live more than three kilometers from school or children with 
special needs. This is where equalization funds operate, too, but the formula based on per-
student average cost is ﬂawed in that it does not take into account local differences. Private 
schools are also permitted to apply for funding, though they are few in number. Preschools 
are strictly organized and funded on a local basis, but co-ﬁnancing is still available from the 
central government for pupils with special needs or from ethnic minorities. 
Local government has gained more opportunities for efﬁciency and accountability 
through the decentralization of education ﬁnancing. And the education sector has responded 
to these allocations by stressing more languages, allowing parents to choose schools, and 
an increase in the number of teachers. 
Due to ﬁnancial decentralization efforts, signiﬁcant changes have occurred in terms of 
resource allocation over the past three years. Education ﬁnancing experts recognize that 
the main advantages of decentralization are related to the fact that the management of 
expenditures is in the vicinity of the actual schools that are better able to recognize their 
own needs. Expenditure norms for primary and secondary education are determined at the 
level of municipalities and towns. 
For the future, the ﬁnancing of education in Croatia should focus on clearer ﬁnancing 
policies that might include: structuring the allocation formula, an improvement of the 
ﬁnancial status of teachers, and strengthening the leadership and managerial knowledge 
of teachers and school directors. What began in ﬁnance will be continued in other relevant 
areas (i.e., management, curriculum, and human resources) in the years to come.
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INTRODUCTION: GENERAL BACKGROUND
The Croatian system of education includes preschool, primary, secondary, and univer-
sity education. Preschool education is delivered to children between six months and 
six years of age. Compulsory education in Croatia begins with primary education and 
includes eight years of schooling. Primary school education is obligatory and free of 
charge for all children aged seven to ﬁfteen. The secondary-school system in Croatia 
includes general education (such as grammar schools) and vocational education. There 
are two types of vocational schools: those that provide a classical, vocational education 
with practical training at school, and others that oﬀer dual programs. Dual programs 
combine apprenticeships at a business as well as vocational education at a vocational 
school within one course. The entire pre-primary education, compulsory primary, and 
secondary education is provided by the public, private, and church educational insti-
tutions, public schools, and other educational institutions. By law, citizens can open 
private schools and learning centers.1
Education Responsibilities
A large number of regional and nongovernmental institutions, research institutes, and 
trade unions are involved in the decentralization of the Croatian education system. 
Governance in education is ensured on three levels: central—the Ministry of Science, 
Education, and Sport (MoSES); regional (21 counties); regional units of the MoSES 
(counties are grouped in the six regional departments of the Education and Teacher 
Training Agency, which focuses on quality control and evaluation); city halls (32 towns); 
and local (schools). 
MoSES retains the overall responsibility for all levels of the education system. Hence, 
MoSES is the main policymaking body with the most ﬁnancial responsibility and 
control. All the functions in education, apart from primary education, are transferred to 
the municipalities, according to their ﬁscal capacity. The decentralized expenditures of 
primary schools in towns with lower ﬁscal capacity are taken over by the municipalities.2 
However, starting in 2007, towns showed an increasing interest in ﬁnancing primary 
schools from their own budgets and are requesting a further transfer of founder rights 
for primary schools from the level of the municipality to the town.
The process of ﬁscal decentralization started with amendments to the Law on 
Primary Schools,3 the Law on Secondary Schools,4 and the Law on Financing Units of 
Local Self-government and Government5 in 2001. The central government transferred 
the responsibility for ﬁnancing education, healthcare, welfare, and ﬁre departments 
to the local government units. The central government covered the ﬁnancing for only 
a portion of the education costs (that is, for material costs and expenditures for the 
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procurement of non-ﬁnancial assets), while it ensured the full ﬁnancing of salaries. The 
ﬁnancing of the decentralized functions was taken on by local government units with 
greater ﬁscal capacities.6
The decentralization of primary and secondary school ﬁnances is based on the transfer 
of founding rights to primary and secondary schools. The founding rights include an 
obligation for the partial ﬁnancing of educational programs. 
Schools became owners of their school buildings in January 2002. Currently, there 
are 53 school founders in Croatia. However, school owners cannot sell or rent the school 
building without the agreement of the school founders. School founders are commonly 
towns or municipalities.7 The school statute regulates the amount of resources and 
sources of ﬁnancing that school owners have control. Towns have founding rights for 
establishing primary schools, while municipalities have founding rights for the estab-
lishment of primary and secondary schools. The primary schools of poorer and smaller 
towns are funded on the municipality level. All municipalities have at least one town 
that is serving as a school founder. The Ministry of Finance determines which towns 
can be school founders, based on criteria that will be detailed later in this chapter. 
The school founders currently have two ﬁnancing sources that add up to the expen-
diture norms (minimal ﬁnancial standards) set for the decentralized functions:
 1) Their primary source of income is a percentage of income tax, as determined 
by the central government
 2) Their secondary source of income is the Equalization Fund, an additional part 
of the income tax that central government cedes to local government units with 
lower ﬁscal capacities for ﬁnancing the decentralized functions. The govern-
ment sets the fund for the local governments that took on the ﬁnancing of the 
decentralized functions, but are unable to ﬁnance them from the revenue they 
obtained from income tax. What that has meant in practice is that the local 
governments that undertook the ﬁnancing of all the decentralized functions were 
able to increase their share of income tax by 10 percent. Out of this percentage, 
local governments received 2.9 percent of the income tax to ﬁnance primary 
education and two percent for the ﬁnancing of secondary school education. 
Since January 2007, the rate increased to 3.1 percent for primary education 
and 2.2 for secondary education. 
The minimum ﬁnancial standards that need to be met by each local government 
are set each year by the Ministry of Education in cooperation with the government and 
Ministry of Finance. In deﬁning minimum ﬁnancial standards, the ministry takes into 
consideration the expenditure needs of individual local governments. For example, the 
criterion for the allocation of resources to cover materials and ﬁnancial expenditures 
in secondary schools equals the number of enrolled pupils in a certain year multiplied 
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by the average annual cost per pupil. The average annual cost is set for each individual 
local government unit.
The level of resources between schools ﬂuctuates given the diﬀerent economic 
capacity of the local governments across Croatia. In the towns where minimum standards 
are met and ﬁnancial achievements surpass 100 percent, a surplus is returned to the state 
budget in accordance to the equalization mechanisms. In 2006, however, there was only 
one town in Croatia whose ﬁnancial achievements were over 100 percent.
The rules for appointing the school staﬀ (such as school directors, teachers, and 
non-teaching staﬀ) are included in existing primary and secondary school laws. The 
main body in charge of the selection of the school director is the school council, which 
consists of: 
 • four school representatives (three teachers and one parent) and
 • three representatives of a local government unit. 
In 2005, amendments to the Law on Primary Schools8 and the Law on Secondary 
Schools9 established a new relationship between school founders and school owners. At 
present, the school council can formulate a school statute, but only with the approval of 
the school founder. The school statute is a written law enacted by MoSES, containing 
the preamble, provisions, and rules for implementing such legislation. MoSES does not 
have inﬂuence on a school director’s election and the minister can remove the school 
director only if she or he is breaking the law. According to some unoﬃcial propositions, 
in the future, a school council might be changed to include four representatives from 
the town or municipality (the school founders), and three school representatives. Based 
on this proposal, the minister would have to approve an elected school director. 
The school council elects the teachers, school director, and administrative personnel, 
subsequent to the publishing of a job announcement. The salary of teachers, school 
directors, and administrative personnel is calculated on the basis of coeﬃcients regulated 
by the central government.10 Teachers in Croatia have public servant status; therefore, 
a framework contract with the teacher unions regulates the beneﬁts that teachers are 
entitled to receive for working under special conditions (such as combined classes, 
specialized work with students with special needs, teaching in schools in remote areas) 
and surpluses for academic levels.
As Table 1 shows, the average salaries for teachers decreased signiﬁcantly, from 3.28 
to 1.70 percent of GDP between 2001 and 2006.11
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Table 1.
Average Teaching Salaries in Relation to per Capita GDP
Year GDP per Capita (USD) GDP per Capita (HRK) Teachers (HRK)
Amount Teacher Salary as 
Percent of GDP
2001 4,476.7 25,517 83,815 3.28
2002 5,136.9 29,280 82,126 2.80
2003 6,485.7 36,968 87,648 2.37
2004 6,680.3 38,078 92,905 2.44
2005 8,614.3 52,117 92,905 1.78
2006 9,330.9 56,452 95,692 1.70
Source: Annual report by Ministry of Finance for 2002–2006.
As a matter of fact, the increase in the number of teachers was followed by an increase 
of funds for salaries. The decrease in average teaching salaries, as a percentage of GDP, 
is explained by the fast growth of GDP and a subsequent increase in salaries. To illus-
trate, the GDP increase from 2001 until 2007 was 20.8 percent for a six-year period. 
In the same time period, the increase of teachers’ salaries was 11.4 percent. Hence, the 
relationship between teachers’ annual salaries and GDP shows a relative decrease. 
The state budget regulates funds for regular salaries and bonuses for employees (for 
example, anniversary bonuses, ﬁnancial support in case of a death, and ﬁnancial help 
for medications, etc.), travel expenses for primary school employees, funds for expenses 
needed for the education of students with special needs, the co-ﬁnancing of alternative 
and private schools, school library resources, other programs of common interest, and 
the completion of capital projects which started prior to July 2001. 
The law regulates the establishment and ﬁnancing of public primary schools, all types 
of activities conducted in these schools, founding and closure of the primary schools, 
teaching plans and programs, the organization of schools, the rights and obligations of 
students (including their assessment and evaluation), the primary rights and obligations 
of teachers and counseling teams, school management, and obligatory documentation.12 
MoSES certiﬁes programs of both private and public schools. In addition, private primary 
and secondary schools are ﬁnanced from the state budget and according to the criteria 
prescribed by the minister. 
The Education and Teacher Training Agency (the former Institute for School 
Development of the Republic of Croatia) and various other nongovernmental organiza-
tions conduct teacher training. The Education and Teacher Training Agency remains a 
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leading nonproﬁt public institution that oﬀers professional support (teacher training, 
inspection, and monitoring) at the level of preschool, primary, and secondary school 
education. The agency has a network of six branch oﬃces (Zagreb, Rijeka, Zadar, Split, 
Varaždin, and Osijek). The agency in its current form was established in December 
2003. Previously, it was an agency of the ministry.
According to the Law on Primary Schools and the Law on Secondary Schools, the 
establishment or closure of a school is regulated at the level of the town for primary 
schools or the municipality level for primary and secondary schools. The same regula-
tions determine class size and suggest that classes should have 30 students (plus or minus 
two). Furthermore, in Croatia, there is a partial inclusion of students with special needs 
both at the primary13 and secondary14 school level. If there is a student with special needs 
in a class, the regulations state that the total number of students in a class should not 
exceed 25. Teaching plans and programs are determined at the central level. Currently, 
teaching plans and programs are passing through a process of content reduction. 
BASIC STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION FINANCING
The process of public sector decentralization oﬃcially started in July 2001, when the 
Croatian Parliament passed the laws through which the ﬁnancing of certain functions 
and costs of primary and secondary education were transferred from the national budget 
to the budgets of towns and municipalities. The resources needed for the implementa-
tion of the policy were also provided for. 
Educational provisions are directly linked to educational ﬁnancing, hence the increase 
of education expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Public expenditure should positively 
inﬂuence educational opportunities in Croatia. In 2002, public expenditures experienced 
a large increase due to the inclusion of both the retirement and health funds. Thus, 
education decreased as a percentage of participation in public expenditure (see Table 
2). Although the nominal values increased, the relative values decreased. In conclusion, 
education expenditures increased signiﬁcantly in the last six years. 
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A percentage division of education expenditures from central budget between types 
of costs is presented in Table 3. Centralized costs for primary and secondary schools 
consist of: 
 • Salaries for employees in primary and secondary schools, 
 • Daily transportation costs for employees in primary schools, 
 • Compensation for employees according to a contract settled with the trade 
union, 
 • Increased costs of schooling for additional programs for ethnic minorities, 
 • Programs for children with special needs, 
 • Equipment for school libraries,
 • ICT programs,
 • In-service training of teachers, 
 • Capital projects (only for projects that started prior to July 2001), 
 • Participation in ﬁnancing of alternative and private schools, and 
 • Other programs of common interest.
Table 3.
Percent Division of Education Expenditures from Central Budget 
(Split between Types of Cost)
Year Salaries and Bonuses 
(Expenditures for Employees)
Capital 
Expenditures
Special 
Programs
Other 
Programs
Total
2001 88.32 6.72 0.68 4.28 100.00
2002 90.94 8.12 0.94 0.00 100.00
2003 92.96 5.74 1.11 0.19 100.00
2004 95.05 3.64 1.01 0.30 100.00
2005 96.99 2.41 0.24 0.36 100.00
2006 96.77 2.03 0.26 0.94 100.00
Source: Ministry of Science, Education, and Sport.
The percentage division of education expenditures of the decentralized expenditures 
for primary and secondary schools is presented in Table 4. The speciﬁc decentralized 
costs for primary schools consist of: 
 • General costs for schools, 
 • Heating and lighting in schools, 
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 • Transportation for students (when the distance from a student’s home address 
to the school is more than three kilometers for students in grades one to four, 
or more than ﬁve kilometers for students in grades ﬁve to eight), 
 • Maintenance of schools and equipment, and 
 • Capital expenditures (according to the standards approved by the Ministry). 
Table 4.
Percent Division of Education Expenditures of Decentralized Expenditures for 
Primary and Secondary Schools (Split between Types of Cost)
Year Material and Financial 
Expenditures
Maintenance, Investments and Capital 
Expenditures
2001 94.56 5.44
2002 84.48 15.52
2003 76.58 23.42
2004 75.60 24.40
2005 71.77 28.23
2006 71.61 28.39
Source: Ministry of Science, Education, and Sport.
Each year the level of resources directed toward decentralized costs changes. One 
can notice an increase in the level of funding for capital expenditures. Since the start 
of the decentralization of education ﬁnancing, there has been a visible increase in the 
yearly percentage of the contribution of local government revenues and equalization 
funds allocated to education (Table 5). 
Table 5.
Percent Contributions of National and Local Government to Education Expenditure 
(HRK thousands)
Sources 2001* 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total funds 4,987,984 5,458,695 6,030,140 6,434,351 6,759,535 7,152,907
Local government 
contribution to education 326,896 881,763 1,068,615 1,111,692 1,265,003 1,333,712
Percent of contributions 
for decentralized sources 6.55 16.15 17.72 17.28 18.71 18.64
Source: Ministry of Science, Education, and Sport.
Note: * Decentralized since July 1, 2001.
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The speciﬁc decentralized costs of secondary schools consist of: 
 • General costs for schools, 
 • Heating and lighting in schools, 
 • Transportation costs for employees, 
 • Participation in costs of boarding dormitories for students (a total of 53 boarding 
houses),
 • Maintenance of schools and equipment, and 
 • Capital expenditures (according to the standards approved by the ministry).
A notable decreasing trend in capital expenditures ﬁnanced from the central budget 
has inﬂuenced the increase of funds at the local level (see Tables 4 and 5). These funds 
are distributed to the local government (towns or municipalities), according to the 
number of school buildings, classes, and students. 
The amounts of planned costs for diﬀerent MoSES’s programs15 are shown in Table 6. 
Most of the local governments in Croatia use additional income taxes, collected 
locally. The diﬀerence between additional, locally-collected income taxes in towns 
and municipalities, and the level of resources needed to cover the minimal standard, 
is received from equalization funds (e.g., for the maintenance of old school buildings, 
regional-level student competitions, additional programs for students, and the transport 
of students that live less than three kilometers from school). Equalization funds are allo-
cated in the annual State Budget Law. This sum is deﬁned annually, placed in the Ministry 
of Finance, then distributed among three bodies (MoSES, the Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare, and the Croatian National Protection and Rescue Directorate). 
For example, the criterion for the allocation of resources to cover material and 
ﬁnancial expenditure in secondary schools equals the number of enrolled pupils in a 
certain year multiplied by the average annual cost per pupil. The average annual cost is 
set for each individual local government unit.
Croatian education ﬁnance experts believe that the methodology for fund allocation 
should be based on a per-student formula. While the current method—based on an 
average per-student cost—does take into account some diﬀerences in per-student costs 
generated by population density,16 equally important factors are not adjusted for—such 
as heating cost diﬀerences, transportation issues, minorities, students with special 
needs, etc. A formula would make things more straightforward and would increase the 
eﬃciency in fund distribution.
Private primary and secondary schools can be co-ﬁnanced by the state budget, 
according to criteria identiﬁed by the minister. Resources for co-ﬁnancing are secured 
in the central budget.17 The resources approved for the current expenses are based on 
measures approved by the minister and amount to 30 percent of the educational cost 
for students in public schools. The ministry subsidizes private schools based on a policy 
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intended to encourage private education and thus create competition between private and 
state schools. In Croatia, there are 12 private primary schools and 22 private secondary 
schools. Nevertheless, the number of students in these schools is smaller than in the 
public schools. In total, only 0.2 percent of primary school students and one percent 
of secondary school students attend private schools. Apparently, ﬁnancial measures are 
not enough to stimulate educational diversity in Croatia, and increase the likelihood 
that parents will opt for private schooling for their children. Because private education 
in Croatia does not have a long tradition, it is diﬃcult to draw more conclusions based 
on the present ﬁnancial data.
Table 6.
Croatian Education Budget for 2007
Type of Program HRK Percent 
Ministry’s administration and common services 112,768,237 1.14
Joint educational programs 116,104,235 1.17
Preschool 22,716,000 0.23
Primary schools 4,113,155,192 41.28
Secondary schools and housing 2,032,586,849 20.40
Sports 115,030,133 1.11
Higher education 2,348,046.,338 23.56
Research and scientific work 840,011.,410 8.43
National information infrastructure 97,126,889 0.98
Technology and development 113,125,718 1.14
International cooperation 55,084,000 0.56
Total for MoSES 9,965,755,001 100.00
 Education and Teacher Training Agency 292,195,913
 Agency for Adult Education 8,427,545
 Agency for Vocational Education 20,088,490
 Agency for Science and Higher Education 12,158,178
 Croatian Academic and Research Network 90,236,987
 SRCE University Computing Center 25,444,879
 National Center for External Evaluation of Education 35,224,703
Total 10,449,531,696
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Preschool education is organized and ﬁnanced at the local level.18 According to 
Article 50 of the Law on Preschool Education, preschool education is co-ﬁnanced from 
the central budget for children with special needs, gifted children, who represent a total 
of 1,700 children from ethnic minorities (Czech, Roma, Serbian, and Italian children), 
and preschool programs (total of 16,000 children who were not involved in regular 
kindergarten programs in 2005). MoSES has determined the criteria for the co-ﬁnancing 
of preschool programs that include the number of children and the number of hours 
that children spend in preschool education.19 MoSES approves preschool education 
investments for each ﬁscal year. Investment expenditures from 2001 until 2006 are 
presented in Table 7. The source of funding is ensured by both MoSES funds and also 
by decentralized funds that include both local government revenues and equalization 
funds, thus the level is constantly increasing.
As Table 7 shows, between 2001 and 2006, there is a slight increase in total funds 
and a decrease in capital expenditures. This change is due to the fact that the central 
government governs preschool institutions. Nevertheless, the central government made 
investments in the areas where local government does not have a ﬁscal capacity to set 
up preschools.
Table 7.
Preschool Education Investments from the Central Budget 2001–2006 
(HRK Thousands) 
Program Description 2001 2002 2003 2004 200520 200621
Special needs 4,369 4,937 4,087 7,186 7,200 7,200
Gifted children — — 500 1,200 1,500 1,700
Ethnic minorities 841 885 1,081 1,500 1,500 1,500
Preschool (short preparation 
for primary school)
— — 1,200 3,600 4,000 4,000
Total 5,210 5,822 6,868 13,486 14,200 14,400
Capital expenditures 2,757 4,800 13,442 10,032 7,000 3,366
Grand total 7,967 10,622 20,310 23,518 21,200 17,766
THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK FOR EDUCATION FINANCING
Local governments are partially responsible for funding schools as a result of recent 
decentralization eﬀorts. Though this does not inﬂuence the level of school ﬁnance, 
it inﬂuences school quality. In the centralized system, the central government was 
unable to recognize local problems in education. One of the advantages of ﬁnancial 
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decentralization is in the fact the local government has better insight into region-speciﬁc 
problems and can channel funds to address the speciﬁc needs of a school.
The secondary-school network was always under municipal responsibility. Thus, 
decentralization had no signiﬁcant impact on the curriculum in the secondary schools. 
Nevertheless, the level of expenditures increased and there has been a noticeable impact 
on the proliferation of schools. An increase in school numbers occurred in all parts of 
Croatia, not only in the areas where refugees returned. The reason for this is directly 
linked to the planned transfer to one-shift schools, while most of the schools are still 
working in two shifts. 
In addition to the funds provided by the center—which cover the minimum stan-
dards in education—local governments are encouraged to participate in the ﬁnancing 
of primary and secondary education. Consequently, local governments oﬀer grants 
for student participation in local competitions, purchase school equipment, etc. State 
competitions are ﬁnanced from the central budget. Additionally, schools raise their own 
revenues from donations and can earn money by renting school premises. This source 
of revenue is monitored by the school founders, but is not reported to the MoSES. 
MoSES monitors and analyses total expenditures for decentralized functions in 21 
counties and 32 towns. In each ﬁscal year, the monitoring is conducted through tables 
for the two periods: January through June and January through December. 
The current education system has insuﬃcient capabilities to cope with the structural 
change presented by decentralization. Improvements in the quality of education are 
not possible in the absence of skilled human resources, such as local ﬁnancial experts 
and managers. There is a deﬁnite need to strengthen the capacity of school directors, 
specialists in education, and ﬁnancial experts at the level of the local government. 
Additionally, there is an ongoing need to bring teachers to remote areas. Existing 
administrative and ﬁnancial arrangements do not attract and retain good teachers. 
Complete ﬁnancial decentralization would negatively impact teacher salaries in poorer 
areas where local government are not in the position to oﬀer attractive salaries. This 
should be compensated with other government forms of support, such as subsidized 
home loans.22 
According to the data there exists a decrease in the student–teacher ratio (see Table 
8). This is directly related to demographic changes and the decrease of the student popu-
lation in schools. Although there is a decrease in number of students in classes, there is 
no change in the number of actual classes. Consequently, in the time period from 1994 
until 2004, the average number of students in primary school classes decreased from 
24 to 21 (MoSES 2005).23 This change is related to the apparent drop in the birth rate 
and the continuous increase in number of schools and teachers. 
There was a visible increase in the number of schools from 2001 to 2006, which was 
due to the return of refugees and renewal of schools destroyed during the war. These 
new schools have opened in areas under special state concern.24 
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Table 8.
Trends in Student Numbers and their Relationship 
to Numbers of Teachers, Schools 
Year Number of 
Students
Number of 
Teachers
Number of 
Schools
Teacher–student 
Ratio
Average Number of 
Students in School
Primary Schools
2001 412,360 31,062 893 13.27 462
2002 408,424 30,922 893 13.20 457
2003 406,564 31,694 900 12.82 452
2004 406,712 33,256 902 12.22 451
2005 402,776 33,926 904 11.87 446
2006 397,962 34,616 915 11.50 435
Secondary Schools
2001 193,377 15,689 378 12.32 512
2002 191,499 15,586 379 12.28 505
2003 190,776 15,635 384 12.20 497
2004 187,657 16,085 385 11.66 487
2005 187,715 16,473 385 11.40 487
2006 186,226 16,685 388 11.16 480
Source: Ministry of Science, Education, and Sport.
Note: As of October 31 of each year.
The number of students in Croatian schools is decreasing due to demographic 
reasons; this occurrence has a direct impact on the student–teacher ratio. In addition, 
there is an increase in the number of teachers due to the inclusion of two obligatory 
foreign languages in the school curriculum. Students are starting to learn their ﬁrst 
foreign language in the ﬁrst grade of primary school, and the second foreign language 
in the fourth grade of primary school. In the past, students were commonly learning 
one foreign language, and foreign-language learning started in the fourth grade.
Parents do have the right to choose a school for their child. Private primary and 
secondary schools contribute to the diversity and quality of educational opportunities 
in Croatia. But additional research should be conducted in order to determine a degree 
to which the existing framework stimulates equity and eﬃciency in the allocation of 
resources. When determining resource allocations to certain programs, policymakers 
should take into account short-term outcomes (e.g., gained knowledge, skills, and 
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competencies) and long-term outcomes (e.g., employability of students that graduate 
from certain secondary school programs). 
Equity in the allocation of resources is obtained by the Equalization Fund. The 
fund serves those towns and counties that do not meet the minimum standards as 
determined by MoSES. The main diﬀerence between towns and municipalities is, 
in fact, that municipalities and towns that are opening new schools do receive larger 
funds. It is important to emphasize that additional resources from equalization funds 
are received when the local governments prove that they are opening new programs. 
These are regular equalization fund resources, as just one town in Croatia is meeting the 
minimal standards, while the majority of towns and counties are meeting just 35–40 
percent of the minimum standards.25 The minimum standards, which are expenditure 
based, are set by the government each year and announced in the oﬃcial periodicals. 
The additional funds are not included in the macroeconomic indicators of the cost of 
living stated by the central government. All of the municipalities and towns have the 
same index of growth, and the principle of solidarity and equality is followed. Still, if 
the municipality or town is wealthy they can devote more money to their schools. It is 
important that the state guarantees the same minimum standards for all.
It is important to emphasize that local governments are receiving additional funds 
for larger numbers of new students and for new schools. Nevertheless, when there is a 
decrease in the number of students, the funds for the particular school do not decrease. 
Since the school funding is not directly linked to inter-school competition for students, 
it is possible to conclude that the current educational ﬁnances do not stimulate a variety 
of educational oﬀerings. Nevertheless, the variety of educational oﬀerings is stimulated 
by additional ﬁnancing for the education of minorities, while religious and private 
education stimulate the variety. 
School management can encourage the eﬃcient use of resources, but cannot 
signiﬁcantly contribute to expenditure eﬃciency. Still, if the school director has an 
entrepreneur’s attitude, she or he can do a lot for the school. The school director can 
organize donor events and collect money for the school. Also, it is common to rent the 
school facilities, though schools never solely rely on this type of income. Funds that are 
collected through donor events and the renting of school facilities are under the direct 
monitoring of the school founders (the local government) and the school owner (the 
school) for elementary schools. This cannot be done without the approval of a school 
founder (this would be the town for primary schools or a municipality for primary and 
secondary schools). 
The teacher unions support teachers’ rights and also have an impact on the national 
and local educational policies in Croatia. Since salary policies have never been decen-
tralized, this responsibility is managed from the center, though unions also have an 
inﬂuence on salaries. 
The majority of the schools have expressed their satisfaction with the decentraliza-
tion of educational ﬁnances. However, there are some complaints—coming mainly from 
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schools—pertaining to the increased control of local governments over the allocation 
of local resources. 
CONCLUSION 
The Croatian education system is centralized in terms of schools’ management and 
human resources, as well as in the establishment and implementation of the curriculum. 
Due to ﬁnancial decentralization eﬀorts, in the last three years, signiﬁcant changes 
occurred in terms of resource allocation. Not all of them, however, are what is needed. 
While towns and municipalities are able to better relate to the needs of schools, there 
are signiﬁcant disparities among the regions in terms of resource allocation. 
When working from the central position, there is a desire to act equally towards 
everybody, though on certain occasions, this is neither possible nor appropriate. Hence, 
it is not surprising that ongoing decentralization eﬀorts are accepted by interested parties, 
both at the level of local and central governments. The closure and opening of schools 
is left to local governments, which creates the opportunity for school network ratio-
nalization, but the distribution of the students among schools is not well deﬁned and 
frequently interferes with the school networks. While certain municipalities managed to 
ﬁnd appropriate school-network solutions, others are not in a position to plan an entirely 
eﬃcient school network. These are school networks that include remote mountainous 
areas and islands, where the central government wants to retain the population and thus 
it is necessary to keep open schools with a small number of pupils. The local education-
ﬁnance specialists plan the minimum standards at the local level and then address them 
to MoSES. These local government plans are based on macroeconomic guidelines from 
Ministry of Finance for each ﬁscal year. These plans are collected and negotiated with 
the MoSES ﬁnancial experts, where the Ministry of Finance acknowledges the minimum 
standards in accordance with the yearly state budget. Hence, minimal standards that are 
prepared by the ﬁnancial department of the MoSES are based on plans of 53 founders 
(transfer of school founding rights happened on January 1, 2002) and are accepted by 
the central government after negotiations with the Ministry of Finance. Based on these 
standards, each municipality and county has a clear idea of how much money they 
have for each year. Local government acts independently with regard to how they will 
divide these funds to the schools. If the municipality is rich, they can invest additional 
funds in education.
In the years to come, additional ﬁnancial decentralization measures will be imple-
mented. According to these measures, salaries for auxiliary personnel will be ﬁnanced 
from local budgets. This, however, is the only portion of the salary policy that will prob-
ably be decentralized, as it would be extremely diﬃcult to decentralize teacher salaries, 
which would lead to understaﬃng in the areas with lower income levels. The founder 
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of the schools will ﬁnance overheads and current maintenance, minor investments, and 
equipment. The founder will also ﬁnance capital investments, while the central state 
can intervene when the ﬁscal capacity of the local government is lower. 
It is crucial to establish clearer educational ﬁnancing policies to address several 
problems, such as the low number of students that are attending private schools or 
alternative programs oﬀered by public schools. Prior to deciding on the allocation of 
resources, policymakers should determine the viability of the existing programs based 
on their outcomes. 
It is important to emphasize that, in the period from 2001 to 2007, the ﬁnancial 
decentralization system passed through many changes and improvements. The process 
of ﬁnancial decentralization is inﬂuenced by the fact that there is no unique political 
decision on further ﬁnancial decentralization eﬀorts. One of the proposals was to place 
salary funds on a local level and assure money for salaries in equalization funds. The 
MoSES ﬁnancial experts currently are working on an acceptable model for the decen-
tralization of salaries, where local governments would have increased powers in deciding 
the level of salaries for teachers.
Current ﬁnancing arrangements cannot address the problem of the lack of teachers 
in the remote areas. The trend of decreasing salaries will endanger the quality of teaching 
as well as professional selection mechanisms for teachers. Consequently, it is necessary 
to improve teachers’ ﬁnancial status. 
School directors’ readiness to hold managerial functions would enhance the variety 
of the educational oﬀerings for their schools. Furthermore, it is necessary to extend 
teachers’ leadership responsibilities, which should match their competences and expe-
rience. Various forms of in-service training would positively inﬂuence opportunities 
for a more ﬂexible deployment of teachers. For this reason, it is necessary to establish 
leadership and management training courses for both teachers and school directors.
In his review of the status of decentralization eﬀorts in four Central European 
countries, Davey (2002)26 concluded that neither of these eﬀorts oﬀers an ideal solution. 
Still, examples from other countries might be useful in the further decentralization of 
Croatian education, and in structuring the formula for the division of funds. 
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Executive Summary
Emerging during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Macedonia voted for an independence refer-
endum and escaped the armed conﬂict that destroyed many other former Yugoslav republics. 
But it experienced its own ethnic strife and limited civil war in 2001 that ended with the 
signing of the Ohrid Agreement. Since then Macedonia started a unique attempt to defuse 
ethnic tension through a far-reaching decentralization of all major social functions. 
The 2001 Ohrid agreement brought about a complete turnaround in the policies pursued 
by the Macedonian central government, which had before, in response to economic decline 
following independence, centralized the country. For over a decade, the education sector 
was ﬁnanced directly from the central budgets, because Yugoslavian-type local councils 
were too poor to even pay teacher salaries. No longer autonomous, schools were made the 
direct responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Science (MoES). School boards powers 
were severely restricted, and even their statutory powers, such as opinions regarding the 
appointment of school directors, were frequently disregarded by MoES. The Ohrid Agreement 
reversed this trend. Between 2004 and 2005, the process really began when new structures 
of ﬁnancing were put in place and more responsibilities were devolved from the central 
government to local governments. 
Macedonia, like all post-communist countries, was facing a serious demographic 
decline, which particularly affected education. Between 1999–2003, the number of students 
in primary school decreased about nine percent, class size decreased by 3.7 percent, and 
teachers by 1.7 percent. Still, Macedonia’s student–teacher ratio remained compatible with 
the OECD average: 16.5 in primary education and 13.6 in secondary. As a percentage of 
GDP, expenditures for primary and secondary education had fallen from 3.19 percent in 
1998 to 2.84 percent in 2003. 
The budgeting system developed in Macedonia recognized different sources of funds 
for schools: from the state budget, own revenues (including rent of school properties and 
some payments from parents, such as a participation fee in secondary education), and 
grants and donations (mainly from foreign donors); schools had to prepare a separate 
ﬁnancial plan for each revenue stream. In reality, extrabudgetary resources covered only a 
fraction of overall school’s budget and no funds could be transferred between categories 
even if shortages appeared. Of a typical school’s budget, about 85–90 percent was spent 
on salaries, eight percent on goods and services, four percent on student transport, and 
two percent on investments.
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The budget for teachers’ salaries was calculated in two steps, on the basis of two norms. 
The number of teaching positions ﬁrst was determined on the basis of teaching plans for 
every grade in every type of school as established by the Bureau for the Development of 
Education. Class size was also subject to its approval. The number of classes was then used 
to allocate teaching positions. Salaries were awarded according to a set of criteria on quali-
ﬁcations, seniority, and other factors in addition to a base coefﬁcient, the UNR, or normative 
unqualiﬁed employee, the amount of which has only been amended once, in 2002. 
Interestingly, equity in education has internalized divisions over ethnicity and rural/urban 
divisions within the territorial-administrative units of Macedonia. A complicated portrait 
emerges from a comparison of schools, class sizes, and expenditures per student in Skopje, 
large cities (over 50,000 inhabitants), small cities, rural municipalities, and Macedonia as a 
whole. Indeed, the demand for education is so high in some Albanian areas, whether urban 
or rural, that students attend school in morning and afternoon shifts. This is less likely in 
Macedonian schools, partly because of different birth rates in the two communities. 
The Law on Local Government of 2002 was the ﬁrst of a series of legal acts, including 
the Law on Local Government Finance of 2004, amendments to the laws on primary and 
secondary education in the same year, and also the Law on Territorial Division—redeﬁning 
municipality boundaries to reduce the number from 124 to 85—that completely changed 
the legal and ﬁnancial framework within which local governments operate. 
In particular, local authorities were given more opportunities to levy local fees and 
charges, and received block, categorical, and capital grants from the central government, 
as well as shares of personal income tax. An equalization fund, albeit rather weak, was 
also put into place. 
Phase I of decentralization transferred responsibilities for maintenance, repairs and 
material expenditures to municipalities. While the responsibilities regarding “establishing, 
ﬁnancing, and administering of primary and secondary schools” were transferred to munici-
palities, school boards were re-empowered to select and dismiss the school director, form 
a budget, and adopt school statutes. However, numerous legal intricacies regarding the 
ownership of school facilities have hampered and delayed their transfer to local govern-
ments. Phase II of decentralization included transfer of responsibilities for salaries. 
The decentralization process in Macedonia was accompanied by many training programs 
for local ofﬁcials (usually funded by donors), by production and distribution of guidebooks 
and other supportive documentation for both local administrations and the school boards, 
and by some institutional framework designed to limit conﬂicts (managed by the Ministry of 
Local Governments). Nevertheless, the process was not easy to implement, due to opposi-
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tion from many sources within the country. Consolidation of municipalities was one of the 
most controversial steps. 
Certainly, many rural municipalities faced an extraordinary challenge in funding and 
maintaining their schools, especially in rural and mountainous areas. To address this issue, 
MoES adopted speciﬁc formulas for allocation of categorical and block grants in education. 
The lump sum in the allocation formula is provided for the basic ﬁxed costs of education. 
The per-student amount is then weighted according to population density. A separate 
formula was used for the categorical grant for student transportation. Overall, Macedonia 
has been successful in designing and implementing a formula driven system of ﬁnancing 
education.
By all accounts, education decentralization has given local governments real power, and 
they have taken seriously their duties to assess, manage, and rebuild their schools, optimize 
the networks, and improve the budgeting process. Urgent tasks for the future include 
addressing past school debts, completing the transfer of ownership of school properties, 
introducing proper monitoring procedures and tools, and adopting a modiﬁed normative 
on school conditions and teaching aids and equipment. None of this could have happened 
without the overriding political determination to implement the Ohrid Agreement and 
without a long planning and preparation stage.
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INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Macedonia emerged from the disintegrating Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia in a relatively calm manner, through an independence referendum and 
without the armed conﬂicts that devastated many other former Yugoslav republics. 
Nevertheless, the country faced quite severe tensions. Some of those tensions were 
external in nature, due to continuing conﬂicts in surrounding countries (the conﬂict 
in Kosovo and tension with Greece over Macedonian national symbols and its consti-
tutional name, see ICG 2001a). The main source of internal tension was the economic 
collapse of the country, with GDP to this day still more than 20 percent below its 1990 
level. The country also experienced a short-lived armed insurrection in 2001 (a spillover 
from the conﬂict in Kosovo, see ICG 2001b), which was terminated with the signing in 
Ohrid of the Framework Agreement. The Ohrid Agreement deﬁnes the basic directions 
of the future development of Macedonia, namely, the devolution of signiﬁcant powers 
to municipalities in many sectors of the public life, including education. 
The decentralization eﬀort undertaken in Macedonia since 2001 is a dramatic and 
complete reversal of policies pursued since independence in 1992. Indeed, in response 
to economic diﬃculties and the general turmoil in the surrounding Balkan countries, 
the newly independent Macedonia abandoned the Yugoslav tradition of local self-
government and centralized all sectors. The 34 former municipalities, with their far-
reaching autonomy and ﬁnancial independence, were broken in 1996 into 124 much 
smaller and much weaker jurisdictions, with very little authority and very small budgets. 
The ill-deﬁned revenues of municipalities, especially a very complex and irrational 
equalization system, together with inadequate budgetary control and poor auditing, 
quickly saddled the municipalities with ever-growing debt. 
The centralization was particularly severe in the education sector, within both the 
political and ﬁnancial dimensions. The political dimension of centralization was to 
break the schools’ autonomy and to make schools directly responsible to the Ministry of 
Education and Science (MoES). Thus, although formerly inﬂuential school boards still 
functioned, their powers were taken away and transferred to the ministry. All respon-
sibility for the development of schools, their closure and opening, was taken over by 
MoES. The most extreme and painful example of this process was the nomination and 
dismissal of all school directors in the country by the decision of the minister himself. 
The school boards retained some advisory role, but their voice was routinely disregarded, 
leading to politicization of the process of selection of school directors. The resulting 
turnover of school directors had a lasting and damaging eﬀect on education. At the 
same time, centralization meant that some schools received preferential treatment due 
to their better links with the responsible ministry oﬃcials. 
The ﬁnancial dimension of centralization was no less extreme than the political 
one. Budgets of all the schools were decided by the MoES, which decided on the 
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use of funds allocated from the state budget, and the approval of which was required 
for the use of funds earned by the schools. All school expenditures went through the 
centralized treasury system operated by the Ministry of Finance. Thus, for instance, if a 
student wanted to buy a subscription to Drugarche (Little Friend, a weekly for children 
aged 7–12), the money for this purpose had to be included in the ﬁnancial plan of the 
school, in the own revenues part of the budget. Parents paid the subscription to the 
school, the school deposited the funds in the treasury system, the money after a few days 
reached the school account of the treasury system, and the director ﬁnally authorized the 
payment to the publisher. If the subscription was not included in the ﬁnancial plan, the 
director could not make the payment order, with the Ministry of Finance responsible 
for verifying that all transactions were within the pre-deﬁned limits, by every school, 
by every detailed budget line, and by the source of funds (budget funds, own revenues, 
grants, or other).  
Nevertheless, as already indicated, the new thinking about public governance in 
general, and about the management and ﬁnancing of education in particular, following 
the Ohrid Agreement, very strongly favors decentralization. Initially construed as a way 
of resolving ethnic tensions, decentralization is now seen as a new way for the evolu-
tion of the Macedonian state. For the education sector, this poses an entirely new set of 
challenges and diﬃculties, and much to the credit of Macedonian authorities, a serious 
debate and analysis is ongoing, with a growing number of ministries actively involved 
in the shaping of the new structure of responsibilities and ﬁnancing. Among the most 
active of those is the Ministry of Education and Science, which adopted an Education 
Decentralization Strategy in 2004. MoES has thus made the ﬁrst careful steps towards 
decentralization of education and already has accumulated signiﬁcant decentralization 
experiences. 
Our report is structured to reﬂect the initial situation of complete centralization, the 
preparations to begin decentralization in 2004–2005, and the ﬁrst experiences of decen-
tralization as implemented in 2005. First, we analyze the ﬁnancing of the initial central-
ized system, with special emphasis not only on the normative budgeting procedures, but 
on the equity and eﬃciency of the Macedonian education system. Then we review the 
preparations for decentralization, and the planning of the MoES to manage and ﬁnance 
decentralized education. We outline this new experience in the last section. 
MANAGEMENT AND FINANCING OF 
CENTRALIZED EDUCATION SYSTEM
In the introduction, we described some extreme examples of education centralization 
in Macedonia. The primary motivation to centralize was to control spending, especially 
the spending on salaries, in a period of ﬁscal constraints. A system of allocation norms 
110
P U B L I C  M O N E Y  F O R  P U B L I C  S C H O O L S
for salaries, and for material expenditures was meant to ensure a basic level of equity 
of school funding, and in some measure succeeded, although the achievements in this 
area are mixed. However, this blocked any local initiatives in the system, while the 
centralized government was unable, despite its considerable powers in the sector, to 
ensure eﬃciency and equity. In particular, it was unable to react to growing tensions 
and to shifting demographic patterns. The many small schools in rural communities 
continue to provide deﬁcient education at a very high unit cost, while vocational schools 
are underinvested in and still tuned to traditional Macedonian industries that are no 
longer operating.
Overview of Macedonian Education
We begin with a short preview of the main indicators over the past years, such as 
the number of schools, students, classes, expenditures, average cost per student, and 
average cost per class. Table 1 provides the basic indicators for primary education, where 
we have included only the regular primary schools2 (this approach is chosen because 
there are large variations in ﬁnancing of diﬀerent types of schools). 
Table 1.
Indicators for Primary Education
School Year 1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04
Number 
of schools
342 342 342 343 344
Students 254,828 248,469 244,211 238,050 232,143
Classes 10,328 10,097 10,065 10,036 9,940
Teachers 12,562 12,240 11,968 12,277 12,351
Expenditures 
(MKD)
4,098,829,790 4,091,082,203 4,023,339,026 4,446,298,723 4,768,792,293
Average cost/
student (MKD)
16,085 16,465 16,475 18,678 20,542
Average cost/class 
(MKD)
396,866 405,178 399,736 443,035 479,758
Class size 24.6 24.6 24.3 23.7 23.3
Student–teacher 
ratio
20.3 20.3 20.4 19.4 18.8
Between 1999 and 2003, the number of students in primary school decreased by 
about 8.9 percent. This was accompanied by a decrease in the number of classes by 3.7 
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percent and of teachers by 1.6 percent. It seems that the Macedonian education system 
was unable to adjust the teaching force to the decreasing student population, and the 
student–teacher ratio decreased by only 7.3 percent. At the same time, the class size 
decreased by about 5.2 percent. Still, the student–teacher ratio is in line with OECD 
averages of 16.5 students per teacher in primary education, and 13.6 students per teacher 
in secondary education (Education at a Glance 2003). The following table shows the 
evolution of student–teacher ratio, for primary and secondary education.
Table 2.
The Evolution of the Student–teacher Ratio (Primary and Secondary Education)
Year Primary Secondary
Students Teachers Student– 
teacher 
Ratio
Students Teachers Student– 
teacher 
Ratio
1999–2000 254,828 12,562 20.29 91,083 5.350 17.02
2000–2001 248,901 12,240 20.34 91.644 5.420 16.91
2001–2002 244,211 11,968 20.41 93,206 5.545 16.81
2002–2003 238,060 12,277 19.39 94,854 5.696 16.65
2003–2004 232,143 12,351 18.80 94,973 5.171 18.37
Between the school years 2001–2002 and 2003–2004 the average cost per class 
increased from MKD 399,736 to 479,759, an increase of 20 percent. This is due to 
an increase of 19 percent of UNR (normative unqualiﬁed employee) in 2002 (see the 
section on ﬁnancing). In the same time, the average cost per student increased from MKD 
16,475 to 20,542 , an increase of 25 percent. This increase is slightly higher because of 
a three percent decrease of the average class size at that time.
Table 3 presents the main indicators for secondary education. Here, from the total 
of 91 secondary schools in Macedonia of diﬀerent types,3 we have selected 81 regular 
schools (gymnasia, vocational, and mixed). Due to the lack of data we can present only 
ﬁgures for two consecutive school years. 
As we can see from Table 3, the average cost per student in 2003–2004 was MKD 
19,604 and the average cost per class was MKD 612,144. This is somewhat lower than 
the average for primary schools, because the above tables include the budget funds only 
(funds received from the state budget). Since the own revenues of schools account for 
about 18.9 percent of total secondary school budgets (see section on ﬁnancing), we 
obtain that Macedonian education is in line with OECD norms, with secondary schools 
about 20 percent more expensive per student than primary schools. 
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Table 3.
Secondary Education Finance
Only Regular Schools Included School Year
2002–03 2003–04
Number of schools 81 81
Students 92,553 93,267
Classes 2,945 2,982
Expenditures (MKD) 1,702,082,524 1,828,395,328
Average cost per student 18,390 19,604
Average cost per class 577,957 613,144
Financing Procedures
The education budget in ﬁscal year 2003 represented 13 percent of the state budget 
and 2.8 percent of GDP. 
Table 4.
 Education Expenditures as Percent of State Budget (2003)
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Primary education 10.54 9.13 7.90 7.19 6.74 9.23
Secondary education 4.00 3.50 3.00 2.89 2.66 3.55
Total 14.54 12.63 10.90 10.08 9.40 12.78
Table 5.
Education Expenditures as Percent of GDP (2003)
 
 
Percent of GDP
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Primary education 2.31 2.17 1.93 1.84 2.00 2.05
Secondary education 0.88 0.83 0.73 0.74 0.79 0.79
Total 3.19 3.00 2.66 2.58 2.79 2.84
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Most of the education budget is spent on primary and secondary education.
Table 6.
Share of Primary and Secondary Education in the Total Budget for Education (2003)
 Percent of Education Budget
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Primary education 55.45 57.86 57.33 55.20 53.07 56.44
Secondary education 21.04 22.19 21.80 22.21 20.91 21.70
Total 76.49 80.05 79.13 77.41 73.98 78.14
Figure 1 shows this division in more detail for 2003. 
Figure 1.4
Allocation of the Education Budget
Current sources of education ﬁnancing are:
 • The state budget,
 • Income from institutions (such as rent of premises),
 • Own income,5 and
 • Grants and donations from foreign donors. 
The main source of education ﬁnancing is the education budget (95 percent in 
primary and 80 percent in secondary education). Extrabudgetary resources are used to 
compensate a very limited level of budget allocations, especially maintenance. 
Primary education 56.44%
Secondary education 21.70%
Tertiary education 11.93% Student standard (secondary) 1.94%
Student standard (tertiary) 3.65%
Science 1.65%
Administration 0.95%
Science institutions 1.74%
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Table 7.
Structure of Expenditure in Primary and Secondary Education by Sources (2003)
Level Budget
(%)
Income from 
Institutions (%)
Self-ﬁnancing
(%)
Grants
(%)
Primary 94.34 0.36  5.18 0.12
Secondary 79.65 1.05 18.92 0.38
It must be stressed that every school must prepare a separate ﬁnancial plan for each 
of four revenue streams. Schools have separate accounts for each source of income and 
are not allowed to transfer money from one account to another without permission 
from the ministry (and since 2007, without the permission of the appropriate local 
government). 
Between 1996–2004, the Ministry of Education and Science had a central role in 
the entire process of budgeting and execution of education funds. According to instruc-
tions given by the Ministry of Finance, it prepared ﬁnancial plans for individual schools. 
In order to do this, MoES must reconcile the overall insuﬃcient allocation provided 
by the Ministry of Finance in the budget law with the detailed norms and criteria for 
staﬃng levels, good and services (maintenance), the so-called transfers (transportation 
and accommodation of students), and capital investments. Those norms and criteria 
were approved by the ministry itself, and usually could not be satisﬁed with the funds 
provided in the budget law. When the funds were insuﬃcient, MoES protected salaries 
and then heating expenditures. During the execution of the budgets, the Ministry of 
Finance approved transfers monthly by budget lines and controlled the spending of 
money. 
About 85–90 percent of the education budget is generally spent on salaries, eight 
percent on goods and services, four percent on student transport, and two percent on 
investments. 
Table 8.
Structure of Expenditures by Budget Categories, Primary Education6 (1998–2003)
Year Salaries Maintenance Student Transport 
and Accommodation
Investments
1998 84.65 8.40 4.32 2.63
1999 86.41 7.47 4.44 1.69
2000 82.37 7.25 8.30 2.08
2001 83.88 9.21 5.35 1.56
2002 81.75 10.95 5.93 1.37
2003 85.68 7.85 4.25 2.23
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A comparison of primary and secondary education shows that there are no expen-
ditures on transportation for secondary education (there is only a legal obligation of the 
state to transport students to schools for non-obligatory education), so correspondingly, 
the shares of expenditures on salaries and maintenance are somewhat lower. 
The criteria for the allocation of funds of each category are diﬀerent and will be 
described separately.
Table 9.
Structure of Expenditures by Budget Categories, Secondary Education (1998–2003)
Year Salaries Maintenance Student Transport 
and Accommodation
Investments
1998 88.90 8.11 0.13 2.86
1999 90.06 7.08 0.11 2.75
2000 88.21 6.98 2.54 2.27
2001 86.73 8.94 1.19 3.13
2002 85.01 12.04 0.00 2.95
2003 89.60 8.16 0.00 2.24
Staﬀ Salaries 
Staﬀ salaries are calculated in two steps, on the basis of two sets of norms. The ﬁrst 
set of norms deﬁnes the employment level for each school, controlled directly by the 
ministry. The second step consists of calculating the salaries of teachers and of non-
teaching staﬀ. 
The number of teaching positions is determined on the basis of the programmatic 
standards (teaching plans for every grade in every type of school, established by the 
Bureau for the Development of Education).7 The ministry also uses class-size norms, 
namely 25 to 34 students per class (smaller classes may be formed only with the ministry’s 
approval), for both the primary and secondary schools. Every school year, for every 
school and every grade, the ministry monitors the division of students into classes, 
intervening if they are too small. 
The number of classes is then used to allocate teaching positions for each school. 
The total required teaching time (number of lessons per week) is added for all classes 
for each school, and divided by 20: that is the weekly teaching load of the teacher, used 
to yield the number of teaching positions. Even fully-employed teachers will be paid 
only for the classes they actually teach each year. 
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Teachers are employed in the school by the director, after a selection process, in 
which the school board also participates. After one year, a new teacher has to pass an 
exam. The teacher may be employed for a ﬁxed time (usually for one year, extended 
yearly) or for an indeterminate period. 
A separate set of norms governs the employment of non-teaching staﬀ, as described 
in Table 10. 
Table 10.
Employment Norms for Primary Schools8
Position Criteria
Director One per school that is a legal entity
Deputy director For schools with over 24 classes
Pedagogue One for up to 24 classes, two for above 24 classes 
Administrator The same
Librarian One half for up to 24 classes, one for over 24 classes 
Cleaning staff Depending on the school area, number of shifts, and type of heating
Maintenance staff One guard, one technical administrator, one heating operator, plus 
additional staff for satellite schools
Determination of salaries is based on speciﬁc criteria that include the following 
elements:
 1) Education level of staﬀ,
 2) Work experience (years of employment),
 3) Managing position,
 4) Special conditions (joined grades teaching, special classes),
 5) Work in mountains and places near the border, and
 6) Pedagogic titles.9
The basic unit for the calculation of salaries is the UNR (normative unqualiﬁed 
employee). Between 1992 (when the system was introduced) and 1994, the value of 
UNR was changed every year according to inﬂation. Between 1994 and 2002, the value 
of UNR was frozen at MKD 3,370. In 2002, the UNR was increased 19 percent of its 
present value of MKD 4,000. 
The main factor in calculating salaries is the coeﬃcient for employees’ education 
level.10  
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Table 11.
Coeﬃcient for Employee Education Level (Primary and Secondary Schools)
Education Level M-r VSP VSS SSS NSS VKV KV PKV NKV
Primary 3.00 2.8 2.4 1.8 1.265 1.8 1.7 1.265 1.265
Secondary 3.05 3.0 2.3 1.7 1.265 2.3 1.7 1.265 1.265
Notes: M-r and VSP–university degree; VSS–post-secondary degree; SSS, VKV, KV–secondary school; 
 PKV, NKV–primary school. 
Additionally, for each year of experience a teacher gets a 0.5 percent wage increase. 
The school director receives a supplementary pay of 1.12 UNR, and there are also other 
coeﬃcients for the deputy director, the pedagogue, etc. 
Here is an example of teacher salary calculation, for a primary school teacher with 
20 years experience, university training (VSP), and full teaching load of 20 lessons per 
week. The value of UNR is multiplied by coeﬃcient 2.8 (highly educated) to get a net 
salary of MKD 11,200. Moreover, there is a supplement of 10 percent due to 20 years 
of service, that is MKD 1,120. Those who work in special conditions get an additional 
14–30 percent of UNR, for working in the mountains 12–48 percent of UNR, and 
for a pedagogic title six to 14 percent of UNR. Together with all legal contributions 
such as health insurance, pension, taxes, etc., the average gross teacher salary in primary 
education is MKD 20,650.11 The distribution of salaries is not linked to real teacher 
performance. 
Technical and administrative staﬀ in primary education receive on average MKD 
7,000–8,000 net or MKD 11,700–13,440 gross salary per month. The minimum net 
salary allowed by the law is MKD 5,060 per month.
For a secondary education teacher with a university education (VSP), we use coef-
ﬁcient three, and she or he has an average monthly salary of MKD 17,560 net (MKD 
22,125 gross). The average monthly salary for technical staﬀ in secondary education is 
MKD 7,500–10,000 net or MKD 12,600–16,800 gross.
Each month schools are obliged to submit a list of staﬀ and a calculation of staﬀ 
salaries to the Ministry of Education and Science. After checking all the data, the Ministry 
of Education and Science submits the total calculation of net and gross salaries for all 
the schools to the Ministry of Finance for approval. After that, these funds are dispos-
able to a school’s treasury account. This complex control mechanism was introduced a 
few years ago on the advice of the IMF.  
This complicated system of salaries has been in operation in Macedonia since 1992. 
The speciﬁc feature of the system is a large number of numerical coeﬃcients, which have 
not changed since then. Of all the coeﬃcients used, the main ones relate to the educa-
tion level of the staﬀ (provided in the previous table). Their work experience receives 
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a very low weight, and therefore the teacher salaries do not change much during their 
professional careers. The school director receives about 40 percent more than an average 
teacher. The main change introduced in recent years into the system was the increase of 
UNR. In the last 11 years, the value of UNR was changed only once, in 2002. 
Goods and Services
Until 2005, funds for maintenance (good and services) had to be planned and allocated 
according to criteria prepared by the departments for planning of the ministry. Because 
of the restrictive budget policy, there was not enough money to cover the real needs of 
schools, and debts regularly became a problem. The previous year’s spending was also 
taken into account during the process of planning, as the starting point for possible 
incremental changes. 
In primary education, electricity, water, taxes, city rent, and communal expenses had 
been fully paid monthly after the receipt of the invoices by the schools. In secondary 
education, the ministry covered only part of the expenses, using criteria such as space, 
and classes, while the rest was covered by the schools’ own incomes (on average around 
20 percent). 
Heating costs were planned and paid according to the school space (square meters), 
number of shifts (1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, or 3),12 type of heating (wood, oil, coal, central heating), 
and current prices. The allocation was based on norms deﬁned and maintained by 
MoES, often deﬁned in kind (liters of heating oil, cubic meters of wood), and classifying 
of schools based on the number of shifts. Of course, those norms cannot and do not 
depend on key factors, which in reality inﬂuence the heating costs, such as the quality 
of windows, and the control over keeping the windows closed.
Other costs like telephone, post, oﬃce supplies, teaching materials, tools, cleaning 
materials, etc., are allocated to schools on the basis of the number of classes. 
Transfers (Student Transport and Accommodation)
Transport is organized only for primary school students who live more than two kilo-
meters from school.
Schools select the transportation company (the best oﬀer in the tender organized 
by the school) and sign the contracts. Every month they submit to the ministry the 
number of students transported, distance, and transport costs, on the basis of invoices 
received. The ministry paid those invoices. Since 2005, this responsibility was transferred 
to municipalities. On average, 20,000 students are transported every month. The costs 
depend on the distance, but average costs are MKD 1,000 per student monthly.
Moreover, there are 14 dormitories in the primary education system. On average, 
300 students are accommodated every school year. About 200 students use dormito-
ries, while about 100 students are residents in households (with families taking care of 
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them). The ministry pays MKD 3,000 per student monthly for student accommodation. 
Decentralization of those institutions and their handing over to local governments was 
delayed until 2007. 
Students Standard (Secondary)
Since 2002, student transportation and accommodation for secondary education was 
transformed into a separate program, called the student standard (student transportation 
and accommodation for primary education was not separated). The student standard 
includes transfers for student accommodation, regular medical check-ups, equipment, 
reconstruction of dormitories, and scholarships for talented students. The structure of 
student standard (secondary) allocation is shown below.
Table 12.
Student Standard Budget 2003 (Percent)
Accommodation 74.28
Medical check-ups  1.63
Equipment  1.23
Reconstruction  5.48
Scholarships for talented students 17.38
The ministry used to pay only one half of the costs for student accommodation 
or MKD 4,080 monthly per student. The other half was paid by the students. All 
interested students can ﬁnd a place in the dormitory, as the number of places is much 
higher than the demand. 
There are 25 dormitories in secondary education. About 2,500 students are accom-
modated every year; they pay their room and board. Scholarships (grants) for talented 
students are MKD 2,000 per month (for 9 months). About 500 scholarships are 
disbursed every year. 
Capital Investments
The allocation of capital investment funds is done according to a special program, 
approved by the Minister of Education and Science. Due to the restrictive budget there 
are not enough funds to invest in every school, therefore only priority cases are included 
in this program. Resources from external grants (donations) are mostly used for capital 
expenses, especially for school equipment, computers, furniture, etc.
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Problems of External Efﬁciency
The description of ﬁnancing procedures highlights some serious problems of the external 
eﬃciency of Macedonian education. There are no built-in mechanisms that control the 
spending of the schools. Since the eﬀort to save can only be made at the local level, but 
the savings accrue at the central level, the schools do not cooperate with the ministry in 
this respect. For instance, if the schools manage to use less heating oil than prescribed 
by the norms (see above), the ministry will just need to pay less. If the school uses more 
heating oil than planned, MoES will cover the bill. 
The lack of incentives to improve eﬃciency is also seen in the large number of 
expenditure items that are paid by MoES based on received invoices. The schools 
have no interest in, for instance, shutting down all its electrical equipment in order to 
decrease electricity costs. 
The main non-salary expenditure item is heating, and it is here that the lack of 
eﬃciency mechanisms can be most dramatically seen. The allocation of funds is based 
on the surface of heated space, and therefore the school has no interest in reducing this 
space even if student numbers are decreasing. Over years, this has led to some very inef-
ﬁcient uses of school space, with very large rural schools serving a handful of students 
(see below). 
The situation is slightly better with the secondary schools, which do pay a proportion 
of maintenance costs (about 20 percent) in a sort of co-ﬁnancing scheme. This makes 
the schools more sensitive to eﬃciency issues. 
Internal Efﬁciency of Macedonian Education
The discussion of the internal eﬃciency of the education system, that is, of how eﬃcient 
the system is in keeping the students in the schools once enrolled, is always diﬃcult 
because it requires careful analysis of what happens to the student cohort over years. 
In the case of Macedonian education, we are able to make some estimates about the 
primary education for the whole country, and they also are broken down by the language 
of instruction for the two main ethnic communities, Macedonians and Albanians. This 
approach allows us to disregard the problems of students changing schools. For this 
analysis we have used student numbers by grade, as shown in the following tables: 
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Table 13.
Students by Grade (Primary)
 Grade 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
1 30,889 29,956 29,277 28,060 26,951 26,321
2 32,044 30,326 29,392 29,083 27,809 26,714
3 31,487 31,517 30,052 29,102 28,874 27,766
4 31,804 31,080 31,244 29,768 29,114 28,606
5 33,100 31,521 30,928 30,783 29,646 29,070
6 32,956 31,716 30,636 30,059 30,253 29,011
7 31,461 32,115 31,140 30,046 29,809 29,787
8 31,087 30,670 31,445 30,284 29,687 29.218
Total 254,828 248,901 244,114 237,185 232,143 226,493
Table 14.
Number of Students in Schools with Albanian-language Teaching 
Grade 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
1 10,265 10,247 9,847 9,684 9,240 8,935
2 10,479 10,183 10,042 9,853 9,671 8,988
3 9,861 10,482 10,025 9,745 9,923 9,587
4 9,724 9,919 10,227 9,826 9,828 9,682
5 9,927 9,666 9,641 9,878 9,708 9,691
6 9,571 9,653 9,105 9,341 9,843 9,580
7 9,021 9,314 9,381 9,101 9,210 9,671
8 8,638 8,705 8,910 8,924 8,923 9,012
Grand Total 77,486 78,169 77,178 76,352 76,346 75,146
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Table 15.
Number of Students in Schools with Macedonian-language Teaching 
Grade 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
1 19,593 18,773 18,601 17,487 16,834 16,542
2 20,521 19,125 18,483 18,362 17,260 16,878
3 20,647 20,013 19,106 18,472 18,109 17,293
4 21,072 20,211 20,057 18,988 18,416 18,073
5 22,414 21,117 20,560 20,147 19,190 18,683
6 22,606 21,315 20,824 20,017 19,655 18,752
7 21,726 22,062 21,043 20,263 19,874 19,395
8 21,833 21,289 21,796 20,679 20,075 19,534
Grand Total 170,412 163,905 160,470 154,415 149,413 145,150
As can be seen from the tables, every school year the total number of primary 
students decreases. There are three main reasons for this: 
 1) demographic changes (birth rate decrease, as seen from the decrease of enroll-
ment in grade 1),13
 2) students dropping out during the school year, and 
 3) emigration (mainly economic).
The second and third reasons eﬀect the decrease of student numbers from one 
school year to another, when successive grades are considered. However, it is impossible 
to distinguish between those two mechanisms, due to a lack of data. Therefore, in what 
follows, we treat both types of students disappearing from the school as dropouts, thus 
our data overestimates the dropout rate (and underestimates the internal eﬃciency of 
Macedonian primary education). The repeat rate in primary education is very low and 
is not taken into account due to lack of data, too. 
The overall dropout rate for primary education is about 1.46 percent. According to 
the teaching language, the dropout rate for Macedonian pupils is 1.11 percent, whereas 
for Albanian students it is higher, at 1.81 percent. It is an important, open question 
whether this is due to more Albanian students abandoning school for social and economic 
reasons or to higher emigration among the Albanian population. 
Table 16 follows three cohorts of students in six consecutive school years. Those 
are students from ﬁrst, second, and third grade in the school year 1999–2000, reaching 
grades six, seven, and eight in the school year 2004–2005, for Albanian-language 
123
T h e  F i r s t  C a r e f u l  S t e p :  E d u c a t i o n  D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  a n d  F i n a n c e  i n  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  M a c e d o n i a
instruction. Below, the yearly dropout rates are provided for each of the three groups 
of students. Cumulative dropout rates are provided in the rightmost column. 
Table 16.
 Dropout Rates in Albanian-language Schools
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The data for the school year 2000–2001 represents an anomaly, which is an increase 
in the cohort size. This is due to the special conditions during the regional conﬂict in 
that year, probably due to a temporary immigration of Albanian students from Kosovo. 
The data suggests that the dropout rates are higher for higher grades. The cumulative 
dropout rates after six years of over seven percent are very worrying. 
Table 17 presents the dropout phenomenon in a diﬀerent way; namely, we assess 
the average dropout rate in separate school years (so the cohorts of students are diﬀerent 
in each year, unlike in the previous analysis). For each school year, we provide the 
number of students from grades one to seven in the previous year (meaning those who 
should continue to attend school in the current year), as well as the number of student 
attending the grades two until eight in the current year (those who have continued to 
attend from the previous school year). The average of those ﬁve yearly dropout rates 
is 1.81 percent. This must be considered a very high dropout rate, which should be 
addressed by the ministry. 
Table 17.
Average Dropout Rate (Separate School Years, Primary Education)
2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
Students 1–7 (previous year) 68,848 69,464 68,268 67,428 67,423
Students 2–8 (current year) 67,922 67,331 66,668 67,106 66,211
Difference 926 2,133 1,600 322 1,212
Percent dropout 1.34 3.07 2.4 0.48 1.80
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The same data for the students learning in Macedonian are provided in Tables 18 
and 19. The average yearly dropout rates from the second of those tables is equal to 
1.11 percent, a much lower but still very worrying ﬁgure. 
Table 18.
Dropout Rates in Macedonian-language Schools
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Table 19.
Average Dropout Rate (Separate School Years, Primary Education)
2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
Students 1–7 (previous year) 148,579 142,616 138,674 133,736 129,338
Students 2–8 (next year) 145,132 141,869 136,928 132,579 128,608
Difference 3,447 747 1,746 1,157 730
Percent dropout 2.32 0.52 1.26 0.87 0.56
Unfortunately, we have much less data for the secondary schools (and no distinction 
on instruction language).
 
Table 20.
Student Numbers in Secondary Schools
Grade Number of Students
2002–2003 2003–2004
1 26,697 26,293
2 24,532 25,240
3 23,728 23,446
4 19,897 19,994
Total 94,854 94,973
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The transfer rate from primary to secondary education is 86 percent. The total 
number of students increased by one percent last year. The dropout rate in secondary 
education is about ﬁve percent, much higher than in primary education. This shows that 
Macedonian secondary schools have a lower internal eﬃciency than primary schools. 
Equity Issues in Macedonian Education
We concentrate ﬁrst on primary education. There are two dimensions of equity that 
we consider: the ethnic dimension and the urban/rural dimension. For the ethnic 
dimension, we take into account two dominant ethnic communities in the Republic 
of Macedonia: Macedonians and Albanians. We divide the 84 existing municipalities 
into ﬁve classes: those where over 95 percent of students who learn in Macedonian, 
those where between 70 and 95 percent of students learn in Macedonian, analogously 
for Albanian-language instruction, and the mixed municipalities without a dominant 
ethnic community.
For the second dimension, we divide the municipalities into four categories: the 
capital Skopje, large cities (municipality including a city of over 50,000 inhabitants), 
small cities, and rural municipalities (which do not include any city). This gives us 
together 17 groups of municipalities (there are no municipalities satisfying all three 
possible combinations of categories). 
We discuss groups of municipalities rather than groups of schools, because there 
are very large diﬀerences between individual schools due to historical reasons, and 
also because we are already considering the equity problems from the point of view of 
decentralization, that is we look at equity between municipalities. 
Table 21 provides the basic characteristics of school systems in the municipalities 
divided along those two dimensions.
The most interesting elements of this table are the school sizes and class sizes. We 
note that both of them decrease along the Skopje/urban/rural dimension. The behavior 
along the ethnic dimension is more complicated. We note that rural, predominantly-
Albanian municipalities have school networks similar to those in urban, predomi-
nantly-Macedonian ones (except for Skopje). On the other hand, rural, predomi-
nantly-Macedonian communities do have very small schools with very small classes. 
This implies, among others, that it is not possible to use the rural schools as a factor in 
the allocation of education block grants. Indeed, using rural status as a criterion would 
provide an unnecessarily high allocation to those Albanian schools, which have, in 
reality, urban class sizes.
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Table 21.
Basic Data on Primary Schools by Type of Municipality
Type of 
Municipality
Data Macedonian Mixed Albanian Macedonia
>95 
Percent
70–95 
Percent
70–95 
Percent
>95 
Percent
Skopje Municipalities 2 3 3 1 1 10
Students 11,060 18,382 19,922 536 4,897 54,797
School size 553 511 866 268 288 559
Class size 27.3 26.0 26.9 23.3 23.2 26.24
Large Cities Municipalities 2 2 1 1 6
Students 17,078 11,746 13,122 12,333 54,279
School size 213 286 345 561 300
Class size 23.2 23.7 24.9 27.0 24.52
Small Cities Municipalities 18 6 3 27
Students 32,786 16,813 22,924 72,523
School size 166 172 314 197
Class size 21.9 22.4 23.6 22.54
Rural Municipalities 16 9 7 3 6 41
Students 8,452 7,438 9,101 8,457 17,096 50,544
School size 85 80 92 313 219 128
Class size 18.3 18.8 19.0 23.4 23.6 20.89
Macedonia Municipalities 38.00 20.00 14.00 5.00 7.00 84
Students 69,376 54,379 65,069 21,326 21,993 232,143
School size 175 203 279 418 232 223
Class size 22.39 23.17 23.92 25.39 23.55 23.35
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Table 22.
Class Sizes and Expenditures per Student by Type of Municipality, 2003
Type of 
Municipality
Data Macedonian Mixed Albanian Macedonia
>95 
Percent
70–95 
Percent
70–95 
Percent
>95 
Percent
Skopje Municipalities 2 3 3 1 1 10
Class size 27.3 26.0 26.9 23.3 23.2 26.2
Cost/student 18,806 19,005 17,372 22,098 20,415 18,527
Large Cities Municipalities 2 2 1 1 6
Class size 23.2 23.7 24.9 27.0 24.52
Cost/student 20,752 21,514 18,364 16,117 19,286
Small Cities Municipalities 18 6 3 27
Class size 21.9 22.4 23.6 22.54
Cost/student 23,067 21,545 18,501 21,271
Rural Municipalities 16 9 7 3 6 41
Class size 18.3 18.8 19.0 23.4 23.6 20.89
Cost/student 27,573 27,516 26,564 17,977 18,317 22,647
Macedonia Municipalities 38 20 14 5 7 84
Class size 22.39 23.17 23.92 25.39 23.55 23.35
Cost/student 22,366 21,496 19,255 17,005 18,784 20,459
The average per-student expenditure for primary schools in Macedonia in 2003 was 
MKD 20,459. However, the range at the municipality level is from 16,117 in large cities 
like the predominantly-Albanian municipality of Tetovo, to 27,573 in rural, predomi-
nantly-Macedonian municipalities. This variation is matched by the class sizes in those 
municipalities: 27 students per class in Tetovo, and 18.3 students in the rural Macedonian 
municipalities. The per-student expenditures also increase along the Skopje/urban/rural 
dimension. We have already noted that the rural Albanian communities have school 
networks with urban characteristics. Accordingly, per-student spending there is smaller 
than in rural Macedonian ones. 
Table 23 presents disparities in heated space per student, cost of heating per student, 
and full maintenance14 costs per student. 
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Table 23.
Utilities and Maintenance15 Costs per Student, 2003
Type of 
Municipality
Data Macedonian Mixed Albanian Macedonia
>95 
Percent
70–95 
Percent
70–95 
Percent
>95 
Percent
Skopje Municipalities 2 3 3 1 1 10
Heated space 
for students
5.54 5.42 4.41 2.65 2.77 4.81
Heating cost/
student
1,362 1,974 1,588 1,000 760 1,592
Maintenance/
student
5,057 3,980 3,199 2,388 1,042 3,635
Large Cities Municipalities 2 2 1 1 6
Heated space 
for students
4.13 4.58 3.37 2.04 3.57
Heating cost/
student
1,086 1,321 878 694 997
Maintenance/ 
student
2,210 3,863 1,210 857 2,018
Small Cities Municipalities 18 6 3 27
Heated space 
for students
5.39 3.22 2.94 4.11
Heating cost/ 
student
1,311 2,245 804 1,136
Maintenance/ 
student
2,504 1,309 1,035 1,763
Rural Municipalities 16 9 7 3 6 41
Heated space 
for students
4.28 4.40 4.00 2.39 2.03 3.17
Heating cost 
per student
1,114 1,211 964 721 568 851
Maintenance 
per student
2,076 1,705 1,424 753 612 1,188
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Type of 
Municipality
Data Macedonian Mixed Albanian Macedonia
>95 
Percent
70–95 
Percent
70–95 
Percent
>95
Percent
Macedonia Municipalities 38 20 14 5 7 84
Heated space 
for students
4.97 4.42 3.63 2.19 2.20 3.95
Heating cost 
per student
1,240 1,503 1,081 712 611 1,149
Maintenance 
per student
2,786 2,818 1,787 854 708 2,139
As the years since independence were marked by economic stagnation and rapid 
demographic shifts, the country could not aﬀord much-needed investment in education. 
Thus, the school infrastructure could not keep up with the rapidly changing demog-
raphy of the student population. Thus, we see that the space per student in Macedonian 
municipalities is signiﬁcantly higher than in Albanian communities (more than double). 
This means that many more Albanian students attend the second shift. 
The ﬁnancial norms allocate the funds for heating based on the heated space, as 
well as the number of shifts (see section on ﬁnancing). Therefore, the heating costs per 
student are also very diﬀerent in diﬀerent municipalities. Also, the maintenance costs 
per student reveal great disparities, much higher than the disparities in total per-student 
spending (see Table 23). 
DECENTRALIZATION AFTER THE OHRID AGREEMENT
The Ohrid Agreement, signed in 2001, calls for wide-ranging decentralization of public 
governance in the Republic of Macedonia. The implementation of this agenda was 
begun with the adoption of the Law on Local Governments (LLG) in 2002. Signiﬁcant 
responsibilities for many sectors were allocated to local governments, including educa-
tion, but the government was slow in adopting other laws governing decentralization, 
in part because some of them posed real challenges. Thus, following some delay, the 
government of Macedonia began enacting other new laws, as well as amendments to 
existing laws, setting out in greater detail the decentralization plan. Here, we need to 
mention the Law on Local Government Finance (LLGF), passed in October 2004, 
Table 23. (continued)
Utilities and Maintenance15 Costs per Student, 2003
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the amendments to the Law on Primary Education (LPE) and the Law on Secondary 
Education (LSE), passed in September 2004. The ﬁnal law important for education was 
the Law on the Territorial Division of Macedonia, passed in November 2004. That law 
redeﬁned the municipal boundaries and reduced their number from 124 to 85. Those 
laws form the basic legal framework of education decentralization in Macedonia. 
Here, we discuss the implications of LLGF and of its speciﬁc provisions deﬁning the 
phases of ﬁscal decentralization for the education sector. We also review how education 
adapted to this overall decentralization framework. Internal institutional preparations for 
education decentralization undertaken by the ministry are the subject of this section. 
Character and Phases of Fiscal Decentralization 
The Law on Local Governments clearly prescribes to municipalities an important role 
in the education sector. Article 22 lists the activities for the performance of which the 
municipalities will be responsible. Item 8 of this list deﬁnes activities for education: 
“establishing, ﬁnancing and administering of primary and secondary schools, in coopera-
tion with the central government, in accordance with the law; organizing of transporta-
tion of students, and their accommodation in dormitories.” As Levitas (2002) points 
out, this is broad language and it is the task of MoES to deﬁne in practical, legal terms 
the meaning of those responsibilities and the manner in which they will be transferred 
to municipalities. 
The Law of Local Government Finance adopted in 2004 deﬁnes a clear framework 
for the ﬁnances of local governments in Macedonia. In Articles 4 and 8 it lists the 
revenues of local governments as:
 1) Own revenues, including:
  a) Local taxes (property, on the transfer of property, on inheritance, etc.),
  b) Local fees (for placing signs and announcements, for using roads, tourist 
fees, for public lighting, for environmental protection, etc.), 
  c) Local charges (for urbanization of land, for utilization of assets, etc.). 
 2) Grants from the budget of the Republic of Macedonia and from the Funds:16
  a) Income from the personal income tax,
  b) Income from value added tax (VAT), 
  c) Block grants (for ﬁnancing basic municipal competencies listed in Article 
22 of LLGF, that is, education, must be based on a formula using need 
indicators), 
  d) Categorical grants (for ﬁnancing of speciﬁc activities), 
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  e) Capital grants (for ﬁnancing investments), 
  f ) Grants for delegated competencies (for ﬁnancing a function delegated by 
a central administration to a municipality). 
Moreover, the LLGF calls for establishing of an Ordinance on the Methodology of 
Allocation of Block Grants to municipalities, with formulas for the allocation of block 
grants. Thus, it is clear that education responsibilities of municipalities were to be 
ﬁnanced through a block grant, calculated for each local government using a formula 
based on indicators of need, reﬂected by the number of students of schools of various 
type and level. We discuss below the types of grants used and the contents of those 
ordinances.  
LLGF in Articles 44 and 45 also deﬁnes the two separate phases of ﬁscal decen-
tralization. During Phase I, transferred responsibilities were to be ﬁnanced through 
categorical grants, with the exclusion of salaries. The starting date of the ﬁrst phase was 
planned for January 1, 2005, but had to be postponed due to controversies over the 
new territorial division and to the postponement of the new local elections (initially 
planned for November, then scheduled for March the following year). The start date 
was eventually July 1, 2005. The full budgetary responsibility, including the salaries, 
was to be passed to the municipalities in the second phase, at least three years later. 
The law also included some conditions to be met before the start of the ﬁrst phase (for 
all municipalities together) and of the second phase (for each municipality separately). 
The division of the process into two phases and the conditions of beginning each phase 
were suggested by the International Monetary Fund, and were motivated by the fear 
that poor ﬁscal management by the municipalities might contribute to an excessive 
budget deﬁcit. 
 Thus, during Phase I, only the responsibilities for maintenance, repairs, and material 
expenditures were transferred to the municipalities. Fragmentation of the school budgets 
became unavoidable, with the major part (about 90 percent on average MoES) provided 
by MoES to every school in the same manner as in the past, while the remaining parts 
were provided by municipalities from the categorical grants, supplemented in some 
cases by own revenues of the municipalities. 
Management and Financing of Decentralized Education
The amendments to the laws on primary and on secondary education provide a detailed 
speciﬁcation of the general transfer of responsibility on “establishing, ﬁnancing, and 
administering of primary and secondary schools” to municipalities, as dictated by the 
LLGF. The laws redesign the role of the school board, by allocating it very signiﬁcant 
powers, including the authority to select and dismiss the school director, to set the 
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school budget, and to adopt the school statute. The selected candidate is now 
appointed by the mayor, in accordance with the LLGF. Parents are assured one-third of 
the places on the school board, and the local governments about the same (the remaining 
places will be ﬁlled by the school employees). The school director, depending on the 
school board with which he or she will workclosely, thus becomes a much stronger 
function, and what is even more important, a much more stable function. Hopefully, 
the very frequent replacement of the school director for transient political reasons 
will be stopped. 
The new laws also foresee the introduction of a system of licensing of school directors. 
This is a welcome step towards better professional preparation of managing cadres in 
Macedonian schools, though the new system is not yet clearly deﬁned. What is worrying 
is that the laws mandate the almost immediate introduction of the new system (within 
less than two years), while the experience of more developed countries (such as national 
Headship Qualiﬁcations in the United Kingdom) shows that a transition period of ﬁve 
years or more is very useful. 
The key responsibility of the founding organ—in other words, the owner of the 
school—is assigned to municipalities (with the exception of special and artistic schools). 
The founding rights also include the ownership of school property and the right to open 
and close schools, although the latter actions require prior approval of MoES. The transfer 
of property ownership to the new school founder is especially complicated because the 
legal status of many of those properties was unclear in 2005 and is still in limbo.  
Nevertheless, the new laws take into account the phasing of ﬁscal decentralization, 
as deﬁned by the Law on Local Government Finance (LLGF). The main provisions 
regarding the founders and the school boards came into force with the beginning of 
Phase I. The laws formulate the basic principles of the ﬁnancing of education (use of 
the per-student formula), but do not provide details as to how this may be translated 
into a numerical formula.  
The Ministry of Education, in its Education Decentralization Strategy (see MoES 
2004), also planned to transfer to municipalities in the ﬁrst phase, together with the 
responsibility for maintenance, the responsibility for the salaries of the technical staﬀ 
(cleaners, guards, gardeners, drivers, operators of the heating systems, and the like). 
Such a move partially breaks with the fragmentation of education ﬁnance, by linking 
the maintenance functions with the salaries of people responsible for carrying out those 
functions. Moreover, as seen from the earlier analysis, it is the variation of technical 
staﬀ between the schools and between the municipalities that is one of the most diﬃ-
cult equity issues in Macedonian education. MoES entered into negotiations with the 
Ministry of Finance over this provision of LLGF, which is in contradiction with the 
MoES decentralization strategy, but without success. 
The amended laws on education also allocate to municipalities the responsibility for 
organizing the transportation of students to schools, in line with Article 22 of LLGF. 
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However, the municipalities may delegate this responsibility to schools, and thus decide 
to continue with the present system of schools organizing the transportation tenders 
themselves. 
As described in the previous section, decentralization was planned to begin on July 1, 
2005, in the middle of the ﬁscal year. This made planning the new ﬁnancing mechanisms 
diﬃcult, and in particular called for a half-year transition until the end of 2005.  
For the transition half-year period until the end of ﬁscal year 2005, it was assumed 
that it would not be preferable to use a per-student formula to allocate the education 
funds to municipalities, because the maintenance plans of schools had already been 
approved and were in the middle of being executed. Therefore, the ministry thought of 
using those plans as a basis for the allocation of categorical grants, on the assumption 
that this would not lead to a contradiction with the newly amended education laws. 
The main diﬃculty with this plan was that education institutions regularly run end-
of-year deﬁcits, paid oﬀ with the new year’s allocation. This, in turn, has led to new 
debts accumulating during the current ﬁscal year. When the decentralization process 
started, MoES could not clean the debt situation and transfer to municipalities only the 
responsibility for current expenditures. Two diﬃcult problems appeared: how to assess 
the level of debt to be paid oﬀ, and how to ﬁnd the funds to pay oﬀ this debt. 
For the ﬁrst phase of education decentralization, the ministry prepared a per-student 
allocation formula to municipalities. A number of factors were considered for use in the 
formula and then rejected, such as rural school students (because some rural communi-
ties are very large and have city-like structure of school networks). The main objective 
indicator, which seemed compatible with the historical allocation patterns, was popula-
tion density. The setting of budgets of individual schools became the responsibility of 
the municipalities, though closely monitored by the ministry. 
For the second phase, the allocation formula will almost certainly have to change, 
because the present distribution patterns of maintenance expenditures and of full school 
expenditures are quite diﬀerent. However, the Ministry will be able to use the experience 
gained during the ﬁrst phase and to adjust its formula approach accordingly. 
Finally, we return to the issues of external eﬃciency of the education system in 
Macedonia, as discussed above in the context of centralized system. There are two ways 
in which decentralization can contribute to introducing eﬃciency mechanisms:
 1) Local governments, closely monitoring the expenditures of their schools, will be 
able to assess the impact on investment in better windows and roofs on heating 
expenses, and will therefore be able to lower the current costs through good 
investment and maintenance of schools. 
 2) The allocation formula, based primarily on student numbers, will put pressure 
on the local governments to adjust the school network to the demographic 
shifts. 
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Preparations of the Ministry
MoES carefully prepared the ﬁrst phase of decentralization and set up an analytical 
unit to gather, for the ﬁrst time, all enrollment and ﬁnancial data about all Macedonian 
schools, primary and secondary. The unit began producing reviews and analysis, as well 
as supporting the activities of other sectors of MoES. 
Subsequently, MoES prepared for the technical and legal work necessary to transfer 
the ownership of school facilities to municipalities. Here, a compromise had to be found 
between the desire to transfer the ownership as soon as possible and the necessity to 
clarify the ownership status of the properties. 
Following the adoption of the laws, MoES prepared a series of bylaws and ordinances 
to deﬁne the practical steps and procedures necessary to manage the decentralized educa-
tion sector. The main open and diﬃcult issue here was how to deﬁne the responsibilities 
of municipalities with respect to their schools in the sphere of maintenance. Before 2005, 
many of the norms and prescriptions concerning school equipment were not met in the 
schools because the requirements were unrealistically high. The challenge was how to 
adjust the requirements and make them easier to be implemented, but not retreat from 
higher education standards. Finally, it was not very clear what legal mechanisms were 
needed to enforce the standards deﬁned in the ordinances passed by the ministry. 
A new per-student allocation formula to deﬁne the block grants to municipalities was 
prepared, simulated, and discussed within the ministry. The analytical unit prepared a 
computer tool to perform those simulations and to analyze the impact of various alloca-
tion scenarios. The simulations were presented and discussed with other ministries.
Open Problems 
Despite the fact that Macedonia adopted a carefully prepared set of legal laws, and that 
the Ministry of Education and Science made some signiﬁcant internal preparations for 
decentralization, there remained signiﬁcant open problems that MoES could not address 
before starting the decentralization process. Some of them were:
 1) No signiﬁcant work on raising the education management capacities of the 
municipalities was implemented. The local elections brought changes in the 
composition of local councils, but the new local leaders did not have suﬃcient 
experience and understanding of the complex problems in the education 
sphere. 
 2) An analogous problem appeared for the new members of the school boards. 
The long and rich history of strong school boards in Macedonia suﬀered a 
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15-year break, and it was not at all clear that the people with the experience 
and the skills would be selected to the school boards. Moreover, those may have 
been somewhat diﬀerent skills, given the very diﬀerent political and economic 
context of managing schools in what was Socialist Yugoslavia and the present. 
The ministry prepared a written guidebook for their members, but it proved to 
be insuﬃcient for increasing the capacity of the boards. 
 3) The rationalization of rural schools was a very diﬃcult problem for many reasons. 
The sharing of responsibility for schools between municipalities (maintenance) 
and the ministry (salaries) during the ﬁrst phase of decentralization made the 
resolution of those conﬂicts even more diﬃcult. 
 4) The municipalities will also become the founders of the secondary schools, and 
this will pose a number of even more diﬃcult planning and coordination issues. 
The vocational schools, especially, will need restructuring in accordance with the 
needs of the labor market, which will in all cases extend far beyond the bound-
aries of the municipalities. Also here MoES and the municipalities will need 
to learn to cooperate, rather than quarrel, and the ministry should already be 
planning proper mechanisms and procedures for this necessary cooperation.   
 5) There were no mechanisms in place to protect the schools serving ethnic commu-
nities who are subject to discrimination by the local majority, both ﬁnancial 
and managerial. 
THE FIRST PHASE (2005–2007)
In the present section we summarize the experience of the ﬁrst phase of education 
decentralization in Macedonia. We also include some preliminary comments on the 
pilot phase for the second phase of decentralization, which began in mid-2007 in 
selected municipalities (about 10 were considered ready to be included in this pilot). 
Here, we describe what has happened and then describe the use of categorical and 
block grants in education, and a more technical description of the allocation formulas 
for categorical grants for school maintenance in 2006 and 2007. Finally, we provide 
some assessment of the situation and the lessons drawn. This part is heavily based on 
reports by Jan Herczynski, Challenges of the Second Phase of Education Decentralization 
in Macedonia and Towards the Formula for Block Grants in Macedonia, written in 2007 
for the USAID-funded project Making Decentralization Work (MDW). 
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The First Phase
The ﬁrst phase of education decentralization in the Republic of Macedonia started on 
July 1, 2005. Long preparations for decentralization undertaken by the Macedonian 
Ministry of Education and Science (MoES) included the adoption of a strategy for educa-
tion decentralization in June 2004, and signiﬁcant amendments to the Law on Primary 
Education and the Law on Secondary Education,17 passed by Macedonian Parliament 
in September 2004. MoES has transferred complete responsibility for school mainte-
nance and student transportation to local governments, while retaining responsibility 
for teacher and non-teacher salaries.18
Simultaneously, the Ministry of Finance prepared the basic framework of ﬁscal decen-
tralization in the Law of Local Government Finance (LLGF), adopted by Macedonian 
Parliament in August 2004. This framework includes: 
 1) A schedule for ﬁscal decentralization, including its division into two phases 
(phase I—maintenance, and phase II—salaries). 
 2) New types of intergovernmental transfers, namely categorical grants for phase I 
and block grants for phase II, to ﬁnance decentralized functions to local govern-
ments. 
 3) Responsibility of the line ministries to monitor the eﬀective use of categorical 
and block grants.
Initially, the starting date for decentralization was planned for January 1, 2005, 
but there were delays due to political processes, especially the disputes surrounding 
the consolidation of Macedonian municipalities in 2004 (including a referendum on 
the issue in October 2004). Eventually, the government of Macedonia decided that, in 
order to limit the delays, the ﬁrst phase would be postponed not by one year, but only 
by half a year. That is why the ﬁrst phase began in the middle of the ﬁscal year of 2005. 
This was not an easy beginning. Some diﬃculties that appeared may be formulated as 
follows: 
 1) Central government did not pay old school debts,19 so the courts were still 
demanding the schools and municipalities pay their creditors. 
 2) There was no eﬀective ﬁnancial monitoring tools and corrective procedures at 
the disposal of Ministry of Education and Science. Consequently, the ministry 
was unable to respond to various cases of mismanagement. 
 3) The schools were transferred to municipalities in varied technical conditions 
and with very diﬀerent levels of equipment. Many municipalities are unable to 
improve those conditions. 
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 4) The transfer to municipalities of ownership of school properties was delayed 
and remains incomplete. Unclear conditions of many of the properties are a 
barrier to rapid progress. 
 5) MoES still has not deﬁned the new normative on school conditions and equip-
ment, so the exact responsibilities of municipalities are not clearly deﬁned.20 
 6) The allocation formula for categorical grants has not been subject of public 
debate and there are still many misconceptions and uncertainties regarding it. 
 7) There are three categorical grants: for maintenance of primary and secondary 
schools, and for student transport. This increases the complexity of the alloca-
tion formulas and reduces the freedom of local governments to manage their 
school networks. 
Moreover, some problems were a direct result of the start of decentralization in the 
middle of the ﬁscal year. The deﬁnition of the pool for education categorical grants in 
2005 was diﬃcult because of seasonal variation of education expenditures; consequently 
many municipalities considered that they have received insuﬃcient funding. Also, the 
detailed registration of school debts incurred in 2005 prior to July was made more 
diﬃcult.21 Those problems, of course, were relevant only in 2005. 
Categorical and Block Grants
The Law on Local Government Finance of 2004 foresees two types of grants that 
can be used to ﬁnance activities decentralized to local governments: categorical and 
block grants. The categorical grants are used to ﬁnance speciﬁc activities within a 
sector, while the block grants are used to ﬁnance whole sectors. The deﬁnition of those 
grants in the LLGF (Articles 25 and 26) makes no reference to what type of activities 
or expenditures the grants may cover. In other words, the government of Macedonia 
is free to deﬁne such grants as what best suits its strategies and policies in any sector, 
including education. 
The diﬀerence between the categorical grants and block grants appears in connec-
tion with decentralization in Article 45 of LLGF. Namely, the law clearly states that 
during the ﬁrst phase decentralized functions will be ﬁnanced through categorical grants 
excluding salaries, and full ﬁnancing of the sectors including the salaries will start only 
in the second phase, with block grants. This has led a number of specialists in MoES 
to believe that categorical grants are for maintenance only, and only the block grants 
can be used in the second phase. However, both those conclusions are incorrect, as the 
deﬁnitions of LLGF recalled above clearly show. 
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Indeed, in the future MoES will be using both types of grants to ﬁnance education, 
though in diﬀerent ways and for diﬀerent purposes. Block grants, as grants directed 
to the whole sector, will be the main instrument of ﬁnancing the operational costs of 
providing education, that is, of the operating and ﬁnancing of schools. Those grants have 
to be allocated to municipalities through an allocation formula based on the numbers 
of students of speciﬁc categories, and should be rather stable, to protect education from 
excessive changes. Here, stability means that MoES should not change radically from 
year to year, either the allocation formula or the amounts allocated to each munici-
pality. Nevertheless, there will certainly be changes in the allocation formulas, because 
the education priorities of the ministry may change in time. Thus, for example MoES 
may decide at any time that more support is needed for small rural schools, and may 
increase the appropriate factors used in the formula.22 
Categorical grants will be used to ﬁnance speciﬁc programs or projects within 
the education sector, to achieve speciﬁc policy goals of MoES. It is possible to use the 
categorical grants for many purposes, for example: 
 1) Financing speciﬁc types of extracurricular activities, such as sports; 
 2) Supporting speciﬁc programs, such as teacher in-service training; 
 3) Improving access to education by vulnerable or minority groups of students; 
 4) Promoting academic excellence in speciﬁc subjects or areas. 
Block grants are not suitable ﬁnancing instruments for those types of education 
policies, because they can be used by municipalities in any way they want, as long as 
the expenditures are within the education sector. Categorical grants in education, unlike 
the block grants, may change signiﬁcantly from year to year in the amounts involved 
and in the allocation criteria. Indeed, some may be used for a few years and then be 
replaced by other categorical grants, addressed to diﬀerent groups of students. On the 
other hand, the categorical grants are likely to remain rather small in terms of allocated 
funds compared to block grants. 
We note that the implementation of some policy initiatives of the ministry may 
require using both types of grants. For example, the integration of handicapped students 
in mainstream education may be facilitated in two parallel ways: 
 1) Speciﬁc projects, such as the training of teachers or the provision of specialized 
equipment to the schools, may be ﬁnanced through categorical grants; 
 2) An overall introduction of integrated teaching may be encouraged by introducing 
a small weight in the allocation formula based on the number of handicapped 
children receiving education in mainstream schools. 
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We may say that categorical grants would ﬁnance the costs of introducing integrated 
teaching, while block grants would ﬁnance the increased recurrent costs of the schools 
where integrated education is conducted. This example illustrates the ﬂexibility and care 
which MoES needs to show in using the block and categorical grants. 
Since the local governments may use the funds from the block grant in any way 
within the sector, there can obviously be only one block grant per sector. In practice, 
until education legislation is seriously amended in Macedonia, this means that there will 
be one block grant for primary education and one block grant for secondary education.23 
On the other hand, the number of categorical grants in the sector may vary depending 
on the needs of the sector and on the policies of the ministry. Indeed, in 2005 and 
2006, there were two categorical grants in primary education—for the maintenance of 
primary schools and for transportation of primary school students. This does not have a 
legislative basis, but is due to a traditional way of budgeting. The Ministry of Education 
and Science wanted, from the beginning of decentralization, to put the two grants 
together and create one categorical grant for primary education, but this was resisted by 
the Ministry of Finance. The separate categorical grant for student transportation will 
disappear only in ﬁscal year 2008. However, the ministry may be required to introduce 
a separate categorical grant for student standard to ﬁnance dormitories. 
Table 24.
Number and Type of Grants in Education24
Period Grants
Phase I of decentralization (2005–2006) 1) Categorical: maintenance of primary schools
2) Categorical: transport for primary education
3) Categorical: maintenance of secondary schools
Phase I of decentralization (2007) 1) Categorical: maintenance of primary schools
2) Categorical: maintenance of secondary schools
Pilot stage of Phase II of decentralization 
(September 1 to December 31, 2007)
For 41 municipalities that moved to second phase: 
1) Block: primary education
2) Block: secondary education
For remaining municipalities:
3) Categorical: maintenance of primary schools
4) Categorical: maintenance of secondary schools
First years of Phase II of decentralization 
(FY 2008)
For the municipalities that enter Phase II: 
1) Block: primary education
2) Block: secondary education
For the municipalities that stay in Phase I: 
3) Categorical: maintenance of primary schools
4) Categorical: dormitories for primary education
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Period Grants
Complete implementation of Phase II 
(probably from FY 2009)
1) Block: primary education
2) Block: secondary education
In addition possibly: 
3) Categorical: grants for specific programs defined 
by MoES (such as support for vulnerable students, 
subsidies for student food, improvement in IT 
equipment) 
In practice, of course, as the categorical grant is a new policy instrument, it should 
be initially used very carefully, with strong emphasis on monitoring and reporting by 
the municipalities. 
Allocation Formulas for Categorical Grants for Maintenance 
Two goals guided the design of the allocation formula for the categorical grants during 
Phase I of education decentralization: that the formulas for primary and secondary 
school maintenance should be similar,25 and that the overall structure of the formula may 
be also used for the block grants, though with possibly diﬀerent factors and diﬀerent 
numerical values of coeﬃcients. This means that, if that structure is maintained,26 the 
beginning of Phase II will not bring major changes or surprises in the formula itself. In 
the present section, we will brieﬂy review this present structure, so that discussion of 
possible changes in subsequent sections will be easier to understand. 
There are three main elements of the formula:
 1) The lump sum, allocated to each municipality irrespective of the number of 
students (for primary schools only). 
 2) For each municipality the number of weighted students is calculated. The 
following groups of students are included in this calculation, apart from the 
physical number of students: 
  a) For primary schools, students attending school located in municipalities 
with low population density. 
  b) For secondary schools, also students attending gymnasiums. 
 3) Lower and upper buﬀers used to protect the municipalities from excessive 
changes from the previous year’s allocation (in 2007, only for primary educa-
tion). 
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The role of the lump sum is to protect the small municipalities that have very 
few students and still need to maintain schools for them. For cities and for large rural 
municipalities the lump sum becomes a negligible element, but it is signiﬁcant for 
very small municipalities. One can also say that the lump sum covers the ﬁxed costs of 
providing education. The role of the weights for students in municipalities with low 
population density is to provide more funds to the small schools with small classes, 
where maintenance costs per student are higher. The role of the weight for gymnasium 
students is to provide more funds to gymnasiums than to vocational schools, because 
vocational schools have additional revenues from the sale of products and services and 
hence need relatively less funds for maintenance.27 The role of the lower buﬀer is to 
ensure that municipalities with schools spending more than the average on maintenance 
do not suﬀer a sudden decrease of funding levels. 
The application of the formula thus begins with the setting of the lump sum. To 
allocate the remaining funds to municipalities, the weighted number of students is 
calculated for each municipality, based on the groups of students identiﬁed above. The 
funds are then allocated proportionally to the weighted number of students, with the 
allocation standard being proportionality constant. This means that the allocation to 
each municipality is equal to the lump sum plus the number of weighted students in 
the schools of that municipality multiplied by the allocation standard. Finally, the upper 
and lower buﬀers limit the impact of the formula and produce the ﬁnal allocation that 
is closer to the historical allocation (the previous year’s allocation). 
The speciﬁc values of the coeﬃcients used in the present allocation formulas for 
categorical grants are provided in the tables below (the population density is measured 
in inhabitants per square kilometer). 
Table 25.
 Allocation Formula for Primary Education 
Coefﬁcient 2006 2007
Total pool of funds (MKD) 440,000,000 613,000,000
Lump sum (MKD) 400,000 500,000
Weight for density below 25 0.6 0.6
Weight for density 25 to 40 0.4 0.4
Weight for density 40 to 70 0.2 0.2
Allocation standard (MKD) 1,558 2,244
Lower buffer (%) 85 130
Upper buffer (%) 112 149.86
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Table 26.
Allocation Formula for Secondary Education
Coefﬁcient 2006 2007
Total pool of funds (MKD) 170,000,000 210,000,000
Weight for density below 40 0.1 0.1
Weight for gymnasium students 1.0 1.0
Allocation standard (MKD) 1,294 1,611
Lower buffer (%) 80
Upper buffer (%) 175
The most important and politically sensitive issue is the lower buﬀer, because it 
deﬁnes the level of adjustment which the ministry considers acceptable. The upper buﬀer, 
which limits how much the allocation can increase compared to the previous year, is 
then adjusted to the lower buﬀer to ensure that all the funds are allocated.28 
The formulas adopted for the categorical grants for 2008 have not been signiﬁ-
cantly altered. For primary education, the three bands of population density and respec-
tive coeﬃcients have been changed to the following: 
 • Density below 20 persons per square kilometer: 1.4
 • Density between 20 and 35: 0.8 
 • Density between 35 and 70: 0.6 
This represents an increase of coeﬃcients, especially for sparsely populated munici-
palities, and more pronounced support to small rural schools. For categorical grants for 
secondary education, the weight for sparsely populated municipalities was abandoned 
and the weight for gymnasium students decreased to 0.5. 
For the new block grants in 2008, the ministry conducted a serious empirical review 
of the formulas and introduced signiﬁcant changes by adding new factors, though the 
structure of the formula was preserved.29 For primary education, the following coeﬃ-
cients based on population density were used: 
 • Density below 20 persons per square kilometer: 0.6 
 • Density between 20 and 35: 0.4 
 • Density between 35 and 70: 0.2 
At the same time, a new weight for special needs students was added (value 1), 
as well as a weight for subject teaching30 (value 0.2). The latter weight recognizes the 
diﬀerence in teaching for initial and later grades of primary school. 
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For block grants for secondary education, the main new element is using the lump 
sum (which was not used for categorical grants for secondary education). The weight 
for gymnasium students was reduced to a very low value of 0.1. 
We thus see that the ministry was able to adapt the factors and the coeﬃcients used 
in the formula to serve the block grants, which allocate to municipalities signiﬁcantly 
more funds than the categorical grants for school maintenance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the delayed start and initial problem, the ﬁrst phase of education decentraliza-
tion in Macedonia must be considered a major success. By transferring to municipalities 
a limited responsibility in the education sector, restricted to school maintenance and 
student transportation, MoES ensured a relatively smooth decentralization process. 
Education decentralization in Macedonia became a fact, and municipalities have in 
reality taken over their new responsibilities, often demanding more powers in the sector. 
An example is the demand by ZELS (Association of Local Governments of Macedonia) 
that mayors be given more inﬂuence over the appointment of school directors, for 
the transfer of responsibilities was associated with the transfer of funds in the form of 
categorical education grants. There were, of course, disputes regarding the level of the 
allocation of the funds, but the municipalities took an increasingly active attitude to the 
budgeting of maintenance in their schools (as we discuss below). In its serious approach 
to education decentralization, Macedonia is one of the most advanced countries in 
South Eastern Europe.31 
Municipalities are now asserting their new powers in the education sector in a 
number of ways. The changes of municipalities as new owners of schools have many 
faces, of course. Some are changing their administrative structure and establishing 
special units responsible for education sector within their local administrations.32 Some 
are deliberating and adopting local education strategies, including long-term visions of 
their school systems.33 
The most important change regards the municipal role in the budgeting process. 
Although restricted to school maintenance, some municipalities have begun the serious 
work of assessing the relative conditions of their schools, as well as the relative needs of 
recurrent funding and investments.34 The new procedures are based on a more transparent 
process, in which information from diﬀerent schools and for successive budget years is 
evaluated to assess the budget requests from the schools. Similarly, municipalities have 
begun to review and streamline the organization and ﬁnancing of student transporta-
tion, which in many cases became quite irrational under the previous decentralized 
system. Here, the main eﬀort was to review the actual transportation routes and ensure 
that they were as eﬃcient as possible. Finally, some municipalities have begun a serious 
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eﬀort in the optimization of school networks, including the consolidation of schools 
and the redrafting of school catchment areas.35 It is precisely this process of establishing 
new rules and procedures that will, hopefully, lead to a more eﬃcient management and 
use of resources, and ultimately to provision of better education.36  
At the same time, the Ministry of Education is also adapting to the new management 
and ﬁnancing of education. A restructuring of the ministry is taking place, including 
the setting up of a speciﬁc unit to analyze and monitor the performance of the decen-
tralized education system. Regional representatives of the ministry and their staﬀ have 
been incorporated to larger municipalities to reﬂect changes in the responsibilities. New 
laws have redeﬁned the roles of the State Education Inspectorate and the Bureau for 
Education Development. 
However, the eﬀorts to complete the ﬁrst phase of education decentralization are 
incomplete. We list the most urgent tasks ahead, which certainly should be resolved 
prior to the beginning of the second phase: 
 1) Clearing up of old school debts. This is an old problem, which has received signiﬁ-
cant attention recently, and progress has been achieved. Indeed, ZELS estimates 
that by January 2007 about 90 percent of old debts were paid oﬀ. MoES should 
insist on the rapid ﬁnalization of this problem. It would be good to compile 
and agree with the municipalities on a list of all remaining outstanding debts. 
 2) Transfer of ownership of school properties. Currently, a speciﬁc, small unit of the 
Ministry of Finance is charged with clearing the situation of those properties and 
of successively passing them to the municipalities. This system is dysfunctional; 
it delays the clearing of the cadastre of school properties and their transfer to 
the municipalities. MoES should propose a more realistic and faster procedure 
to ensure that the municipalities receive legal ownership of school facilities. 
 3) Introduction of proper monitoring tools and procedures. The present situation, 
when the ministry has only limited and incomplete monitoring capacities is 
unsafe for the education system, because it does not allow urgent intervention 
in cases when the law is broken or local decisions are inconsistent with the legal 
regulations. The ministry ﬁnds it diﬃcult to monitor even the disbursement 
of categorical grants and is quite unable to monitor, during the ﬁscal year, the 
categorical grants that are used only for education. Again, cooperation with 
the Ministry of Finance should improve (including better access to treasury 
system data). Of course, the scope for misuse of funds and the need for good 
monitoring will increase in the second phase. 
 4) Adoption of a modiﬁed normative on conditions in schools and on teaching aids 
and equipment.37 A draft normative prepared by MoES needs to be discussed 
with all stakeholders and adopted. The normative should deﬁne the minimum 
standards of school space, furniture, and teaching equipment to be maintained in 
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schools. Without such a normative the responsibilities of municipalities remain 
ill deﬁned, and the ministry will not be able to fulﬁll its role of ensuring that 
all students in Macedonian schools enjoy basic minimal conditions. 
It is worthwhile to formulate the lessons learned during the ﬁrst phase of education 
decentralization. Firstly, it is important to note that Ministry of Education and Science 
had to deﬁne its decentralization strategy within the overall decentralization framework 
deﬁned by the Ministry of Finance. MoES did not have to invent its own procedures, 
it simply had to intelligently use the framework developed in the LLGF. As the second 
phase becomes a reality, the Ministry of Finance should provide similar clarity on how 
the management of employees and salaries will be transferred to municipalities. 
Secondly, the relative success of the ﬁrst phase was in part due to a long preparation 
process led by the ministry. This included the adoption of a sectoral strategy and prepa-
ration of signiﬁcant amendments to education laws. Within the ministry, in a series of 
workshops and seminars, a consensus was built which allowed common understanding 
and the implementation of reforms. Creation of a consensus within the ministry and with 
other key education institutions, such as the Bureau for the Development of Education 
or State Education Inspectorate is crucial for the success of the second phase. 
Finally, the start of the ﬁrst phase was preceded by a public information campaign, 
addressed to the general public and to speciﬁc institutions. Local governments received 
a lot of training and support, part of it ﬁnanced by the international community. The 
second phase should also be introduced with information campaigns. However, due 
to diﬀerent nature of the second phase, the main target of the campaign should be 
municipalities, school boards, and teachers. 
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NOTES
1 We express our gratitude to Mr. Muamet Demiri, formerly of MoES, to Mrs. Liljana 
Ristovska and to Mr. Bill Althaus of the former MDW project for support and cooperation. 
We are indebted to our colleague Tony Levitas, whose understanding of social and political 
implications proved to be an invaluable asset in our work. The views expressed in the report 
are of the authors’ only, and do not reﬂect the opinions of the Ministry of Education and 
Science, of the project Make Decentralization Work, nor of the United Stated Agency for 
International Development. 
2 There are ﬁve types of primary schools: regular, music, special (two types), and primary 
school for adults. 
3 In secondary education there are ﬁve types of schools: gymnasium, vocational, mixed 
(gymnasium and vocational), music, and special.
4 As described later in the paper; since 2002 student transportation and accommodation for 
secondary education were turned into a separate program, called the “student standard.”
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5 Includes: voluntary yearly fee (called “participation fee”) paid by students at the beginning 
of the school year, and income from selling of goods and services. Among those services are 
external examinations provided by secondary schools for adult learners. 
6 Teacher training and scholarship are provided directly from the ministry to teacher-training 
providers and to students, respectively. Manuals are paid for by parents. 
7 The Bureau for the Development of Education is a professional institution, subordinated to 
the ministry, responsible for developing curricula and teaching materials, and for providing 
teacher in-service training. 
8 Those norms will most likely be soon replaced by more general recommendations, as 
municipalities become responsible for salaries and employment. 
9 There are two titles for teachers given by school commission: exemplary and special exem-
plary.
10 Explanation: M-r and VSP–university degree; VSS–post-secondary degree; SSS, VKV, 
KV–secondary school; PKV, NKV–primary school. 
11 USD 1 = MKD 50; EUR 1 = MKD 62 as of 2005. 
12 The criteria provide detailed deﬁnitions of what it means for the school to have 1.5 or 2.5 
shifts. 
13 It is estimated that the enrollment rate in grade one of primary schools is about 95 percent 
and steadily increasing. 
14 This includes energy (electricity, heating), water, communal services, materials, small repairs, 
telephones, etc. 
15 This includes energy (electricity, heating), water, communal services, materials, small repairs, 
telephones, etc. 
16 They are various oﬀ-budget funds ﬁnanced in part from the state budget, and in part from 
own revenues, responsible for speciﬁc functions such as roads. 
17 The amended laws transferred school founding rights to local governments and introduced 
new provisions for education ﬁnance. 
18 Education decentralization in Macedonia has, thus far, administrative and ﬁscal dimensions, 
and has not yet touched on the areas of curriculum, textbooks, or monitoring of quality. 
19 A large part of those debts were due to school directors ordering major repairs or investments 
in their schools without having ﬁrst secured MoES funds for those projects.
20 Draft normative was prepared by MoES in mid-2007 and will be presumably adopted in 
2008 following consultations with local governments. 
21 Problematic areas included invoices for services provided to the school during the ﬁrst six 
months of 2005, but received by the schools after July 1. 
22 In the current allocation formula, this would mean increasing the lump sum and the values 
of coeﬃcients for low population density. 
23 Two separate laws on primary and secondary education provide separate legal regulations 
and legally require separate block grants.
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24 LLGF states that a municipality needs to meet certain conditions in order to qualify for 
Phase 2 of decentralization. On September 1, 2007, 41 municipalities moved to Phase 2. 
On January 1, 2008, nine more joined them. 
25 We do not discuss here the allocation formula for student transportation, based on the 
number of student-kilometers, because this was a transition formula. As discussed in the 
previous section, MoES wanted to join this categorical grant with the maintenance grant for 
primary education. This was achieved only for FY 2007, due to resistance from the Ministry 
of Finance. We also do not discuss the formula used for the second half of 2005, when the 
ministry decided that use of a per-student formula for half a year is not possible, and used 
a simple allocation proportional to historical expenditures on school maintenance. 
26 Of course, the ministry may change the structure of the formula as it sees ﬁt. 
27 The lower per-student allocation of maintenance funds to vocational schools is a speciﬁc 
Macedonian phenomenon, related to the fact that vocational secondary schools ﬁnance 
some of their maintenance costs from own revenues, such as sale of services. If all elements 
of the school budgets are included, with teacher salaries, then the per-student allocations 
of vocational schools become somewhat higher than those of general education schools. 
28 Speciﬁcally, this means the following: the setting of the lower buﬀer deﬁnes the amount of 
funds which needs to be provided to municipalities. The pure formula without the buﬀer 
would allocate less to some municipalities. The funds that should be allocated according to 
the lower buﬀer are obtained from applying the upper buﬀer to the municipalities which 
had historically lower costs. 
29 We discuss formulas for block grants in 2008. For the last four months of 2007 it was decided 
not to use per-student formulas for the block grants, but to allocate them proportionally to 
historical expenditures (similarly to the second half of 2005). 
30 “Subject teaching” refers to grades ﬁve to eight, where students have diﬀerent subjects. Initial 
instruction is called “class teaching.” 
31 It is not surprising that Macedonia hosted a regional conference on education decentraliza-
tion in Ohrid in May 2006. The conference was attended by high-level representatives of 
education ministries from almost all Balkan countries. It was clear from the presentations 
in Ohrid that Macedonia was most systematic and advanced among the participating coun-
tries. 
32 Among other examples, this has happened in the municipality of Strumica, see Hoxha 
2007. 
33 This was the approach taken in municipality of Tearce, see Hoxha 2007.
34 The new procedures were adopted by many municipalities, see Hoxha 2007.
35 Resen conducted a far-reaching review both of student transportation and of networks, see 
Hoxha 2007. 
36 The experiences and procedures of the ﬁrst phase of decentralization have been summarized 
in Municipal Management of Schools: Guidebook, edited by Ella Hoxha. 
37 A report commissioned by USAID/DP demonstrated that the conditions in secondary 
schools are relatively adequate, so the new normative is needed, especially for the primary 
schools.
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Executive Summary
Education reform in the Republic of Moldova has been an ongoing process that has involved 
not only the rethinking of the role of public authorities in the education sector but also 
changes to the principles of education itself. 
After passing a new Constitution in 1994, Moldova began the changes to make its 
national education system reﬂect modern, democratic values. Two pieces of legislation 
were critical to its implementation, the Law on Education No. 547 of 1995 and the Law on 
Local Public Finance No. 127 of 2003. This was matched with secondary legislation as well 
as some speciﬁc goals outlined in Moldova’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of 2004. 
The ﬁrst step of education reform de-politicized the system and expunged the curriculum 
of ideology, while a second step reorganized the schools and a third step was planned 
in concert with the decentralization of central government ﬁscal authority. Despite the 
efforts of this well-intentioned change on the part of the central government, economic 
and demographic declines have contributed to a falling number of schools and poorer 
quality education. 
What had been modeled in Moldova on the Soviet educational system of general schools 
has diversiﬁed into a multileveled system of preschools and primary and secondary schools 
culminating in high schools and vocational schools based on European standards obligatory 
for students until the age of 16. The baccalaureate is the ﬁnal degree qualiﬁcation for those 
students wishing to continue to university; vocational students who reach the qualiﬁca-
tion of technician may also apply. In theory, Moldova now has a modern curriculum that 
corresponds to the developments and demands of its labor market. 
Many anomalies and problems remain, for example, the insertion of “high school” level 
courses in rural schools to augment the lack of transport and accommodation for rural high 
school students to attend larger regional schools. Likewise, preschools suffered from a long 
period of economic shortages when local authorities were burdened with the debts and 
poor maintenance of these preschools formerly run by kolkhoz. Many preschools closed and 
some eventually re-opened. Today, only 60 percent of preschool students are enrolled.
Moldova’s central government has planned a slow release of its authority in the 
ﬁnancing, organization, and assessment of the education sector; however, policy and its 
execution remains its remit. Even if the law legislated responsibility to municipalities for 
preschool and primary and secondary schools, this may not be the case due to restrictions 
on the catchment area of the school concerned. For example, professional schools are 
under the jurisdiction of the districts or raions and some raions also may control boarding 
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schools and high school hostels. The raion-level board of education has the authority 
to close, reorganize, or open schools. The Ministry of Education, which ultimately holds 
responsibility for all policy and decisions regarding schools in Moldova, can also make this 
decision if deemed necessary. Wages and social and health beneﬁts are paid by the raion 
departments of the Ministry of Education, but so poor is the pay and beneﬁt package 
for teachers, and by default the revenue of schools, especially in rural areas, that some 
communities have developed an informal wage and revenue top-up scheme in order to 
keep their schools open. At the same time, the ministry has delegated new responsibilities 
to local authorities without ensuring funding sources like grants, taxes, or own revenues 
for their implementation. To compound the arbitrary attitude of the Ministry of Education 
towards decentralizing ﬁnances and management, local schools are still unable to choose 
and hire their own directors.
In 2003, education expenditures in Moldova made up six percent of GDP and about 
a quarter of the state budget. Funds for education are shared and divided according to 
revenues from a local percentage of corporate, personal, and road taxes; and general and 
allocated transfers in addition to own revenue of local governments and schools. School 
budgets are estimated by local authorities, submitted to the central government, then aver-
aged through data from the Department of Statistics and Sociology, and funds are then 
administered as categorical grants, though this is prone to change. 
In conclusion, the reforms have been piecemeal and incomplete. Decentralization started 
in 1999, but efforts were discontinued in 2003. In 2006, decentralization was re-initiated, 
and the idea to involve more local government authorities in the delivery of education was 
put back on the public agenda. Unfortunately, a coherent ﬁnancing framework was not 
developed and the unclear allocation of responsibilities has contributed to the problems 
of a Moldovan education system beset by poor infrastructure, low efﬁciency, and high 
teaching costs. External assistance has come from international donors like the World 
Bank and UNICEF that have implemented a number of projects (particularly meals and 
maintenance), but this has not yielded an overall improvement in the performance of the 
education system, one of the sole services provided by local authorities. These problems 
are systematic and especially acute in rural schools, which typically need more revenue to 
function. Solving these problems requires a clear allocation of educational and ﬁnancial 
responsibilities legislated on the national level, freeing decision-making from the Ministry 
of Education and giving more ﬁscal autonomy to local authorities.
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THE GENERAL SYSTEM OF EDUCATION 
Since the proclamation of its independence, Moldova has initiated political, economic, 
and social changes aimed at creating a market economy based on private and public 
property, free initiative, and competition. In 1994, the Moldovan Parliament adopted 
the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, conﬁrming the right of all citizens to 
education, with no limitation or discrimination, and compulsory education was declared 
free of charge in all state institutions. The transition from a centrally-planned economy 
to a market economy called for changes in the educational policies of the newly-formed 
independent state. The task ahead was to build a modern and democratic national 
educational system, based on both national and universal values. 
The main policy document of the government for education is the State Program 
of Educational Development,1 which provides for the implementation of the Law on 
Education 547/1995. Policy directions in the reform of education are also embodied 
in the Law on Local Public Finances 123/2003 and other secondary legislation. All the 
above deﬁne the structure of the system and ﬁnancing principles.
Another key policy document is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), 
adopted by the Parliament in Law 398-XV/2004, which puts forth the three pillars of 
the government’s poverty reduction strategy: 
(i) sustainable and inclusive economic growth that will provide the 
population with productive employment; (ii) human development poli-
cies emphasizing increased access to basic services (especially primary 
medical services and primary education); and (iii) social protection 
policies targeting those most in need.
Education, along with the economic growth and protection of those in need, is 
considered one of the main factors ensuring the sustainable development of the country. 
Various donors active in Moldova, such as the World Bank, the European Foundation 
for Professional Training, UNICEF, and the Soros Foundation–Moldova acknowledge 
the importance of education and support the reform. Some of the most important 
projects implemented with donor assistance are:
 • IPEP (Individual Preschool Education Program), ﬁnanced by the UNICEF 
Cooperation Program. 
 • The project on general education reform in Moldova, co-ﬁnanced by the World 
Bank and designed for primary and secondary education (grades one through 
ten). The main objective of this project was to improve quality in education 
by modernizing the syllabus, drafting new manuals, developing the capacity of 
teachers, creating and implementing new pedagogic techniques, and creating a 
modern system to assess school performance. 
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 • The “Assistance in Professional Training System,” supported by TACIS, aimed 
at developing a modern system of primary, secondary, and vocational educa-
tion adaptable to changes in the labor market. The focus of the project was on 
institutional development and policy reform.
The major achievement of Moldovan education reform is the transition from the 
Soviet educational system in 1995, focused mainly on general education, to a multi-level 
modern system including high school and vocational schools. The reform lasted until 
the end of 2007. The current structure of the educational system (Figure 1) is oriented 
towards European standards. Mandatory general education is nine years. Obligatory 
attendance of classes ﬁnishes when the student reaches the age of 16.
Figure 1.
Structure of the Education System in Moldova
Preschools provide care and education for pupils between three and six years old. 
Preschool education is mandatory, but in reality, actual enrollment rates are well below 
universal enrollment, as a result of insuﬃcient resources, as will be detailed later.
Primary education includes grades one to four. Students are admitted into primary 
education at the age of six. Few schools oﬀer only primary education. Very often, all 
forms of pre-university education (primary, lower, and upper secondary) are provided 
at the same school. This situation is a leftover from the older Soviet school structure.2
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Lower-secondary education include grades ﬁve to nine. This level of education is 
oﬀered in gymnasiums, general secondary schools (GSS), and high schools. 
Upper-secondary education. Under the old system, upper-secondary education 
consisted of grades 10 and 11 delivered in high schools; under the new system, high 
schools include grades 10–12. Students graduating from high schools get the bacca-
laureate degree that is a prerequisite for admission to university.
Starting in 2008, all general secondary schools (GSS) are transformed into high 
schools. This process is slow, however. Currently, there are only two “high schools” in 
the real sense of the word. The most common situation is that all levels of education are 
provided in one school unit, where the same teachers provide education to gymnasium 
and high school students alike. In the rural areas, given the small student population, 
an excessive form of school consolidation takes place. The rural school hosts students 
in all forms of education, from primary to high school,3 with teachers delivering several 
topics—such as chemistry, mathematics, physics, and biology—for all levels of educa-
tion. While this has some positive impact on the internal migration of students, the 
main impact is a signiﬁcantly lower quality in teaching. 
Vocational education is oﬀered in two forms: professional and polyvalent 
education. 
Professional programs vary in duration. Typically, these programs accept students who 
have completed lower-secondary education. Students who graduate from vocational 
schools cannot apply for university studies. 
Polyvalent programs are structured in a three-level structure: 
 • Upon completion of the lower-secondary education program, students are 
accepted in a polyvalent program, which they can graduate from in one year, 
with a certiﬁcate of worker. 
 • Students who decide that they want to continue their studies can go for the 
second level of the polyvalent school, based on a competitive process. Upon 
graduation, they obtain a certiﬁcate of skilled worker. 
 • Finally, students who go for the third level obtain a certiﬁcate of technician. 
Students graduating from polyvalent schools can apply to universities.
At present, the majority of polyvalent schools are being transformed into colleges. 
Most colleges accept students graduating from GSS (grade 11) and high schools 
(grade 12), but some colleges (pedagogical colleges and colleges of art and music) accept 
gymnasium graduates (grade nine). The duration of study is ﬁve years for grade-nine 
graduates, three years for grade-11 graduates, and two years for grade-12 graduates. After 
four years of study in a pedagogical college, or three years in another college, students 
are entitled to compete for the baccalaureate. If successful, they may be admitted into 
university. If they decide to continue onto higher education, students take a special 
program (three years instead of four years after high school).
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Universities accept graduates with baccalaureate diplomas, based on the scores they 
achieved. The duration of studies is from four to six years.
Most schools are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. Some 
professional/polyvalent schools, universities, and post-university institutions are the 
responsibility of sector ministries, while other schools and universities are private. 
Table 1.
School Network Development 
Number of Schools 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
Preschool 1,135 1,128 1,192 1,246 1,269 1,295 1,305
Primary 115 120 120 119 116 104 96
Lower secondary 
(Gymnasiums)
674 674 672 669 667 664 668
Upper secondary 
(High schools) 
183 198 211 284 369 387 442
General schools 601 554 546 538 380 359 296
Vocational 80 82 83 83 81 78 78
TOTAL Schools 1,566 1,577 1,580 1,576 1,570 1,551 1,539
Students 629,327 618,387 603,385 578,705 546,615 517,029 491,482
Teachers 42,300 42,500 41,600 42,600 41,000 40,900 40,000
Students-teachers 14.9 14.6 14.5 13.6 13.3 12.6 12.3
Students-school 402 392 382 367 348 333 319
In the Soviet period, preschool education was under the patronage of state-owned, 
local economic agents, the so-called kolkhoz. Once the USSR broke apart, and Moldova 
had to cope with economic collapse, most of the kolkhoz closed. As a consequence, the 
majority of preschool institutions were discontinued. In an attempt to resolve the situa-
tion, local authorities took over the responsibility of running the preschools, and added 
the debt of the economic agents to their consolidated budget. Between 1995 and 2000, 
however, local authorities had to deal with very tight budgets themselves and discon-
tinued the ﬁnancing of the maintenance for preschools. This resulted in a signiﬁcant 
deterioration of the buildings. The crisis ended in 2003, when local governments saw 
major increases in their budgetary income. This allowed them to re-open preschools. 
Despite this, today, only 60 percent of preschool-aged students are enrolled. 
Regarding secondary education that started in 2004, one can notice a signiﬁcant 
decrease in the number of schools, mainly as a result of the decreasing number of 
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students. Additionally, the quality of education delivered decreased signiﬁcantly, mainly 
as a result of the cumbersome process of turning old general schools in colleges and 
high schools. 
Access of rural students to high schools is diﬃcult. One impediment is the lack 
of transportation; the second is the absence of accommodation for the students. The 
central government’s solution is to insert “high school” classes into existing rural schools, 
as mentioned above.
DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
The central government is planning to slowly give up its authority in areas such as 
organization, ﬁnancing, and assessment of education. However, a snapshot of the system 
reveals almost complete centralization for all policy competencies, from the determina-
tion of policy standards in education to the execution of policy. 
The allocation of education responsibilities among diﬀerent levels of government is 
regulated by the Law on Education 547/95, the Law on Local Public Finances 123/2003, 
and other secondary legislation. According to the Law on Local Authorities (Articles 
10–13), ﬁrst-level local governments (municipalities) are responsible for preschool, 
primary, and high school education. In some cases, high schools are under the jurisdiction 
of a higher administrative level than the municipality, namely the districts (or raions). 
The state also delegated professional education, boarding schools, and high school hostels 
to raions.4 The principle according to which a high school is considered either under 
the municipal or raion subordination is determined by the catchment areas—whether 
students are attracted from the municipality only or also from the whole raion.
Local governments can submit proposals for opening, reorganization, and closing 
schools.5 The Board of Education6 at the raion level then analyzes the documents and 
submits a proposed decision for approval to the Ministry of Education. In the case 
of high schools, special, and professional schools that are subordinated to the central 
authorities, the Ministry of Education makes the decision. Obviously, the Ministry of 
Education needs to submit the ultimate decision for government approval.
Wages, social, and medical insurance expenditures for education personnel are the 
responsibility of the deconcentrated departments of the Ministry of Education, at the 
level of the raion. 
The government frequently transfers new powers and tasks to the raions and local 
governments without any ﬁnancial support. An example of an unfunded mandate is 
Governmental Decision 542/2002, which mandates paid housing—or payment of 
mortgage interest—by local authorities for young teachers who settle in rural areas. The 
Ministry of Education should ensure their salaries. Because the local government revenues 
were not high enough to cover this additional expenditure, the law was implemented 
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starting in 2006, when the government allocated around EUR 600 per academic year 
for each young teacher.7 
At present, most of the local governments in the rural areas, as well as a large number 
of rural small municipalities, are facing an acute personnel crisis. In order to address this 
situation, the Ministry of Education attempted several approaches. One of them was to 
overburden existing teachers with larger teaching norms. Currently, many of the teachers 
in the rural areas have a norm twice or almost three times higher than teachers in urban 
schools. A second approach is requesting a teacher to teach several topics. Finally, retired 
teachers were oﬀered their old jobs or new teaching positions. 
The ministry is in charge of the overall management of the school, from the orga-
nizational chart to the selection of school directors and teachers. The director of the 
school, however, can hire additional teachers if needed, but only with the approval of 
the raion. Inspection and monitoring of school performances and ﬁnances are ensured 
by the deconcentrated oﬃces of the Ministry of Education. 
Local governments are responsible for maintenance of schools, while capital works 
are under the responsibility of the central government. Capital projects are ﬁnanced 
through categorical grants.
An area that is still untouched is support for private education. Central government 
has failed to create adequate conditions to support the growth of private education, 
such as a deﬁnition of standards or the involvement of the private sector in ﬁnancing 
and management of professional education.
THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION FINANCING
The education budget in ﬁscal year 2003 represented 26 percent of the state budget 
and six percent of GDP.
The main ﬁnancing sources for education are: 
 1. State budget, in the form of shared revenues and transfers (grants) for local 
governments:
  • State taxes, like corporate income tax, personal income tax, and charges from 
roads, are a source of shared revenues. Part of the revenues collected are 
retained locally, while the remaining portion goes to the central government 
budget. The percentage of shared revenues is deﬁned annually by the budget 
law. The speciﬁc feature of this regulation is that the minimum percentage 
of shared revenues to be kept by respective local government should not be 
less than 50 percent.8 
  • Transfers (grants) are calculated by a formula. There are two types of trans-
fers. First, there is a general transfer. The amount of the general transfer is 
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calculated to ﬁll the gap between anticipated revenues and expenditure 
needs. This is an equalization mechanism—local governments which have 
revenues per capita exceeding the average expenditures per capita by 20 
percent should transfer its excesses to the central budget for its redistribu-
tion among other local governments. Second, there are special allocations 
to fund-speciﬁc activities. Transfers are made from the central government 
to raions,9 which allocate them onwards to local governments.10 
 2. Own revenues of local governments (local taxes and other revenues from renting 
local facilities). Own source revenues are collected from taxes and fees, approved 
by each local government, and go directly into the local budget. In the structure 
of local revenues, own source revenues constitute around 40 percent.
 3. Own revenues of schools (the “school fund,” revenues from extracurricular 
courses, rental revenues). 
Table 2.
 Preschool, Primary, Secondary, and Vocational Education Expenditures 
as a Percent of GDP and Public Expenditure (MDL million)
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
approved
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)
19,051 22,556 27,297 32,032 37,652 44,069 53,354 63,200
Total public 
expenditures
43,259 51,942 61,834 11,407 14,527 17,845 22,355 24,500
Education 
expenditures
923 1,240 1,498 2,169 2,697 3,605 4,240 5,230
Percent of GDP 4.8 5.5 5.5 6.8 7.2 8.2 7.9 8.3
Teachers’ wages 3,369 4,633 6,102 7,107 8,818 12,093 13,510 15,500
Percent of teachers 
wages from average 
wages in economy
62.0 67.0 68.5 64.4 66.9 71.3 65.4 59.6
Wages share in 
total education 
expenditures** (%)
— — — 86.9 84.0 80.5 82.8 82.2
Notes: * Up to 2003 State Budget, from 2004 National Public Budget, which includes the state budget, 
 local budgets, social budget, and health budget.
  ** According to IDIS Viitorul survey, March 2008. 
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At the time of budget preparation, the Ministry of Finance communicates the 
methodology of developing the budget to local governments. Local governments need 
to present their estimates of expenditures to the Ministry of Finance. They include in 
their budget proposals the school budgets.
School budgets are composed using the number of potential students in the raion at 
the beginning of the year and at the end of reporting year. These numbers are provided by 
the Statistics and Sociology Department. Next, based on the existing school population, 
average expenditures are estimated. This approach introduces several distortions. In the 
case of preschools, for example, only around 60 percent of the students are currently 
enrolled in preschool education. However, current budget planning starts from the 
assumption that all students aged three to six in each raion are enrolled, and average 
costs are used to create the budget proposal. The planned budgets reﬂect much higher 
needs than reality. The same goes for primary and secondary education. 
Between 1998 and 2003, ﬁnancing of education was made through a block grant 
(general transfer) which was calculated on the basis of expenditure norms. Local authori-
ties enjoyed signiﬁcant discretion over the allocation of the block grant for various local 
services. However, given that the need of local governments was constantly larger than 
the transfer received, one of the results was that teacher salaries became secondary in 
importance and, in many cases, teachers would not receive their salaries for three to 
six months. To address this issue, the central government went back to the system of 
categorical grants in 2003. 
Currently, salary expenditures are secured in a conditional grant allocated to local 
governments through annual budget laws. The central government sends the funds for 
salaries to the raions, and the raions pay the school personnel directly. The local govern-
ment records the salary payments in its accounting system, though it neither sees nor 
“touches” the money. 
The raions also pay funds for maintenance. Capital grants are allocated in the state 
budget by the central government and sent directly to the local governments, which 
pay on behalf of the school (the school is tertiary budget coordinator). 
Maintenance amounts to about 20 percent of the education portion of the local 
budget, and is co-ﬁnanced by local governments. In order to cover this need, local 
governments should routinely allocate twice the grant received from the center. While 
wealthier local governments have managed to cover this need, poorer local governments 
have been critically underfunded for maintenance. 
More than maintenance, the ﬁnancing of major school repairs by local governments 
is on the decrease. Within tight budget constraints, their contribution amounts to more 
than half of the total capital expenditures. 
Parents of students are an important contributor to the education budget in Moldova. 
It is current practice that parents contribute to teachers’ salaries. In Chisinau, for example, 
teachers can receive about one additional salary that has been collected by the parents. 
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ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING FRAMEWORK 
FOR EDUCATION FINANCING
Good Governance and Improvement of the Education System
The main problems of the education system in Moldova are the unclear allocation of 
responsibilities between levels of government, incoherent ﬁscal decentralization reforms, 
and, as a result, signiﬁcant gaps between the autonomy of local communities, as it is 
deﬁned in various policy documents, and how this actually takes place. 
The eﬃciency of the school network is hindered by several factors:
 • In Moldova’s northern and southern regions especially, the distance between 
rural communities is large. This signiﬁcantly increases the cost of transportation 
if a consolidation of schools is undertaken. 
 • Many districts have a high level of ethnic diversity, which means teaching in 
several languages aside from the oﬃcial one. This increases teaching costs in 
schools, where topics can be taught in two languages (Moldavian and Russian), 
if consolidation is considered.
 • A continuous decrease in student population.
 • School infrastructure is a holdover from the Soviet times and is very expensive 
to maintain. 
The average number of students in a class is around 22, though this indicator diﬀers 
from district to district.
The vast majority of small local governments have slight deviations from the national 
average. There are two extremes, however. In one, municipalities of Chişinău and Bălţi 
have over 25 students in class, while the other six districts (at the bottom of Table 3) 
have less than 20 students. Additionally, in some urban areas, there are schools with a 
few classes with over 34 students. This is a result of not just a gradual decrease in the 
student population,11 but also of recent migration of students from the rural to urban 
areas. Obviously, this increases the pressure over local governments in terms of school 
network rationalization. 
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Table 3.
Districts and Average Number of Students per Class
Number of Students District Number of Students
Greater than 25 students Mun. Bălţi 27.1
Chisinau 25.7
22–24 students Hînceşti 23.9
Găgăuzia 23.3
Basarabeasca 23.2
Ialoveni 22.9
Cimişlia 22.7
Dubăsari 22.3
Străşeni 22.3
Drochia 22.1
Ştefan Vodă 22.1
Anenii Noi 22.0
20–22 students Glodeni 21.9
Călăraşi 21.7
Criuleni 21.5
Nisporeni 21.5
Ungheni 21.5
Leova 21.3
Teleneşti 21.3
Orhei 21.2
Sîngerei 21.1
Căuşeni 21.0
Cahul 20.8
Soroca 20.6
Taraclia 20.5
Făleşti 20.3
Briceni 20.2
Cantemir 20.2
Floreşti 20.1
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Number of Students District Number of Students
Less than 20 students Rîşcani 19.8
Rezina 19.7
Edineţ 19.6
Şoldăneşti 19.3
Donduşeni 18.6
Ocniţa 18.1
Local Partnership and Education Improvement
More involvement of the local communities is needed to address several issues for 
which local governments have little resources. The maintenance, capital repairs, as well 
as meals for students are some areas where there is insuﬃcient funding from both the 
central and local government level. 
Parents are greatly involved in ﬁnancing the maintenance of the schools. Until 2002, 
this process was not regulated and parents contributed regularly to a special fund used 
for maintenance. However, this led to abuses. As a result, starting in 2002, school boards 
are in charge of the collection and management of ﬁnancial resources.
If low or no funding for maintenance does not lead to closure of schools, the real 
problem becomes that of capital repairs, which require eﬀorts above the capacity of 
local and central governments. Here, external assistance is still needed, and one such 
solution within Moldova has been the Social Investment Fund of Moldova (SIFM), 
which has already ﬁnanced major school repairs. In 2005, for example, 71 schools and 
kindergartens were repaired using the fund and parent contributions. Overall, around 
60 to 80 units were repaired. The ﬁrst project of the fund, budgeted for over USD 25 
million was completed in 2004. A new fund is currently in use and has a budget of 
more than USD 35 million. 
The strategic alliance between local communities and the central government is a 
vital factor for projects to be approved under SIFM. In other words, 15 percent from 
the cost of the project needs to be supported by the applying community. This increases 
the responsibility of the community to the project, not only during the project’s life, 
but also after its closure, when further maintenance is needed. 
Another important issue is ensuring school meals. This item should also be ﬁnanced 
by the local government. Most of them, however, cannot provide the necessary funds. 
According to the law, each student should receive a meal equivalent to MDL 1.5 per 
child per day.12 Obviously, USD 0.1 per day is not enough for a student meal. 
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Since 2000, an international organization was the main ﬁnancing source for the 
meal program. In 2004, when the program ended, the organization started to look for 
additional ﬁnancing solutions. They contacted a local organization (IDIS Viitorul), and 
together they organized a number of conferences on the local, regional, and national 
levels where they promoted the creation of extrabudgetary funds at the local level as a 
source of ﬁnancing school meals for students. More details on this initiative are described 
in Appendix 2. 
Flaws in the ﬁscal framework also lead to ineﬃciency. One speciﬁc issue is ineﬃcient 
expenditure norms elaborated by the Ministry of Finance. Expenditure estimates are 
based on the availability of resources rather than on need. Expenditure needs should 
be assessed based on real needs, such as the percentage of elderly in the population or 
the number of school-age children.
Exemplifying this is the estimate of maintenance expenditures, which are now 
calculated based on the number of students. As a consequence, small rural locations 
that have a reduced number of students also have a disadvantage compared to bigger 
locations. While there is a causality between these two variables, there are several other 
ways to better reﬂect the needs—and use it for budget-planning purposes—such as the 
use of coeﬃcients. 
This would involve using a coeﬃcient such as k1 = 1.3 for those local governments 
with a population lower than 1,000 inhabitants. In order to encourage local authorities 
to concentrate resources, and to avoid opening schools in very small locations, another 
adjusting coeﬃcient could be used where students need to walk more than seven kilo-
meters to the school (such as k2 = 1.2). 
The ﬁnal calculation of the cost for a student who has to attend school in another 
locality could be performed in the following way:S = S0 x k1 x k2, in which S0 is the 
amount allocated for a student regardless of the location, and S is the adjusted amount 
received in the case of a small local government where students need to walk more than 
seven kilometers to school.13
CONCLUSION
The Overall System for Financing Education
Until 1998, education was ﬁnanced using categorical grants for each budget item. 
In other words, local governments would receive money separately for each education 
function (salaries, maintenance, etc.), and could not change the destination of the 
funds. Starting from 1999, when local self-governance became the goal for public 
administration reform, the ﬁnancing of education used a single per-student norm. 
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Still many municipalities encountered diﬃculties in organizing the educational 
process and providing a well-functioning school. As a result, many of them were 
delaying payment of teachers’ wages. Then the central government returned to 
a more centralized system, where teacher salaries are now paid directly from the 
national budget to schools. Paradoxically, the local budget is adopted together with 
teachers’ salaries (50–70 percent of the local budget), though the local authorities actually 
manage only 30–50 percent of the budget. Moreover, beginning in 2002, the teachers’ 
wages have increased much faster when compared to the norms for this item. If, in 2001, 
salaries constituted around 50–60 percent of the budget for education, then at present 
it may reach 70–90 percent. The remainder of the budget is insuﬃcient to ensure the 
minimum funds necessary for the functioning of schools, and local governments are too 
constrained to allocate own revenues to education. Presently, the vast majority of local 
governments at the community level provide only one single service—education. 
The current model used to estimate costs has a set of deﬁciencies: 
 • the aggregated funding level is calculated per student, whereas teacher salaries 
are determined on the basis of hours taught; 
 • the number of classes decreases from year to year, and in rural localities the 
number of groups with less students increases, a consequence of demographics 
in the republic; 
 • schools are allocated almost equal amounts for electricity, heat, water, etc., while 
the tariﬀs for these services vary across the country. Regional discrepancies in 
ﬁnancing maintenance occur as a result of an ineﬃcient expenditure norm 
calculated based on average expenditures. This aﬀects the rural schools which 
have greater needs for ﬁnancing. 
A New Methodology to Calculate Normative Education 
Expenditures
The current legislation does not clearly stipulate the competences of each administra-
tive level, nor does it guarantee the ﬁnancing sources necessary for the performance of 
these competences. As a consequence, a doubling-up of competences and confusion in 
the implementation of functions very often happens. The ﬁnancing arrangements also 
reﬂect the lack of clarity in the allocation of responsibilities. 
In the short term, the existing system should be altered by introducing an adjustment 
coeﬃcient that could add to the existent expenditure norms. For the small localities, an 
adjustment coeﬃcient of 30–40 percent should be used. In other words, these localities 
should get 30–40 percent over the basic sum. In the long term, however, a completely 
new ﬁnancing system should be created. 
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To that end, the following steps could be taken:
 1) Create sectoral legislation, including a separate law for the allocation of respon-
sibilities in education for each administrative level. The delimitation of compe-
tences should be accomplished considering the following: (i) administrative 
capacity and (ii) the right of decision-making for the qualiﬁed authorities. 
  More speciﬁcally, maintenance should be under the authority of local govern-
ments, while capital investments should be undertaken by the raions. This way, 
this delimitation of authorities will ensure the good functioning of the educa-
tional system: each administrative level will have total freedom concerning the 
decisions regarding the modality of organizing the education within its limits of 
empowerment. The municipalities should have the right to decide how to heat, 
repair, or purchase materials for their schools. The raions should be empowered 
to decide, where, when, and how will the capital investments be performed. 
And the state should decide about the size of teachers’ salaries. This way, the 
decisions taken by one level will not aﬀect other levels. 
 2) Reform of the system of public ﬁnances. At present, local governments are 
completely dependent on the raions and the central government in terms of 
collecting revenues and managing expenditures. Local governments have no 
discretion in drafting local budgets; local budgets are adopted by the raion 
council and further approved by the Ministry of Finance. A new system of local 
public administration has to be conceived in a way so that each administrative 
level receives suﬃcient own resources, in order to be able to exercise its own 
competences established by law. 
In other words, in Moldova, the improvement of the system of education ﬁnancing 
should include a more clear allocation of responsibilities and a local government ﬁnance 
system that would enhance local ﬁscal autonomy. 
NOTES
1 No. 337-XIII/1994.
2 Until 1996, Moldova had two parallel education systems: one based on the Soviet system 
and the new one. In the ﬁrst system “general education” was provided, which meant that no 
distinction was made between primary and secondary, so one school would host students 
for both levels. Today, there are still many schools where the two systems coexist, where half 
of the school studies according to the Soviet system and the other half (usually the better 
students) studies in a system divided by lower- and upper-secondary education. The closure 
of the old general schools should be ﬁnalized by 2010.
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3 The so-called “high school classes.”
4 Until 1999, Moldova was divided into 33 raions, each of them with a population of 
70,000–90,000 people. After the 1999 reform, 12 districts were created and replaced the 
raions. The districts, however, were less developed economically than the raions, and could 
not address the problems that were under the jurisdiction of raions. This was a perfect reason 
for the Communist Party to return to the raion system in 2003, putting a halt to all reforms. 
Districts lost responsibility for boarding schools, high school hostels, special boarding schools, 
professional schools, and art schools. The 2003 halt severely aﬀected the autonomy of local 
governments, to the degree that in 2005 Moldova was at risk of being eliminated from the 
Council of Europe. At present, Moldova has an obligation towards the Council of Europe 
to improve the quality of local autonomy, including in the domain of education. 
6 Article 40/1, Law of Education 547/1995.
7 The boards of education at the raion level are a strange mixture of local and deconcentrated 
government. The raion is secondary local government. Each raion is governed by a locally-
elected council. Raion councils elect executive committees from among their members. 
The board of education employees are, however, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Education. Essentially, a local government level is running a deconcentrated department of 
the ministry. 
7 This was accomplished with the support of external assistance. It is not clear whether the 
program will be implemented further. 
8 Given the economic reality of Moldova, the only local governments that share its revenues 
with the central government are local authorities of municipalities of Chisinau (the capital) 
and Balti (the second largest city). All other territorial units keep their full revenues from 
“taxes on business activity” (FY 2006 State Budget, Appendix 23). For more details, see 
Morozov (2006).
9 There are no clear rules for allocation. In practice, the “list of needs” is established based on 
a per-capita normative revised by each raion, using its own methods. This creates a situation 
where the norms included in the transfer calculations received from the state budget do not 
correspond with those included in the transfers from raions to local governments. Therefore, 
some local governments receive more transfers than others of the same size. In an attempt 
to make the allocation process more transparent and predictable, some raions (Orhei, for 
example) created their own coeﬃcients in order to oﬀer transparency and predictability in 
allocating funds to local governments. These coeﬃcients are not monitored by the central 
government. 
10 The Municipality of Chisinau receives the least transfer revenue (just ﬁve percent of its total 
revenue comes from general transfers). The remaining local governments account for 10 
percent up to 80 percent of their total revenue from general transfers.
11 In the last three years the number of students decreased by 30 percent. 
12 USD 1 = MDL 12.5.
13 This is a proposal of IDIS Viitorul, suggested in 2002, that was tested in eight local govern-
ments from three regions in Moldova.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
 Table A1.1
Delimitation of Jurisdiction among Administration Levels (Proposal for Reform)
Administrative Level Type of Decision Allocated
Ministry of Education Education development policies
Strategic directions of educational policies’ implementation
Design of standards
Elaboration of assessment mechanisms
Elaboration of educational plans and programs 
School network
Design of financing arrangements
Professional development of teachers
District Boards Monitoring of educational policy implementation 
Determination of the strategy of educational policy implementation 
Curriculum supervision
School network
Assistance in technical issues (methodology, specialization) 
City/village administration Do not have authority over school opening or closure; can only 
submit proposals
Schools Teaching 
Student evaluation
Selection and promotion of specialists
Increase of specialists’ professional level 
Maintenance of schools
Appendix 2
IDIS Initiative: Using Extrabudgetary Funds to Finance Local Programs
According to Article 37 of the Law on Local Public Finances, local governments have 
the right to form extrabudgetary funds for ﬁnancing local programs.
Extrabudgetary funds can be created by local authorities as well as by existing public 
institutions such as preschools, general schools, and other educational institutions. 
When an extrabudgetary fund is created by an educational institution or other public 
administration institution, its activity is regulated by normative acts of the Ministry of 
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Finance. When the fund is created by local authorities its activity is regulated by the 
Law on Local Public Finances. 
The best way of extrabudgetary fund creation is at the local level, which would almost 
exclude direct any implication of the central authorities within the process. 
According to the Law on Public Authorities, the set up of extrabudgetary funds is 
within the jurisdiction of local or raion councils. There exists a rule that must be observed 
during the entire period of the extrabudgetary fund’s existence: every ﬁnancial operation 
has to be executed with well-written documentation.
According to the Fiscal Code (Article12, p. 3) and Law on Local Public Finances 
(Article 37, p. 3), the accumulation and utilization of ﬁnancial funds is performed using 
a special account of a speciﬁc organization opened at territorial treasury.
According to the Law on Public Local Finances (Article 37, p. 2) and the Law 
on Budgetary System and Budget Process (Article 12), extrabudgetary reserves are 
formed of:
 • Voluntary contributions of physical persons and legal entities;
 • Revenues obtained from local lotteries, competitions, and other activities orga-
nized by local authorities;
 • Revenues of institutions obtained from services rendered, works executed, or from 
other activities allowed according to the legislation and other regulating acts.
The most important problem society faces in the process of this fund formation is 
the question of how to attract the interest of donors. As a rule, people will only grant 
money for solutions to real problems. If we try to create an extrabudgetary fund for the 
solution of the problems, the essence of which are not understood by the population, 
we will likely meet failure. The only solution is to explain the work to the population. 
Obviously, people better understand problems they face directly. For example, parents are 
aware of the question of meals provided in school, and as a consequence they are potential 
partners in any fund created to address this problem. We should take into consideration 
the fact that they are, at the same time, representatives of local entrepreneurs. 
According to Article 2 of the Law on Philanthropy and Sponsorship 1420-XV, 
October 2002, sponsorship is considered as the ﬁnancing of programs or activities 
within the domain of education, but Article 21 of this law presumes some tax conces-
sions for grantors, which are stipulated in the Fiscal Code (Article 36, p. 1). The grantor 
can deduct from taxable income expenses that deal with philanthropic or sponsorship 
activity, but the deducted sum cannot exceed 10 percent of taxable income. 
In order to have access to the above mentioned tax concessions, there exists the 
necessity of these donations’ conﬁrmation according to the legal framework that is 
stipulated in the Regulation on Philanthropic or Sponsorship Donations (Number 
489) from May 1998.
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According to the form of donation, they can be conﬁrmed:
 • If donations were made in a monetary form, and a conﬁrming document is 
supplied from the donor in a free form that attests receiving of money free of 
charge and which is signed by the director and chief accountant of organization 
or beneﬁciary.
 • In the case of donations of non-monetary origin, the conﬁrmation of the dona-
tion can be made in the following way: donation contract is concluded in a free 
from, but in written form and in case of donation in the form of real estate a 
deed should be registered.
Thus, a simple receipt that contains two written rows, where the donation amount 
is indicated, needs to be issued. It is suﬃcient to show this document to the ﬁscal 
authorities. It is valid and for physical persons when there appears necessity to present 
a declaration of revenues.
Aside from sponsorship, there are other ways to replenish extrabudgetary funds. If a 
city/village administration or other public institution obtain some revenues, then upon 
decision of local council, the partial or full amount of these funds can be assigned to 
extrabudgetary funds. First, these actions permit directional usage of resources obtained. 
Second, there problems can be eliminated throughout the process of the transfer-sums 
calculation. In some cases, when a city/village administration obtained revenues that 
were not planned in the location’s budget, district authorities can reduce the sum of 
transfers designed for this administration. In other words, in this case cash ﬂow does 
not change, and the local administration has no interest in the increase of the location’s 
budget revenues. As a rule, an increase in local budget revenues results in a decrease of 
transfers from district or state budget. That is why the importance of additional resources 
transfers in extra budgetary funds cannot be misunderstood.
One of the advantages of extrabudgetary funds is that when using ﬁnancial resources 
through them, expenses decrease up to 20 percent, as stipulated by the Fiscal Code, 
Chapter 4, Article103, paragraph 1.4, which states that: 
VAT is not paid on the resources from the state budget and extra-
budgetary funds for special purposes for ﬁnancing diﬀerent activities, 
with the condition that these funds constitute no less than 40 percent 
of the total funds designed for these activities.
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Appendix 3
Table A3.1.
Division of Education Expenditure between Types of Cost (Teaching Salaries, etc.)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total for schools 7,075,692 9,110,017 1,224,255 1,481,585 1,709,251 1,947,689
Salaries and wages* 3,340,448 3,894,832 5,275,667 7,175,778 8,785,423 1,019,403
Payments for 
goods and services, 
including:
2,289,744 3,257,079 4,163,512 4,358,432 4,591,872 5,307,186
Electricity 337,357 584,622 673,772 677,144 657,102 679,782
Heating 383,603 495,765 505,713 660,038 590,759 472,492
Books magazines, 
and newspapers
28,076 19,744 51,416 22,956 23,259 3,316
Capital investment 
in construction 
0 100 450,891 378,063 588,496 253,184
Acquisition of 
equipment and of 
long-term assets 
51,003 114,551 200,824 155,639 181,866 109,866
Major repairs 317,204 441,884 79,260 643,347 1,168,699 343,732
Other expenses 112,635 12,462 1,142,449 877,155 826,288 410,294
Note: * Contribution to social insurance funds are not included.
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Appendix 4
Table A4.1. 
Percent Division of Education Expenditure between Types of Cost 
(Teaching Salaries, etc.)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total subsidies to “education” 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Salaries and wages* 47.21 42.75 43.09 48.43 51.40 52.34
Payments for goods and services, 
including:
32.36 35.75 34.01 29.42 26.86 27.25
Electricity 4.77 6.42 5.50 4.57 3.84 3.49
Heating 5.42 5.44 4.13 4.45 3.46 2.43
Books magazines, and newspapers 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.15 0.14 0.17
Capital investment in construction 0.00 0.01 3.68 2.55 3.44 1.30
Acquisition of equipment of 
long-term assets 
0.72 1.26 1.64 1.05 1.06 0.56
Major repairs 4.48 4.85 6.47 4.34 6.84 1.76
Note: * Contribution to social insurance funds are not included.
Appendix 5
Table A5.1. 
Average Teaching Salaries in Relation to per Capita GDP
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Plan
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (MDL min.)
16,020 19,051 22,556 27,297 31,992
GDP/capita (MDL) 4,400 5,240 6,220 7,550 10,300
Average teaching salaries (ATS) 2,596 3,357 4,655 6,341 6,174*
ATS per year/GDP per capita 70.8% 76.8% 89.8% 100.8% 71.9%
Note: * Average salary in secondary schools decreased from MDL 685 to MDL 666. As for the educa-
tion system in general, there was no increase in salaries.
   USD 1 = MDL 12.5.
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Executive Summary
Today’s reformers of the education sector in Romania have inherited a deeply fragmented 
management and ﬁnancing system embedded in a confused decentralization framework. 
Their task is to review the results of 18 years of incomplete reforms and to design a realistic 
and forceful strategy to complete them. This chapter aims to help the Romanian Ministry 
of Education, Research, and Youth (MERY) and its regional and county departments as well 
as local authorities in this regard. 
A timeline of reform for the ﬁrst and second half of the 1990s would place the reform 
in two phases of planning and partial implementation, respectively. The pace then slowed 
until 2004 when a new framework was tested in some pilot counties in order to strengthen 
school autonomy. New laws are about to come into effect at the time of writing that will 
formalize new arrangements for preschools and school staff but the reform will stall without 
further incentives and political will. 
Several problems lie in the path of Romania reformers. The primary student population 
has declined by 11 percent in ﬁve years from 2001 to 2007 and this decline will soon hit the 
secondary schools. Over 1,300 rural schools have fewer than ten students, with an average 
of 53 students per school in rural areas compared to 345 students per school in cities. This 
inherited fragmented network of rural schools is creating almost insurmountable barriers to 
efﬁcient and equitable education in rural areas. Over 20 percent of primary school gradu-
ates do not continue to secondary or vocational schools. Secondary education faces its own 
serious challenges. Vocational education is overburdened with large student numbers per 
teacher compared to elite general academic schools. Low salaries have contributed to many 
teachers seeking additional employment or lessons.
As Romania gradually shed the economic, political, and social trauma of communism, 
its leaders maintained a centralized state where power was based on regional represen-
tatives of the central government in 42 counties (judete). The education system was no 
different. Deconcentrated units of MERY, the county school inspectorates (Inspectorul Scolar 
Judetian), were responsible for implementing national norms in the education sector in the 
respective county under its authority. This system, whereby staff, costs, directors, expen-
ditures, and policy have been decided for each school by the inspectorates, by default the 
central government, is still in place in 2008 (except for the eight counties under a limited 
pilot project since 2004, with no plans for replication nationwide). This not only precluded 
the creation of a system of more autonomous and accountable schools, but also excluded 
local governments from playing a major role in the sector. At the same time, however, this 
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centralized system was able to implement centrally mandated curriculum, textbook, and 
teacher training reforms. 
In 1995, a new education law (No. 85) guaranteed children the right to free education 
free of ideology. Administrative boards were established, along with other school manage-
ment structures; but giving them real power to make decisions was indeﬁnitely postponed 
by the central government. At the same time, the law made local governments responsible 
for budgeting and ﬁnancing maintenance, deepening the differences between the cities and 
rural areas. This is because the main revenues of the county and local councils are shares 
of local taxes, although a relatively weak national equalization fund is also in place. Local 
governments have a fair degree of discretion in the area of funding maintenance. At the 
same time, teacher and non-teacher salaries are the exclusive domain of the inspectorates 
and MERY. Although the funds for salaries nominally ﬂow through the judete budgets, under 
a perverse system of sume defalcate, their use is tightly controlled by the center. 
Under the terms of the Programmatic Adjustment Loan of 2004 from the World Bank, 
Romania recommitted to the decentralization of education ﬁnance and management, in 
the context of a larger reform of public administration. This has yet to be translated into 
law, even if the framework and proposals were there in 2004, while the debate about 
targeting decentralization to schools or local governments remained unresolved. Conﬂicts 
in the current legislation have confusingly assigned ﬁscal and management responsibility 
to all parties, including the central government. Except in eight pilot counties, the county 
inspectorates control the opening, management, and closing of kindergartens, primary and 
middle schools, and vocational and scholarship schools; they hold the contracts with the 
school directors, not the local government or wider community. 
Financing arrangements are also complicated by inconsistencies in the new education 
law of 2004 (No. 354) on ﬁnancial ﬂows for education (own revenues or education grant) 
and fragmentation in the ﬁnancing system. Difﬁculties of setting the basic-per-student cost 
standard and unresolved debates over the criteria of the methodological norms that should 
determine it have stalled effective implementation of the law. A lack of a clear leadership 
regarding education decentralization and disagreements between different ministries have 
been counterproductive to meaningful progress. 
In theory, the new legislation supports decentralization as a basic management principle 
for managing and ﬁnancing education with a per-student cost standard mandated by the 
central government. Costs are supposed to be calculated according to differences in basic, 
complementary, and compensatory ﬁnancing, although the deﬁnitions of these categories 
are confusing. The National Council for Pre-university Education Financing should be respon-
sible for determining this amount in consultation with other stakeholders. But without an 
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effective assessment mechanism to measure whether the standard cost is appropriate, this 
institution has not been very assertive under the watch of its parent organization, MERY. 
No established system of cost standard has been so far discussed and approved, and thus 
the ﬁnancial provisions of the 2004 law remain unimplemented. 
A speciﬁc Romanian dissolution of budgetary responsibility, called a “budgeting 
vacuum” in the report, contributed both to underﬁnancing and to low external efﬁciency. 
Consequently, Romania sits at the bottom of the scale for resources devoted to education 
in the region (3.1 percent of GDP in 2001, compared to an OECD average of ﬁve percent), 
even if overall spending has increased. A dramatic fall in student numbers (annually ﬁve 
percent) has exacerbated the inefﬁciencies in the school system. Disparities between rural 
and urban localities are not effectively addressed, leading to inequity. 
It does not seem likely that the confused managerial and ﬁnancial arrangements 
plaguing Romanian education can be reformed without a more fundamental review of what 
Romania wants to do with its centralized governance system. The Ministry of Education, 
Research, and Youth needs to develop a coherent decentralization strategy, in line with the 
overall decentralization process, and to address the main real challenges, that is fragmented 
school networks, a low scholarization rate for secondary education, and inadequate educa-
tion quality. This, in turn, may create a space for informed discussions regarding what cost 
standards are needed and how they should be implemented.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, all transition countries faced signiﬁcant problems in developing new 
management and ﬁnancing structures for their education systems, and Romania was no 
exception. The economic decline was severe and recovery much delayed. Turbulent polit-
ical processes did not create the stability necessary for a measured and rational devolution 
of authorities from the highly centralized education system characteristic of communist 
regimes. In those adverse circumstances, Romania did make remarkably determined eﬀorts 
in modernizing, streamlining, and decentralizing its education sector. It is, nevertheless, 
not surprising that those eﬀorts were not fully consistent or coordinated.
Today’s reformers of Romanian education have inherited a deeply fragmented 
management and ﬁnancing system, embedded in a confused decentralization framework. 
Their task is to review the results of 18 years of incomplete reforms of the sector, and to 
design a realistic and forceful strategy to complete those reforms. The present report, in 
part, aims at helping the Ministry of Education, Research, and Youth (MERY) achieve 
the ﬁrst of those objectives. 
The identiﬁcation of stages of education reform in Romania has been subject to 
much discussion (for instance, Velea and Botnariuc 2002, Halasz 2002, Berryman et al. 
2006), and is largely dependent on the focus of speciﬁc research.2 However, the focus of 
education ﬁnance, adopted in the present report, justiﬁes the following timeline:
 • 1990–1995: preparatory phase, during which most of the reforms were reactions 
to the excesses of the communist period, including de-communization and 
removal of overly ideological education content; the focus was the adoption of 
an interim curriculum; the reforms were introduced in legal documents of the 
government of Romania (ordinances and decisions) and of MERY (orders), and 
implemented by the ministry and by deconcentrated county oﬃces of MERY 
Inspectoratul Scolar Judetean (ISJ); the preparatory phase concluded with the 
adoption of the Law on Education 85/1995 (it reduced obligatory schooling to 
eight years); the school ﬁnances were still completely centralized through ISJ. 
 • 1995–2000: reform phase, based on the new education law and supported by 
World Bank projects3 and by the EU;4 a new coherent national curriculum 
was deﬁned (including a balance between the compulsory and elective courses) 
and multiple textbooks introduced (three or four textbooks per each grade and 
subject); the implementation of the reforms was in part delegated to a number of 
national councils working alongside the ministry; in 1999 compulsory education 
was extended to nine years of education; the ﬁnancing of school maintenance 
was devolved to local governments, while a principle of per-student ﬁnancing 
was put into Law 85/1995, although never implemented; in 2001 the funds for 
school staﬀ salaries were channelled through local budgets, thus creating some 
tension as they are still fully controlled by the ministry. 
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 • 2000–2004: the slowing of reforms, with a reduction of the elective courses in 
the school curricula and suspension of further moves towards the increased 
autonomy of individual schools; introduction of an incentive mechanism to 
attract qualiﬁed teachers in rural areas; transfer of capital expenditures to the 
level of local governments.5 
 • In 2004, Romania introduced a new framework of education ﬁnance and 
management, as described in some detail in Section 2; the framework foresees 
increased school autonomy and a new ﬁnancing system based on standard costs, 
though its implementation remained only partial. A number of pilot projects 
were designed but only partially implemented. 
 • In 2008, MERY prepared from education laws, including the new law on pre-
university education and the new law concerning teaching personnel. These new 
laws are currently undergoing public debate and will most likely be enforced 
starting this year. 
The incomplete character and slow implementation of reforms in the education 
sector did not allow Romania to eﬀectively tackle its diﬃcult external problems, which it 
shares with its neighbors in the region. Following Voicu and Begu (1999), Halasz (2002), 
and Herczyński (2005 and 2006), we can propose the following list of main problems, 
directly pertinent to the institutional and ﬁnancial arrangements in education: 
 • The demographic decline of the student population. Between the school years 
2001–2002 and 2006–2007, the number of students in primary schools fell by 
11 percent, and the decline will continue at a higher rate still. The decline will 
soon hit the secondary education system, too. While in the cities this process 
may bring improvements in the class size and allow better access of students 
to teachers and to other school resources, in the rural areas this threatens the 
ﬁnancial viability of providing education and will signiﬁcantly increase the 
per-student costs without any improvement in quality. 
 • The urban-rural divide in education—namely small rural schools providing 
education of insuﬃcient quality and lacking qualiﬁed teachers and proper 
equipment. The operation of these schools threatens the equity of the educa-
tion system and is a source of serious ineﬃciencies. The average school size is 
53 students in rural areas and 345 students in the cities, and over 1,300 rural 
schools have fewer than 10 students (Voicu and Begu 1999). 
 • Insuﬃcient level of transition from primary to secondary education. In the school 
year 2006–2007, 97 percent of seven- to 10-year-old children were enrolled in 
schools, 95 percent of 11–14 year olds , and only 75.7 percent of 15–18 year 
olds (INS 2008). This means that over 20 percent of graduates of primary schools 
do not continue their education at all, not even in basic vocational schools.
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 • Excessive share of vocational education students in secondary education. In 2006-
2007, the vocational schools taught 23 percent of all secondary school students. 
This national average, however, hides signiﬁcant regional variations. While in 
Bucharest 16 percent of all secondary students attend vocational schools, in Iasi 
County we ﬁnd 28 percent (see Appendix, Table A1.1).
 • Vocational education has an excessive number of students—namely over 31 students 
per teacher, compared to 12 students per teacher in general academic schools 
(see Voicu and Begu 1999). This must signiﬁcantly impact the teaching quality 
of vocational schools and reveals an inherited preference for high-quality, elite, 
general academic schools. 
 • Low teacher salaries force many teachers to seek additional part-time employment. 
The average teacher’s salary is equal to 0.66 of GDP/capita, a low level compared 
to the OECD average of 1.33 of GDP/capita for primary education and 1.37 
of GDP/capita for secondary education (see World Bank Education Policy Note 
2007). This is a common problem in transitional economies, where govern-
ments are afraid to undertake more active policies with respect to teachers, by 
increasing their teaching load to western European standards, decreasing the 
number of teachers employed, and raising their salaries. While this is a diﬃcult 
strategy to design and implement, without such a strategy it will be diﬃcult to 
ensure that all teachers treat their work in schools as their main employment. 
Each of these signiﬁcant problems requires careful analysis, and each has a signiﬁ-
cant impact on the management and ﬁnancing of Romanian education. Moreover, it 
is clear that decentralization limits the range of available policy options, and inﬂuences 
the costs and manner of implementing those policy options. 
In December 2004, a new government was elected. Administrative and ﬁscal reforms 
in Romania were accelerated, in part in response to the challenge of imminent acces-
sion to the European Union. MERY was among the most active participants in the new 
reform movement, pressing for a far-reaching decentralization of education. The new 
initiatives and programs are, however, beyond the scope of this report, since their full 
implementation has not yet really begun. 
Accordingly, the structure of this report is as follows. First, we review the education 
law of 1995 and the fragmented managerial and ﬁnancial system it created. Secondly, we 
discuss the revised framework introduced in 2004, which tried but failed to complete 
the reform process. Thirdly, we describe some key open issues of education ﬁnance in 
Romania, and in the ﬁnal section we conclude with some recommendations. 
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REFORM EFFORTS 1990–2004
The Romanian Centralized Model: Inspectoratul Scolar Judetean
In the early 1990s, as successive political leaders tried to steer the economy away from 
collapse, Romania continued to maintain a highly centralized system. This system was 
based on regional representatives of the central government in 42 counties (judete), 
directly nominated and controlled by the central government. The education sector was 
no exception, and the county-level deconcentrated oﬃces of the Ministry of Education 
and Research, called Inspectoratul Scolar Judetian (ISJ) or County School Inspectorates, 
were responsible for implementing national norms concerning employment conditions, 
enrollments, curricula, graduation examinations, budgeting, class sizes, and other func-
tions. They planned the detailed budgets of all their schools, and executed those budgets 
under diﬃcult conditions of scarcity and poverty. The inspectorates also controlled the 
division of students into classes and the teaching plans of every school, and paid all their 
expenses, including salaries. The inspectorates not only nominated school directors, 
but also organized the selection process for the employment of teachers and eﬀectively 
employed all teachers in the country. Thus, the school directors had little inﬂuence on 
the selection of their teaching staﬀ. This unique feature of Romanian education is still 
operational in 2008 (with the exception of eight counties that have been included in a 
pilot program in 2004) and will be discussed in some detail in our report.6
This prolonging of centralization had both fortunate and unfortunate consequences. 
On the one hand, during the period of contracting economy and decreasing allocation 
for all social functions, the government’s patronage provided some measure of support 
and protection and helped ensure some basic standards across Romania. For instance, 
the schools were the only national-level institution able to distribute to all students 
across the country their ﬁxed monthly allowance.7 On the other hand, the retention of 
centralized governance slowed down the development of local governments and more 
autonomous and accountable schools. School staﬀ, especially school heads, their deputies, 
and accountants, were not learning responsible management of institutions or budgeting 
procedures. It also promoted the attitude that pedagogical, organizational, and ﬁnancing 
norms deﬁned in Bucharest were to be the main guidelines for the operation of the 
schools, and impeded any moves towards a more rational use of school recourses. 
The managerial and ﬁnancial tasks of the inspectorates, exercised in such diﬃcult 
conditions, also made it diﬃcult for them to acquire new skills and capacities, such as 
monitoring teaching quality and education results, in preparation for a diﬀerent future 
role in the decentralized education system. 
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The Education Law of 1995
1995 is generally considered to represent the ﬁrst signiﬁcant step towards education 
decentralization in Romania. The work on a new law governing the education sector 
was initiated in 1993 and the process was ﬁnalized in July 1995. Abrogating the old 
education law 28/1978, the new law 85/1995 put Romanian education on a sound 
legal basis, guaranteeing education for all children, free of charge, and free of ideological 
distortion. For pre-university education there were several innovations. The law estab-
lished administration boards (councils) that could be involved in the administrative 
decision-making process. The councils had to include ﬁve to 11 members.8 Preparatory 
groups at the preschool level were also established to ensure the continuity between 
preschool and primary school. 
However, while the law laid down the basis of school-based management structures, 
it gave schools little power over critical issues such as personnel policies. Recruitment 
of the director and teaching staﬀ remained with the central government, through IJS. 
According to the law, the inspectorate appointed directors of primary schools for a 
four-year term, while the ministry appointed the directors of secondary and vocational 
schools.9 Typically, the director was a teacher, who was paid a supplement for under-
taking limited managerial responsibilities, for which he or she had no speciﬁc training 
or professional accreditation. Only later, in 2004, was the school manager position 
institutionalized and the director released from his or her teaching duties. 
The new law also introduced two important new elements. The ﬁrst was to transfer 
to local governments the responsibility for ﬁnancing school maintenance. Article 167 
(2) clearly states that, “The repair and maintenance costs of physical and material facili-
ties of pre-university education units are ﬁnanced by local councils from speciﬁc state 
budget appropriations and from local budgets, as well as from their own resources.” This 
certainly represents a serious step in education ﬁnance decentralization in Romania. Its 
actual scope and consequences, evident today in the form of substantial fragmentation, 
are analyzed next. 
The second new element was the requirement that the allocation of funds to each 
school be based on a per-student amount. Article 169 (5) says, somewhat cryptically, 
that: 
The basis for the calculus of allocations to each education unit and 
institution represents the amount from the state budget that is decided 
per preschooler, schoolchild or student in respect of level and speciﬁcs 
of the educational process, as well as other indicators speciﬁc for educa-
tion, especially those concerning the quality of education. 
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There is some lack of clarity here, namely it is not obvious who is obliged to deter-
mine the amount allocated from the state budget per schoolchild, and what the range of 
other indicators is. It is possible, indeed, to imagine an allocation procedure using the 
state-mandated basic amount, but incorporating a large system of additional indicators 
and weights (both positive and negative) so that the actual allocation will bear little 
resemblance to that basic amount. However, this more fundamental discussion is not 
really necessary here, as this norm of law 84/1995 remained unfulﬁlled until now, and 
no such calculus of allocations is used in practice. Moreover, the amendments to this law, 
adopted in August 2004, introduced a new scheme of education ﬁnancing and made 
the provisions of Article 169 irrelevant (see the section on structural issues). That new 
scheme, as we argue below, also remained unimplemented. 
Devolution of School Maintenance Costs
Maintenance costs include all the material expenditures of schools, such as heating, 
electricity, water, and garbage collection, and also the supplies used by schools for 
their operation. Maintenance also includes small repairs necessary for the running of 
the schools. Those costs are covered by local governments. Local governments do not 
receive from the central budget any speciﬁc grant for those expenditures, as they are 
considered the own responsibilities of local governments. Local governments have to use 
for that purpose non-earmarked revenues, mostly own revenues and shared taxes, that 
is, a proportion of national taxes retained at the local level. This is certainly a highly 
decentralized system. 
The main component of those, the personal income tax (PIT) was shared in the 
following manner: 63 percent remains with the local government, while 37 percent 
accrues to the state budget.10 Since the introduction of the ﬂat-tax rate, the amount 
staying at the local level was increased to 82 percent. Those funds are further distributed 
as Table 1 illustrates.11 
Table 1.
Distribution of Personal Income Tax at the Local Level 
Beneﬁciary Purpose Old PIT Share (%) 2007 PIT Share (%)
County council Own expenditure needs 10 13
County and local council Rebalancing to equalize 
local budgets
17 22
Local council Own expenditure needs 36 47
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The distribution of the local share of the taxes is important, because it demonstrates 
several problems, such as the politicization and unpredictability in the ﬁnancing system, 
as described below. 
Firstly, about half of the PIT income of local councils is collected by the county 
and redistributed among the local budgets according to several rules.12 The rebalancing 
is applied to help local councils deliver public services such as education, health, trans-
port, and so on. This politicizes the budget process, in that one level of local govern-
ment is involved in deciding on the budgets of other local governments (local councils) 
in the areas in which it does not have managerial responsibility (such as education). 
Additionally, it is worth noting that the county council does not have suﬃcient data 
to analyze the sectoral needs of the local councils and therefore has to work in close 
collaboration with the school inspector.13 This implies that the deconcentrated MERY 
apparatus has some inﬂuence over the allocation of maintenance funds, but it is indirect 
and is not governed by a clear division of responsibilities. 
Secondly, the other half of the PIT shares, retained at the local level, provide very 
diﬀerent amounts depending on the wealth of the jurisdiction. Consequently, rich 
jurisdictions from the western part of the country have signiﬁcantly more funds at their 
disposal and can spend much more on school operations than poorer municipalities 
in Moldova. The same applies to equalization through the rebalancing component of 
shared PIT. It has a rather limited impact, because it is localized. Indeed, there will be 
many relatively rich counties, which will have at their disposal quite signiﬁcant funds 
for the rebalancing of budgets. At the same time, the poorer counties in Moldova, for 
instance, will also have their own much smaller equalization funds.
We note that Romania also has a national equalization system. This system allocates 
the funds again to the level of counties, where deconcetrated oﬃces of the Ministry of 
Public Finances as well as county councils further distribute the funds, according to 
several rules.14
A proper equalization system must include the whole country and has no need of 
counties as intermediaries in distribution. Instead, it should be operated by the central 
administration using a simple equalization formula and must be applied uniformly and 
transparently to all local governments. It is clear that the neither the county level systems 
of rebalancing nor nationwide equalization system meet those criteria. 
The uneven distribution of PIT shares, and of PIT-based equalization formula, is 
fully reﬂected in severe regional diﬀerences in per-student maintenance expenditures. 
At the level of counties, those expenditures for primary education range from RON 
464 to RON 4,755, a more than tenfold diﬀerence (see the section of structural issues 
and the Appendix). Neither the inspectorates nor MERY monitor those diﬀerences, 
in part because they have not been assigned any administrative tools and responsibili-
ties to do so. The responsibility for determining the maintenance and materials part 
of school budgets thus rests exclusively with the local governments, and they seem to 
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enjoy remarkable freedom in this area. For instance, in a complex of vocational schools, 
the own income generated by the school is quite considerable, because the school has 
turned an unused student dormitory into a type of low-cost hotel and is allowed to 
keep all the income generated in this way. Therefore, the local government decided not 
to assign any maintenance funds from its own budget to that school. Leaving aside the 
question of whether this is a rational decision,15 we note that this is in sharp contrast 
with other schools, which for their maintenance funding depend completely on the 
local council budget. This also shows that there are no uniform ﬁnancing standards that 
local governments need to follow. 
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that in many schools there were clear signs 
of recent (within the last two years) investments by the local governments. Since no 
capital investment funds are allocated for education in the central budget, all those 
local improvements in school equipment must have been ﬁnanced from local resources. 
Thus, the local councils must have analyzed their options and budgetary possibilities, 
and decided on their priorities in the sector. This means that even with very limited 
managerial responsibilities in the sector, local councils have already begun to behave as 
committed owners of their schools. 
Salaries of Education Staff
The salaries portion of the school budget, in contrast, is strictly controlled by an elaborate 
system of employment norms. Indeed, every year all the pre-university schools submit 
to ISJ their enrollment plans. The enrollment plans include the numbers of students, 
classes, teaching positions, and other non-teaching staﬀ (administration and technical), 
and should be veriﬁed by the school inspectorate concerning proper applications of the 
norms. The norms include:
 • class sizes (10 to 20 for preschool groups; 10 to 25 for grade one; 10 to 30 for 
grade ﬁve; while classes in the intermediate grades will simply continue from 
the previous school year), 
 • teaching time for class (maximum 30 hours per week), 
 • teaching load for a teacher (18 hours per week), 
 • norms for non-teaching staﬀ. 
The school inspectorate aggregates enrollment plans of individual schools into a 
county enrollment plan sent to MERY. It is clear that it is no longer possible to verify 
whether the employment norms are applied correctly at this level of aggregation. Instead, 
the aggregated enrollment plans serve as an employment plan for the county, and its main 
purpose is budgetary planning. Finally, MERY constructs the national enrollment plan 
186
P U B L I C  M O N E Y  F O R  P U B L I C  S C H O O L S
through aggregation of county-level plans, and the national plan is approved through a 
government decision. In theory, this should provide a comprehensive system of checks 
and balances; in practice, however, we note a certain dilution of responsibilities. Indeed, 
while it seems clear that the main managerial authority rests with the school inspector-
ates, their decisions are not ﬁnal and are in theory subject to veriﬁcation and approval 
by higher authorities, up to the government itself. In particular, if MERY is unable 
to secure the national enrollment plan as follows from aggregation of county plans, 
necessary and non-transparent cuts have to be introduced at lower levels (managed of 
course by ISJ). 
Once enrollment plans have been approved, they are used to determine the salaries 
portion of the education budget of the counties. Here again, the Ministry of Finance 
depends on the data provided by school inspectorates, namely the data required to 
establish the salaries of individual teachers (education levels, seniority, professional 
qualiﬁcations). The national budget determines speciﬁc expenditures needs of the 
counties on education salaries. 
However, at present, Romania lacks any system of sectoral transfers16 from the central 
budget to local governments, apart from investment grants. This makes it impossible to 
correctly account for the transfers for education salaries at the central level. The solution 
adopted by the Ministry of Finance is to use the VAT revenues of the central budget17 
to ﬁnance salaries. Initially, the so-called sume defalcate din VAT (retained or deducted 
amounts from VAT revenues) were deﬁned as negative accounting entries under the VAT 
revenues of the state budget. Since 2004, they have been deﬁned separately as expendi-
tures of the central budget and are stated for each county as a part of the yearly budget 
laws. In the absence of well-deﬁned sectoral grants for education, the system of retained 
amounts becomes a type of per-teacher grant to counties for school staﬀ salaries. 
Once the state budget is approved, the counties then determine the education 
budgets of all their local councils by allocating to them the received sume defalcate. 
This is more or less a mechanical exercise, since the allocation for education salaries 
was based on submissions of the counties (together with the School Inspectorates). 
Also, the local government merely transfers those funds to schools (and employees are 
paid in cash). Since neither the county nor the local councils have any inﬂuence on 
the payment amounts, their role in this part of the school budgets seems to be purely 
technical. We can say that the devolution of school staﬀ salaries to local governments 
in Romania has a purely accounting component. 
Consequently, while the maintenance portion of education ﬁnance has been 
excessively decentralized, without proper monitoring mechanisms, the salaries portion 
remains strictly centralized.
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THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF 2004
In 2004, the government of Romania committed itself to decentralize the ﬁnances and 
management of the education system, under the conditionalities of a Programmatic 
Adjustment Loan (PAL) from the World Bank. It also adopted a new Strategy for the 
Reform of Public Administration, promising larger sectoral and ﬁscal decentraliza-
tion. The Ministry of Public Administration introduced a separate Framework Law on 
Decentralization, which also made room for the future reallocation of sectoral responsi-
bilities (such as education). The Ministry of Education, Research, and Youth adopted a 
new legislative framework intended to reform and simplify the education management 
and ﬁnances.18 Unfortunately, those reform initiatives were not well coordinated.19 
The legislation adopted by MERY in 2004 reﬂects the fragmentation in policy-
making described above. There was no oﬃcial strategic document drafted by MERY to 
target decentralization speciﬁcally. The reform document for pre-university education20 
mentions an objective that is related to decentralization: “the reform aims (…) the 
progressive decentralization of decisions and responsibilities in forecasting, allocating and 
using ﬁnancing sources and the material base of the education units.”21 Nevertheless, as 
we discuss in some detail below, the new legislative framework remained inconsistent and 
did not resolve all the tensions apparent in the fragmented management and ﬁnancing 
system. The new education decentralization strategy, approved by the government of 
Romania in December 2005, provides a much clearer vision of a future system. It states 
clear objectives like strengthening school autonomy and reducing the role of the ISJ. 
However, the objectives of that strategy have not been translated into laws. 
First, we will discuss how the new legal framework deﬁnes managerial issues (the 
allocation of responsibilities to institutions) and what the proposals for the ﬁnancing 
system are. 
Institutional Arrangements
There are many accounts in the literature of the two basic options for devolving new 
responsibilities—to schools or to local governments.22 The debate about the target of 
decentralization has been ﬁerce in the region, given the strong and frequently opposing 
interests of the central and local administration, not to mention the schools themselves 
and other education professionals. Romania is no exception, with its strong labor union 
market and its emergence from a highly centralized pre-1990 education system. 
The primary and secondary legislation, adopted in 2004, shows that the previous 
government decided upon a costly and ineﬀective combination of both options. On the 
one hand, the legislation seems to conﬁrm the central role of the school itself and gives 
leverage to its bodies of management. An amendment to the Law of Education23 provides 
that, “the school is run by the administration council. The director of the school is the 
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chairman of the administration council.” This is a clariﬁcation from the old version of 
the law that nominated the director for running the school with the help of the teachers’ 
and administrative council. Further on, the strengthening of the administrative council 
through further managerial responsibilities; the change in the role of the school director, 
from teacher to a manager held accountable through a managerial contract signed with 
the inspectorate;24 and the introduction of school budgets with revenue and expenditure 
sides—all these imply the transformation of the school into a self-managing institution. 
This is very much in line with the decentralization of schools.
On the other hand, the same body of legislation sets the ﬁnancing responsibilities 
with various levels of government. Article 28 of Methodological Norms clearly states that 
at the local level the local council establishes the quantum of funds allocated to each 
education unit, based on a long list of indicators, namely the: 
… number of pupils at each level of education, type and specialty, enrolled 
in the respective education units, the standard costs per gymnasium pupil 
in urban areas, correctional coeﬃcients for each level of education, type, 
and specialty, in urban or rural areas,25 the possible number of pupils 
to be enrolled in a classroom determined solely by demographic causes, 
share of pupils belonging to other nationalities enrolled in the education 
unit, and the volume of local councils’ self-generated income and their 
quantum, that can be allocated to education. 
This makes local councils ultimately responsible for deﬁning the budgetary alloca-
tions of all the schools in its territory. Additionally, the system of national, county, and 
commune commissions for education ﬁnance are tasked with deﬁning per-student costs 
at each level of the system for the schools in their jurisdiction. This is consistent with 
decentralization to local governments. 
However, despite moving towards both school-based and local-government-based 
model of education decentralization, the new framework retains signiﬁcant power with 
regard to the inspectorates. The present system of teacher nominations by the ISJ with no 
role for the school director is unchanged, except in a limited way in eight pilot counties. 
As a result, Law 354/2004 maintains the consultative and advisory role of the admin-
istration council and does not increase the autonomy of the school in the pedagogical 
process, for instance, by allowing some freedom in the use of teaching time.
The inspectorate continues to have signiﬁcant power: they set up public education 
units such as kindergartens, primary schools, middle schools, vocational, and appren-
ticeship schools.26 The director of the school signs his or her contract with the inspec-
torate, not with the local government, so the relationship between the school and the 
local community is considerably weakened. Thus, the director is less accountable to the 
community he or she serves, and more to the inspectorate, as the inspector evaluates his 
or her performance in managing the school. This is a complicated situation, given that, 
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according to the Methodological Norms, the inspector decides on the level of payment 
for the director based on some objective criteria (e.g., the number of students, the size 
of the school) and also on some that are less objective (such as performance evaluation 
run not by an independent body, but also by the inspectorate).27 
Financing Arrangements
We will discuss the following education ﬁnance issues as regulated by the 2004 
legislation: 
 • determination of ﬁnancial ﬂows for education (own income or education 
grant), 
 • fragmentation of the new ﬁnancing system, 
 • the basic per-student amount, and
 • the allocation procedures. 
Determination of Financial Flows for Education 
The legislative framework does not clearly resolve which education function or service 
is ﬁnanced from own income or from an education grant. Article 167, paragraph 1 of 
the Education Law, as amended by Law 354/2004, states that pre-university schools 
are ﬁnanced from “funds allocated through local budgets (…) from the state budget 
and other sources, according to the law.” Later in the law the central funds source is 
speciﬁed: “ﬁnancing is ensured (…) from the shares deducted from some incomes of 
the state budget and from other incomes of the local budgets.”28 The issue is, will those 
shares be deﬁned as ﬁxed percentages valid across the country, making this similar to 
own revenues ﬁnancing, or will they be determined as amounts separately calculated 
for each municipality (based perhaps on standard costs), similar to a grant from the 
central budget?29 
In the ﬁrst case, education ﬁnance would be ﬁrmly based on own income,30 in 
accordance with Article 167, paragraph 8. However, in this case, the system of standard 
costs elaborated in the Methodological Norms will remain relevant only for the setting 
of the budgets of individual schools. This would create an unclear situation, when the 
deducted shares may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the sum of individual school budgets in a 
locality. For many rural jurisdictions this certainly will become an unfunded mandate, 
when their own revenues will be insuﬃcient to cover the costs of school budgets deter-
mined through a formula. 
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In the second case, the standard costs would be used to calculate the required 
expenditures of schools and the resulting funds would be deducted from some revenue 
streams of the central budget. An open question then becomes how to account in this 
system for the ﬁnancing of maintenance, presently based on the ﬁxed shares of PIT.
 
The Fragmentation of the New Financing System
The ﬁnancing mechanism, as deﬁned in Article 167 of the Education Law amended by 
Law 354/2004, is a two-pillar system that includes global (proportional) ﬁnancing and 
complementary ﬁnancing. Global ﬁnancing covers staﬀ salaries, materials, services, and 
teacher in-training. Remaining expenditures, such as dormitories and cafeterias, student 
assessment, scholarships, student transportation, medical check-ups for employees, 
school contests, investments, and major repairs are part of complementary ﬁnancing. 
Global ﬁnancing will comprise over 95 percent of recurrent school budgets. It will be 
calculated through a formula, using the standard costs. Those funds are supposed to be 
“deducted from some incomes of state budget,” mostly from VAT revenues. Funds for 
complementary ﬁnancing will come from local budgets, and their level will reﬂect the 
possibilities of localities. 
The new legislation decreases the fragmentation of the present ﬁnancing system by 
including school maintenance in the global ﬁnancing. Some issues remain, however. 
One problem concerns auxiliary education expenditures, such as student transpor-
tation, dormitories, and cafeterias. Those expenditures, unlike investments and major 
repairs, are recurrent expenditures, cannot be postponed, and need to be ﬁnanced in a 
stable, regular way, usually throughout the school year. The level of those expenditures 
should depend on the number of users, for instance, where there is a need to transport 
students or to locate them in dormitories due to low population density and the diﬃ-
culties of maintaining a dense school network. If the level of this expenditure depends 
upon the availability of funds in the local budget, then access to school in remote, poor 
areas, especially in the mountains, may be threatened. 
There is also a free-rider problem related to the use of own funds to ﬁnance dormi-
tories. The users of dormitories are students coming from outside a given locality. When 
allocating their own revenues to fund the dormitories, the local council is, in fact, using 
local taxes to provide better education for children from another city or village. Local 
councils may be reluctant to ﬁnancially support the education of outsiders. From their 
point of view, closing a dormitory would signiﬁcantly reduce the cost of education in the 
city, without a negative eﬀect on the people most important to the local council—that 
is, the voters. 
191
F i n a n c i n g  E d u c a t i o n  i n  R o m a n i a :  A  L e g a c y  o f  I n c o m p l e t e  R e f o r m s
Basic Per-student Amount 
According to the Methodological Norms, the allocation formula should be based on a 
number of correction coeﬃcients for the type and level of school, for urban and rural 
areas, etc., as well as on the basic per-student amount, namely the per-student cost of a 
gymnasium student in an urban area. The determination of that basic per-student cost 
may prove to be diﬃcult politically and technically. 
The diﬃculty lies in the need to reconcile two requirements: that the per-student 
cost reﬂects the actual minimum cost of providing education for one student, and that 
the total funds for education should not exceed the ability of the national budget to 
support education. Those requirements are in conﬂict and the resolution is far from 
easy. 
The Methodological Norms builds the budget using a bottom-up approach.31 The cost 
of providing education is calculated according to the required factors, of which the most 
important are teacher salaries. The main danger of this calculation is that the overall 
budgetary request from MERY to the Finance Ministry may turn out to be unrealistically 
large, which may cause political diﬃculties and controversies. Indeed, the calculations 
performed by the National Council for Financing of Pre-university Education (CNFIPS) 
are based on the legal norms governing the employment of teachers and non-teachers 
(including curriculum, class sizes, the national pay scale) and on other relevant norms 
(such as for heating). The calculations also use many institutional assumptions (class 
and school size, teacher education level) and lead to a deﬁnition of many standard costs 
for diﬀerent types and locations of schools (over 20 such types). The standard costs 
resulting from those calculations are invariably higher than historical costs of speciﬁc 
types of schools.32 This means that they cannot be used for the allocation process, as 
this would lead to the allocation of signiﬁcantly higher funds than those available for 
education in the state budget. There is a risk that the whole ﬁnancing system proposed 
by the Methodological Norms cannot be implemented, unless some new calculations 
produce much lower values for the standard costs.33 
The Allocation Procedure 
According to the Methodological Norms, the allocation procedure is performed in three 
steps: central to county budgets, county to local budgets, local budgets to schools. 
During all three steps a formula with some corrective coeﬃcients will be employed. 
The Methodological Norms are not clear about how this will work. Articles 28 (b) 
and (c) say that the allocation at the county and local levels will be accomplished using 
standard costs and the corrective coeﬃcients to reﬂect local conditions, and that those 
coeﬃcients will be “calculated and registered in the calculation methodology.” This 
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seems to imply that those coeﬃcients will be valid for the whole country. However, 
Article 33 says that county and local councils will approve the levels of per-student costs 
on their territory. This implies that diﬀerent formulas will used, with possibly diﬀerent 
basic per-student costs. 
Oﬃcials of the Ministry of Education, Research, and Youth state that they plan to 
use a national formula applicable at all the three steps, with the same nationally deﬁned 
coeﬃcients, but with the right to alter the coeﬃcients at the local level. This will mean 
that the ministry will take full responsibility for the funding level of each school, with 
the corresponding political burden (the role of the local governments will be reduced 
to the approval of the structure of the schools’ budgets). The ﬁnancing system is likely 
to become very rigid. With limited and somewhat unreliable information about the 
individual schools, the decisions made by the ministry may lead to serious problems 
for some schools. In conclusion, while it represents a signiﬁcant departure from the 
traditional, arbitrary ﬁnancing, this choice severely limits the inﬂuence of local govern-
ments in the sector. If this happens, the ministry may require some additional ﬁnancing 
mechanisms, such as an education reserve fund, to deal with any serious discrepancies 
between the new rigid formula and the existing ﬁnancing levels. 
The allocation system is complicated even further because of the three-step procedure 
and the involvement of two levels of government: the central level and the local level. 
The central level (the ministry) deﬁnes the overall level of funding and the allocation 
principles, while the local level is responsible for the administration of individual school 
budgets. However, there is also responsibility at the medium level, the county, that is 
less clear and may lead to a signiﬁcant politicization of the system. The principle that 
is usually applied is that of direct funding, by means of allocating the funds for the 
function directly to the administrative organ executing this function. Since the county 
has no direct managerial authority in the operations of individual schools (apart from 
special schools), the passage of the education funds through the county budget is both 
unnecessary and dangerous. It is unnecessary because the same formula at the national 
level can allocate the funds for special schools to the counties and the funds for regular 
schools to the communes. This is dangerous because it will increase room for covert 
negotiations and for intergovernmental disputes. From the education ﬁnancing formula 
point of view, the removal of counties from the allocation procedure would contribute 
signiﬁcantly to its transparency and simplicity. 
The Pilot Programs
As a consequence of the new education management and ﬁnance framework, MERY 
decided to start two limited pilot programs. The ﬁrst one started in 200434 in all school 
units of eight pilot counties to test newly-adopted regulations on management and 
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ﬁnancing. The real eﬀect of the project was to increase school autonomy in regard to 
the employment of teachers and the participation of the school community. The pilot 
program is continuing, although there are no immediate plans for national replication. 
The second program was designed to be implemented in the school year 2006–2007 
and considered 50 selected school units in three diﬀerent counties35 selected from the 
initial eight pilot counties, with the main purpose of testing a per-student formula based 
on historical costs and transferred as a speciﬁc grant to local authorities. However, there 
was no oﬃcial decision regarding the per-student formula to be tested by the schools, 
and therefore, no applicable mechanism to test, monitor, or assess. The second pilot 
ended inconclusively in December 2007. 
The Proposed 2008 Law on Education and Teacher Statute
The new draft law on pre-university education continues to deﬁne decentralization as one 
of the basic principles in managing education. Moreover, it maintains the concept of a 
per-student standard cost that will be established yearly at the central level, and mandated 
through a government decision. The methodology of cost calculation diﬀerentiates 
between basic, complementary, and compensatory ﬁnancing of education. Only the 
basic ﬁnancing (which includes personnel expenses—like teacher training, textbooks, 
maintenance expenditures) is to be calculated in accordance to: 
 • the number of students in a given school;
 • the previously established standard cost;
 • the diﬀerentiation coeﬃcients (relating to the education level, the student 
population density in the area, to speciﬁc disadvantages, and to the complexity 
of the qualiﬁcations that the school provides). 
CNFIPS (National Council for Pre-university Education Financing) is to be 
responsible for the decision regarding the standard cost and the diﬀerent allocation 
coeﬃcients. This MERY institution was created in 2003, in order to collect data on 
education ﬁnance, to calculate the per-student and personnel costs at the national 
level, and to monitor and assess the standard cost implementation in the eight pilot 
counties. However, CNFIPS began to decrease its staﬀ, and undertake fewer and fewer 
responsibilities and activities until it eﬀectively collapsed, which explains why MERY 
no longer has current calculations of the standard costs or current centralized data 
regarding per-student expenditures. The only data connected to the eﬃciency of the 
system that MERY can use in its policy decisions is personnel spending (the Ministry of 
Finance can provide this data by centralizing budgetary executions from local councils). 
In addition, MERY does not receive complete budget reports from the schools, which 
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means that it cannot monitor the use of the funds in pre-university education, either 
by region, by level and type of education, or from year to year. The eﬃciency of the use 
of scarce resources is not controlled. Instead, MERY concentrates on controlling the 
speciﬁc education inputs in each school (class sizes, teaching provided to each class, 
individual teacher salaries).
Article 113 of the new law states that the amount considered to represent the 
basic ﬁnancing will be allocated to the school through the local budgets, but some 
Methodological Norms are needed to clarify this point. In particular, it remains unclear 
if the retained amounts discussed earlier will still be used for this purpose. 
With regard to complementary ﬁnancing—scholarships, maintaining of dormitories 
and cafeterias, building renovations, investments, and diﬀerent bonuses for teachers 
and students—the amounts needed will come from local budgets and from the central 
budget, in the case of national investment programs, and for covering some proportion of 
scholarship expenses. How this proportion is going to be established remains unclear. 
Compensatory ﬁnancing is to be ensured from the local and state budgets (a certain 
proportion, established yearly) for expenses such as teaching in a minority’s language 
or ﬁnancing special-needs education, based on an allocation formula: the number of 
students that will beneﬁt from compensatory ﬁnancing, the standard cost, and the 
diﬀerentiation coeﬃcient for level of education, and for the program that beneﬁts 
from compensatory ﬁnancing.
The funds resulting from all three types of ﬁnancing will be transferred to the local 
level based on a contract, signed by the school director and the main credit coordi-
nator.
Overall, we may conclude that the new proposals unfortunately have failed thus 
far to introduce greater clarity and transparency to the funding of schools. The compli-
cated system of basic, complementary, and compensatory funding is likely to remain 
unimplemented as the system deﬁned in 2004. 
STRUCTURAL ISSUES OF ROMANIAN EDUCATION FINANCE
In the present section we will discuss a number of structural issues, which are a conse-
quence of the peculiar system of the ﬁnancing of Romanian education. The under-
ﬁnancing of Romanian education, the budgeting vacuum, and the external eﬃciency of 
the system are long-term problems that have been inherited from the previous govern-
ments of Romania and require similarly long-term, diﬃcult solutions. 
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Budgeting Vacuum
Above we described the ﬁnancing of school maintenance as fully decentralized and 
exhibiting dramatic disparities across counties, while salaries are fully controlled by 
MERY, although technically the responsibility of local councils.36 
This very unusual approach37 to decentralization has resulted in a sort of budgeting 
vacuum in the budget process: the ministry most interested in the level and manner of 
ﬁnancing of schools is not fully involved in the budget process for any part of school 
budgeting. For school maintenance, towns and cities are fully responsible, and neither 
need nor request any involvement from MERY. For the salaries, the main responsible 
institution is Ministry of Public Finance, which does not need to consult either with 
MERY or the local governments, and introduces changes from year to year without 
prior discussion with MERY. Moreover, the funds ﬂow through the budgets of local 
governments, but municipalities, towns, and localities have no inﬂuence at all on school 
employment, or on the setting of salaries, and therefore are similarly uninvolved in the 
budget process. 
The budgeting vacuum is the single most important problem of the budgeting process 
of MERY and impacts not just budget issues but all aspects of managing and steering 
the Romanian education system. Indeed, the ministry cannot be politically responsible 
for the eﬃcient use of resources devoted to education if its inﬂuence over the ways the 
funds are allocated and spent is so limited. This is especially important for the use of 
teacher resources. The employment of teachers is strictly controlled by the ISJ through 
applying national class-size norms and curriculum requirements. However, there is 
little incentive to save money by consolidating schools in the face of declining student 
numbers (and declining system eﬃciency). In fact, the consolidation of schools is always 
a painful process, with resistance from both the parents and teachers. The main argu-
ment for school consolidation is that the funds saved by a more eﬃcient school network 
will provide improved education for the larger, consolidated schools. But, at present, if 
MERY goes through the diﬃcult process of consolidation, the savings will not accrue 
to the sector and will disappear in the general budget because the retained amounts 
from VAT for salaries will simply become smaller. Similarly, MERY ﬁnds it diﬃcult 
to plan and cost any major reforms of the sector, such as a lengthening of obligatory 
education or increased enrollment in general academic secondary schools. This is because 
the present budget process does not use data which can serve as the basis of projections 
under various reform scenarios. Moreover, no policymaking institution at the central 
level is responsible for taking into account the long-term ﬁnancial and managerial eﬀects 
of demographic processes, decisions about school networks, curriculum changes, and 
changing teacher numbers. 
The most important negative consequence of the budgeting vacuum is that the 
budgeting process is seen as a pure accounting activity. Thus, for salaries, rather than 
considering various tradeoﬀs between school, class size, and teacher employment, the 
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process is based on checking how many school employees there are, according to the 
norms, and how large are their salaries. For textbooks, provided free-of-charge to all 
students of primary schools, the process is based on assessing the numbers of textbooks 
available and on how many are needed in the new school year. In general, the ministry 
sees itself as running the sector system through a system of norms and methodologies, 
rather than as allocating scarce resource to achieve speciﬁc policy objectives. 
It also seems that, overall, the underfunding of education and an inadequate response 
to demographic decline, as analyzed below, are at least partially due to limited role of 
MERY in the ﬁnancing of Romanian education. 
The Underﬁnancing of Romanian Education
Romanian education has suﬀered long-term chronic underﬁnancing. The total education 
expenditures in Romania as percentage of GDP, the most common measure of the eﬀort 
made by countries to ﬁnance their education, lagged signiﬁcantly below that of other 
countries in the region. Table 2 provides this information for years 1989 to 2000.38 
The OECD average in the same years oscillated above ﬁve percent of GDP. The 
table shows that Romania stands out in the region as the country devoting the least 
resources to education. This is especially worrying as Romania had a relatively more 
pronounced economic decline following the end of communism and was very late to 
recover economically. Indeed, total public expenditures in real terms in 2000 were 80.1 
percent of their 1990 level. An Education Policy Note by the World Bank talks about 
budgetary collapse in the education sector.39 However, the data provided by MERY, in 
its yearly state of the education report, shows an increase in the percentage of public 
spending for education (Table 3).
Table 2.
Education Expenditure in Central Europe as Percent of GDP (1989–2000)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech 
Republic
4.0 4.1 4.1 4.5 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.7 — — — 5.2
Bulgaria — 5.0 5.1 6.1 5.7 4.8 4.0 3.2 4.0 3.8 4.3 4.3 —
Hungary — 5.7 5.8 6.3 6.6 6.5 6.4 5.5 4.9 4.3 5.2 5.2 5.1
Poland — 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.8 — — — 5.6
Romania 2.2 2.8 3.6 3.6 3.3 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1
Slovak 
Republic
— 5.1 5.6 6.0 5.2 4.4 5.1 5.0 — — — — 4.0
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Table 3.
Percent of Public Spending for Education
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
3.4 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.9 4.9
Source: Report on the State of National Education System, MERY 2006.
The consequences of this chronic underfunding are severe. Because salaries are the 
main component of education expenditures, we need to review teacher salaries, relatively 
low compared to teacher salaries in the region. 
In Bucharest, the basic salary of an experienced teacher is not enough to cover 
basic expenses such as rent and utilities. Teachers rely on the income of other members 
of their families (parents or spouses) or engage in additional employment, most often 
in private tuition, which in some cases brings them more than the salary they receive 
from the school.40 We note that this relative pauperization of Romanian teachers has an 
important impact on the teaching process and on school quality, not only on the lives 
of teachers. Teachers need to be able to participate in cultural activities, buy and read 
books, and use new technologies such as the internet. Teachers who need to supplement 
their school salary with additional income, for instance, from private tuition, have less 
time for professional development and for good preparation for their teaching duties. 
As we have seen, underfunding of Romanian education has a chronic character 
indicative of the way Romanian society treats its schools and teachers. This is a diﬃcult, 
open issue, but two such potential reasons are proposed here. First, in Romania there is 
a generally high opinion about the level of basic and secondary education, as witnessed 
in the success of Romanian students in international competitions (especially in math-
ematics and computer science). Second, there may not be a clear political champion 
for funds to be allocated for pre-university education in the state budget, as described 
in the previous subsection. 
External Efﬁciency
The external eﬃciency of educational systems is measured by indicators such as student–
teacher ratio (STR) and class sizes, and reﬂects the degree to which an education system 
eﬃciently uses the resources allocated to it. The main challenge to the eﬃciency of the 
education systems of transition countries comes from a dramatic demographic decline, 
which over a period of a few years led to decrease of student population by 30 to 40 
percent. The adaptation of schools to such changes is not easy. Economic diﬃculties 
have made it very diﬃcult to reduce the teacher workforce, both for political and social 
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reasons. Closures of schools in rural areas provoke passionate resistance. It is therefore 
not surprising that, with a few exceptions, the main eﬃciency indicator, namely STR, 
has worsened in the transition countries. On average, the student–teacher ratio in the 
region decreased by over nine percent, with the most pronounced decline occurring 
in Romania.41 This decline is documented in the following table, which provides the 
numbers of students and teachers, and calculates the student–teacher ratio, for primary 
and gymnasium education in ﬁve selected school years.42 
Table 4.
Student–teacher Ratio for Primary Schools and Gymnasiums
School Year Students Teachers Student–teacher Ratio
2002–2003 3,900,489 257,051 15.17
2003–2004 3,854,708 251,135 15.34
2004–2005 3,753,275 255,004 14.71
2005–2006 3,644,367 249,491 14.60
2006–2007 3,560,075 246,735 14.42
We note that between 2003 and 2005, the number of students fell by three 
percent, but the number of teachers grew by two percent. Throughout this period, the 
student–teacher ration fell by ﬁve percent.
This is a serious loss of eﬃciency. Although those results may be partially due to 
an increased number of part-time teachers (unfortunately, INS does not report on 
full-time equivalent or FTE teachers), they nevertheless show that the ministry has not 
been pursuing an active policy to improve the eﬃciency of the sector, in the period of 
serious budget constraints. 
According to a simulation model prepared by the World Bank,43 assuming constant 
age-speciﬁc enrollment rates and with no changes in the number of teachers, the pre-
university student–teacher ratio will fall to 12.58 by the school year 2013–2014.
Another approach to view the eﬃciency of education systems is by analyzing the 
class sizes. Indeed, each class must obtain the same amount of teaching, according to 
curricular forms, and therefore small classes are a source of ineﬃciency. Table 6 places 
Romania among its regional neighbors,44 and shows how it lags behind in regards to 
class size. 
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Table 5.
Simulated Student–teacher Ratios, by Level of Education
Academic Year Preschool Basic Education Upper Secondary Higher Education
2004–2005 18.37 13.72 12.17 18.48
2005–2006 19.24 12.96 12.07 17.06
2006–2007 18.93 12.65 11.53 17.15
2007–2008 18.36 12.55 10.76 17.38
2008–2009 18.35 12.48 9.90 17.57
2009–2010 18.32 12.50 9.10 17.53
2010–2011 18.21 12.60 8.44 17.13
2011–2012 18.01 12.70 7.94 16.36
2012–2013 17.73 12.79 7.67 15.33
2013–2014 17.37 12.77 7.60 14.17
Source: Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (PEIR) Simulation Model, World Bank, 2006, in 
Romania Education Policy Note, World Bank 2007.
Table 6.
Class Size in Central Europe
Primary Lower Secondary
Czech Republic 20.8  23.3  
Hungary 20.5  21.5  
Poland 20.8  24.6  
Slovak Republic 20.2  23.0  
Romania 19.1  21.5
The decreasing eﬃciency of Romanian education over the last decade shows that 
MERY ﬁnds it diﬃcult to prepare a coherent strategy to adjust the system to the 
demographic decline. It seems likely that one source of this diﬃculty is the excessive 
reliance on norms and methodologies, rather than on direct incentive systems, such as 
per-student ﬁnancing, to improve eﬃcient use of resource. 
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Equity Issues
The problems of equity in education ﬁnance are diﬃcult to address, because equitable 
education requires higher per-student allocation for some students, such as those coming 
from disadvantaged households or social backgrounds, or in rural areas with smaller class 
sizes. We approach equity issues by looking at county-level (judete) disparities in per-
student spending, and correlating it with the class size.45 Moreover, we review regional 
disparities of per-class personnel spending (mainly teacher salaries). 
Due to the large size of the counties (on average 67,000 students, see Appendix, 
Table A1.1), the average class size across Romanian counties is not excessively varied 
(much higher variation appears between individual schools). This variation is summa-
rized in Table 7. 
Table 7.
Class Size among Schools
Minimum Average Maximum Percent Difference
Primary 15.81 19.06 25.04 158
Gymnasium 17.42 21.48 25.00 144
Lyceum 22.54 26.61 28.01 124
Vocational 20.40 24.62 30.26 148
The greatest variation is exhibited by primary education, most certainly due to small 
rural schools. The class size of lyceums is most closely controlled, probably because those 
schools are more similar to each other. 
There is much more variation in per-student spending on personnel (salaries of 
both teachers and non-teaching staﬀ). The summary of those variations is detailed in 
the following table (for data for all the counties, see Appendix, Table A1.3). Data for 
vocational schools exhibit some errors, and as a minimum we take the ﬁfth lowest per-
student spending. 
Table 8.
Spending per Student among Schools (RON)
Minimum Average Maximum Percent Difference
Primary 4,080 6,981 9,600 235
Gymnasium 5,847 8,732 12,009 205
Lyceum 5,941 10,733 17,605 296
Vocational 4,325 7,618 18,689 432
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We can note a much more signiﬁcant variation compared to class size variation, 
especially for the lyceums. With similar class sizes, similar programmatic load (although 
Romania has three types of lyceum, the theoretical, technological and vocational), and 
uniform teacher salaries, the counties with highest per-student personnel costs spend 
almost three times as much as those spending the least. This is surprising and may signify 
preferential treatment of some special secondary schools. It is worth noting that the 
highest per-student spending is not seen in Bucharest, but in the counties Satu Mare 
and Vilcea. This is not due to small class sizes in those three counties, because the class 
sizes there are close to the national average (in Vilcea it is even above this average). 
Nevertheless, the per-student expenditures for personnel are, in general, aligned with 
class sizes. For instance, for the primary schools, if three outliers are removed from analysis 
(Satu Mare which is spending less than expected due to class size, and Bucharest and 
Sălaj which are spending more), the class size and per-student non-personnel spending 
have the correlation coeﬃcient R = –0.49, which is negative (as expected, of course), 
and quite high in absolute value. 
Of special interest is personnel spending per class. This reﬂects the teaching eﬀort 
of the schools (the number of lessons would be a better measure, but this information 
is unavailable). Since the teaching is governed by national curricula, we may expect 
that personnel spending per class reﬂects diﬀerences in teacher salaries and is not very 
diﬀerent among schools, and even less so between counties. The data is provided in the 
Appendix, Table A1.4, and exhibits an unexpectedly high variation of per-class spending. 
In particular, it seems that the minimum values are not correct, and may reﬂect the 
weakness of the data collection system. 
When we turn to the non-personnel spending per student, that is, expenditures 
managed by the local governments, we note an even higher variation, as summarized 
in the following table (full data in Appendix, Table A1.5). For vocational schools, we 
again took the ﬁfth lowest spending as the minimum. 
Table 9.
Non-personnel Spending per Student among Schools (RON)
Minimum Average Maximum Percent Diifference
Primary 464 1,627 4,755 1,025
Gymnasium 672 2,135 6,428 957
Lyceum 1,205 2,744 4,695 390
Vocational 533 1,697 4,116 772
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The discrepancies between the lowest and highest per-student non-personnel 
spending are remarkable. They are almost certainly dictated mainly by the level of own 
revenues of the jurisdictions. Moreover, those discrepancies at the level of the individual 
schools are certain to be more pronounced. We also note that there are counties with 
low or high per-student, non-personnel spending for all the levels of education. The 
highest spender is of course Bucharest (for primary and gymnasium it is highest, for the 
other two it is close to the highest). The low spenders are Ilfov, Satu Mare, and Vaslui 
counties. This is quite remarkable, since Satu Mare is at the same time a county with 
high per-student personnel spending. 
If we review the correlation between the class sizes and non-personnel, per-student 
expenditures, we obtain the coeﬃcient R = 0.21, not only small, but, most surpris-
ingly, positive (in counties with larger classes, non-personnel expenditures per student 
are higher!). 
We can only formulate the hypothesis that the transfer of the responsibility for the 
non-salary portion of the school budgets to local governments, and at the same time 
the absence of monitoring of those expenditures by the ministry, led to serious equity 
problems in school maintenance. 
CONCLUSIONS
As we have indicated in a number of places in the present report, the new Romanian 
government seems to be determined to take the necessary but diﬃcult steps and 
bring the long, drawn-out education reform to completion. This is especially true of 
decentralization. Education decentralization is a policy objective that will structure the 
future functioning of the sector and will inﬂuence the ﬁnancing mechanisms and the 
delivery of education. The government already adopted, in December 2005, an educa-
tion decentralization strategy, formulating not only objectives and stages but also the 
inherent risks and risk-minimizing measures. 
Nevertheless, the challenges facing the education reformers in Romania go far beyond 
decentralization problems, and in the present ﬁnal section we brieﬂy formulate some 
recommendations for further action. 
As is evident from the discussion in the ﬁrst sections of this chapter, the Ministry 
of Education, Research, and Youth should accept the need to deal with the inconsisten-
cies of the present, inherited legislation. The changes proposed in the draft education 
legislation of 2008 are insuﬃcient to introduce clarity, transparency, and stability in 
education ﬁnance. Only a consistent, clear legislation supports a proper decentralization 
process. The region has seen examples of compromised decentralization eﬀorts because 
of improper policy, as occurred in Poland in 1997, when the selected 40 large cities 
returned the secondary schools to the Polish Education Ministry, for which they had 
earlier taken responsibility.46 
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The ministry should also review the Framework Law on Decentralization elabo-
rated by the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, as well as plans for ﬁscal 
decentralization of the Finance Ministry. The Framework Law on Decentralization 
will deﬁne how decentralization will proceed in other sectors, and MERY should try 
to achieve some measure of harmony. Fiscal decentralization will deﬁne the available 
ﬁnancial mechanisms, such as proper categorical and block grants, which will be used 
to allocate the education funds to local governments. Close cooperation with other 
ministries is therefore necessary. 
The ministry should address the problem of the chronic underfunding of Romanian 
education, without fuelling inﬂation pressures. The teacher salaries should be increased 
together with the teacher workload, to bring the Romanian education system closer to 
European standards. 
MERY must deﬁne the balance between empowering the schools and empowering 
the municipalities.47 While those two dimensions of decentralization are in many respects 
complementary, on a number of key questions they may clash (e.g., the ﬁnancing of 
schools, and the opening and closing of schools). Since the schools are now subordinated 
to higher-level institutions, and much eﬀort is necessary not only to allocate them greater 
autonomy but also to increase their capacities. It seems that, for some time to come, local 
governments in Romania should retain a large measure of control of schools, especially 
of school budgets. The ministry should review and decide who will control, among 
others, the pedagogical process, the employment levels, the selection and evaluation 
of school directors, the selection and evaluation of teachers and of non-teaching staﬀ, 
the adoption of speciﬁc proﬁles by the schools, school development plans, linkage to 
the labor market, and psychological services rendered to the schools. In general, school 
autonomy dictates that the school itself should have most responsibility in those areas, 
but the skills and capacities required for those functions may not be there yet. 
Conditioned on those decisions, the ministry must deﬁne a stable and transparent 
system of ﬁnancing. The regional experience (as well as Romanian legislation) tells us that 
this should be some form of per-student formula. We do not believe that the standard 
cost calculations, as deﬁned in the current legislation, may serve as the basis for such a 
system. Although many diﬀerent solutions are possible, it is important to remember that 
the ﬁnancing system will become the sphere of discussion and compromise in the debates 
on the development of the sector, held between the ministry, the local governments, 
the trade unions, and other education stakeholders (including in particular professional 
associations of teachers and school directors). Therefore, the ﬁnancing system should be 
suﬃciently simple, and its basic parameters (numerical weights, buﬀers) should have a 
clear strategic role in education. 
The ministry must also reconcile the per-student allocation formula with the 
nationally mandated pay scale of teachers. This is the source of severe tensions in many 
countries. One of the problems is that the national pay scale places some expenditure 
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obligations on local governments, which the per-student formula may be unable to 
satisfy, if the employment levels, due to some speciﬁc conditions, are much higher than 
average. The national pay scale also limits the freedom of local governments in changing 
the structure of the costs of their schools. On the other hand, the national pay scale is 
correctly seen by the teachers as the basic defence against the perceived arbitrariness of 
local governments. 
Finally, the ministry should introduce mechanisms to objectively measure school 
performance and to assess the impact of education reforms on student outcomes. This is 
necessary if the ministry wants to improve the unsatisfactory results of Romanian students 
in internationally comparable tests such as TIMMS and PISA, as noted earlier. 
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Law 349/2004, which amends the Teacher Status Law 128/1997, passed by the Romanian 
Parliament on July 14, 2004.
Law 354/2004, which amends the Education Law 84/1995, passed by the Romanian Parliament 
on July 15, 2004. 
Methodological Norms for Financing and Administration of Pre-university Education 
Units (Methodological Norms), approved by Government Decision in November 2004.
Norma metodologica din 07/06/2001 Publicat in Monitorul Oﬁcial din 19/06/2001, pentru ﬁnan-
tarea invatamantului preuniversitar de stat.
Note no 10671/08.09.2000, Reforma in invatamantul rural (aspecte speciﬁce); Precizari ale 
Ministrului Educatiei Nationale, Andrei Marga.
Annual Budget Law of 2000.
Ministerul Educatiei si Cercetarii, Strategia dezvoltarii invatamintului preuniversitar in perioada 
2001–2004, 2002.
NOTES
1 The authors were fortunate in having good research support from Adina Simandan, formerly 
of MERY and now of Ministry of Interior and Reform of Administration, who helped to 
update this report and wrote the sections on the current proposals of legislative changes. 
2 This diﬃculty in the timeline of the reforms of the Romanian education points in itself to 
the turbulent nature of the process. 
3 The Education Reform Project ﬁnanced textbooks and supplementary materials, equipment, 
computer hardware and software, technical assistance, external and local training, prepara-
tion of studies, and non-salary operating costs. 
4 Phare supported vocational education reform. 
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5 Through the Annual Budget Law of 2000.
6 The present report does not take into account the current wave of reforms, initiated in 2008, 
aimed at changing managerial practices in Romanian education. 
7 This monthly allowance, called alocatii si alte ajutoare pentru copii, is allocated through 
schools to all children in Romania attending schools irrespective of their social status (see 
Herczyński 2006). The current value of the allowance is RON 40 (around EUR 9). 
8 The council included the school director, his deputy, chief accountant, and representatives 
of teachers (elected by the teacher council), of parents, of the local government unit, and 
also of students (for secondary and postsecondary schools). The administration board could 
also include representatives of the local business community.
9 In theory, for both primary and secondary schools there was a competitive process where 
credentials and professional experience are requested. In practice, however, director appoint-
ment was very often a result of the political bargaining among local politicians.
10 Based on discussions with the Ministry of Finance. A review of local government ﬁnance is 
provided in S. Caraman (ed.), The Status of Fiscal Decentralization in Romania, 2003. 
11 Public Finance Law 273/2006.
12 The lump sum is distributed among counties on the basis of land area (30 percent) and ﬁscal 
capacity (70 percent). The latter is determined by calculating a “ﬁscal gap” for each county 
as the diﬀerence between the per-capita PIT tax revenues of the county and the average for 
all counties, multiplied by the population of the county. Fiscal gaps are then aggregated for 
the country as a whole. Each county’s share of the aggregate ﬁscal gap determines its share 
(of this portion) of the lump sum. For a more detailed discussion, please see: Municipal 
Finance Policy Note, World Bank, 2007.
13 Based on interviews with ISJ and county councils. 
14 Criteria used by the national system are part of permanent legislation, but a portion of the 
amount used in the equalization process is decided on an annual basis, in the budget laws. 
A very focused discussion of both systems is laid out in the Municipal Finance Policy Note, 
World Bank, 2007.
15 This assessment would have to include a comparison of all the maintenance budgets of 
the schools in the area and a determination as to whether the degree to which the needs 
of diﬀerent schools are fulﬁlled is more or less similar. If the maintenance budget of that 
speciﬁc school is markedly higher or markedly lower than the maintenance budgets of nearby 
schools, and moreover if that diﬀerence is not part of a conscious policy of the local govern-
ment recognizing diﬀerent needs of individual schools, we may argue that the arrangement 
reached is not justiﬁable. 
16 Those sectoral grants are based on certain measures of need, speciﬁc to the sector (for educa-
tion, the number of students is commonly used), and are either categorical (conditional) 
or block (unconditional) grants. The law must also deﬁne the budgetary procedures and 
reporting requirements for the grants. Both PIT shares and existing equalization systems 
are non-sectoral grants. 
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17 VAT revenues were chosen for simplicity and because this revenue stream is suﬃciently 
robust to support such negative accounting. Nevertheless, there is no budgetary link (beyond 
accounting) between VAT revenues and the education allocation, contrary to what many 
education stakeholders in Romania believe. 
18 Law 349/2004, which amends Law 128/1997 on teacher status, passed by the Romanian 
Parliament on July 14, 2004; Law 354/2004, which amends the Education Law 84/1995, 
passed by the Romanian Parliament on July 15, 2004; and the Methodological Norms for 
Financing and Administration of Pre-university Education Units (Methodological Norms), 
approved by the Government Decision in November 2004.
19 Even more surprisingly, they were not harmonized with Ministry of Finance plans for ﬁscal 
decentralization.
20 “Strategia dezvoltarii invatamintului preuniversitar in perioada 2001–2004.” Document of 
the Ministry of Education, 2002. Available online: http://www.ro.edu.
21 Paragraph 22. 
22 See Halasz 2002 and Herczyński 2005 for a discussion in the context of Romanian educa-
tion.
23 Article 13 of Law 354/2004. 
24 See Article 21 of the Law 128/1997 regarding the teacher statute, as amended by Law 
349/2004. 
25 It is worth noting that Article 20 allows the range of acceptable corrective coeﬃcient to be 
rather large. Besides factors such as rural/urban location, level of education and proﬁle of 
the school, corrective coeﬃcients may include the socioeconomic conditions of the school 
population, school performance, and speciﬁc technical conditions of each school. 
26 Education Law, Article 142, paragraph d. 
27 Methodological norms, Article 13, paragraph 2. 
28 Law 354, Article 167, paragraph 3. 
29 And to the current system of retained amounts from VAT, except that those are calculated 
on a per-teacher basis.
30 Here, we use the classiﬁcation of shared taxes as own income of jurisdictions, even if the 
tax base, rates, and exemptions are beyond the control of local governments. This classiﬁca-
tion is common in transition countries, but is rejected by the OECD, because it blurs the 
distinction between shared taxes and the undisputed own income of local governments, 
such as property taxes. 
31 There is also a top-down approach in building the formula, by which the ministry deﬁnes 
the coeﬃcients to be used in the allocation process and then simulates the eﬀects of various 
values of the coeﬃcients. This calculation is also open to some criticism, namely that the basic 
per-student amount obtained in this way is insuﬃcient. On the other hand, this approach 
guarantees the compliance with the budgetary process at the central level and removes the 
negotiated nature of the per-student amount.
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32 See Dogaru 2002, Annex to Chapter 2. Recent versions of the standard costs were typically 
30 percent to 40 percent higher than actual costs of providing education in schools (based 
on interviews with CNFIPS). 
33 Generating lower standard costs does not seem likely. For instance, the CNFIPS calculation 
for the standard cost for rural primary school assumes a school size of 500, while in general 
rural school are much smaller and therefore have higher costs per student.
34 Government Decision No. 1942/2004 by which eight pilot counties were nominated (Brăila, 
Cluj, Dolj, Harghita, Iaşi, Neamţ, Satu Mare and Sibiu).
35 Ordin privind organizarea şi derularea fazei-pilot “Managementul administrativ şi ﬁnanciar al 
şcolii într-un mediu descentralizat,” signed between MERY and MIRA (Ministry of Interior 
and Administrative Reform).
36 The discussion in the present section draws on J. Herczyński 2006. 
37 In decentralized education systems, like in the United Kingdom or in Poland, the funds ﬂow 
from the center to lower levels (to schools in the United Kingdom, to local governments in 
Poland) according to a formula designed by the Ministry of Education. In other countries 
(Belgium), the funds for salaries are sent from the ministry directly to school staﬀ, while the 
school director retains considerable autonomy in how she or he runs the school. In contrast, 
Romania keeps strong managerial control of school activities, but has decentralized the ﬂow 
of funds. 
38 Sources: Halasz 2002, Berryman et al. 2006. 
39 World Bank 2002. 
40 Based on interviews with school directors and teachers. 
41 See Halasz 2002. 
42 Data from INS, Bucharest 2007. 
43 Education Policy Note 2007.
44 For Romania data from Appendix, Table A1.1, for other countries OECD 2005. 
45 Class size is the key driver of per-student costs. 
46 The conﬂict was mainly over the ﬁnancing of those schools, see Levitas and Herczyński 
2002. 
47 See Halasz 2002 and Herczyński 2005 for in-depth discussion in the context of Romanian 
education. 
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APPENDIX
Remarks on Data Presented in Tables
The data used in the following tables below comes from CNFIPS (with the exception of 
Table A1.1) and refer to the year 2003 for expenditures, and the 2002–2003 school year 
for enrollment. All ﬁnancial data in the appendix are per student, and are in thousand 
RON. The data are collected from schools and aggregated at the county level. This is 
at present the only source of data on both enrollment and expenditures by county and 
by education level, and gives important insight into the regional patterns of education 
spending in Romania. A review of the following tables is provided in the section of this 
chapter on structural issues. 
Secondary schools in Romania are divided into liceul teoretic (general academic), liceul 
tehnologic, and liceul vocational (general academic schools with professional proﬁles), 
and scoale arte si meseri (vocational schools). In the tables below (with the exception of 
Table A1.1), we treat all types of liceul as one level of education. 
Three diﬃculties with CNFIPS data need to be pointed out. One is related to the 
vocational schools, as it seems certain that spending for those schools is underreported 
for many counties. It is not possible that in a judet, on average, the yearly per-student 
personnel spending is RON 279,000, or yearly per-student maintenance spending RON 
7,000. The second problem concerns all school levels, and is related to maintenance 
expenditures. Since the data is collected from schools, and maintenance costs are covered 
by local councils, the schools often do not know exactly how much money was spent 
on heating, electricity, and similar utilities. Finally, the personnel spending per class 
(Table A1.4) exhibits an unexpected variation and may indicate an underreporting of 
salaries in some counties. The third problem is connected to the lack of centralized 
ﬁnancial data and class-size data, as a consequence to what is eﬀectively a temporary 
closure of CNFIPS.
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Table A1.1.
Students by County and by Education Level
Primary Gymnasium Special Ed High School Vocational Professional Total
Alba 15,448 15,658 516 13,992 4,478 567 50,659
Argeş 26,843 28,508 217 25,291 7,338 1,196 89,393
Arad 19,486 19,089 534 16,606 4,293 384 60,392
Bucuresţi 56,035 57,862 2,387 87,322 18,271 4,546 226,423
Bacău 34,348 33,955 393 23,307 8,903 889 101,795
Bihor 26,782 26,107 847 26,128 5,637 1,402 86,903
Bistriţa-Năsăud 15,035 15,040 423 11,110 4,543 131 46,282
Brăila 13,881 14,639 214 11,388 4,291 562 44,975
Botoşani 23,461 22,514 364 13,690 6,400 207 66,636
Braşov 22,089 21,789 397 21,060 6,880 1,007 73,222
Buzău 20,355 20,767 403 15,554 5,409 991 63,479
Cluj 23,572 24,841 1,112 24,080 7,659 1,773 83,037
Călăraşi 14,888 14,167 13 8,952 4,061 136 42,217
Caraş-Severin 13,460 13,594 458 11,818 4,224 225 43,779
Constanţa 30,300 28,786 457 30,743 8,540 1,084 99,910
Covasna 10,395 9,021 198 7,702 2,948 277 30,541
Dâmboviţa 23,985 24,414 231 17,202 5,833 577 72,242
Dolj 29,500 3,056 229 24,932 7,017 1,725 66,459
Gorj 17,849 19,459 103 18,760 4,767 795 61,733
Galaţi 27,349 26,822 522 21,190 7,412 826 84,121
Giurgiu 13,251 12,839 96 6,042 1,920 183 34,331
Hunedoara 18,760 20,518 634 19,676 6,040 876 66,504
Harghita 14,673 13,693 134 13,293 3,844 812 46,449
Ilfov 12,668 11,489 223 7,003 1,612 117 33,112
Ialomiţa 13,607 13,062 87 9,739 3,887 356 40,738
Iaşi 41,123 38,652 865 27,929 12,097 2,406 123,072
Mehedinţi 12,360 13,178 113 12,191 3,386 596 41,824
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Primary Gymnasium Special Ed High School Vocational Professional Total
Maramureş 22,935 23,416 550 19,154 7,183 754 73,992
Mureş 26,325 23,813 328 18,587 6,208 2,321 77,582
Neamţ 24,875 25,574 355 19,198 6,804 861 77,667
Olt 20,720 21,419 129 15,962 5,312 1,015 64,557
Prahova 32,002 33,039 417 28,704 9,793 1,503 105,458
Sibiu 18,498 17,580 631 14,782 5,877 844 58,212
Sălaj 11,139 11,091 82 9,520 2,842 167 34,841
Satu Mare 16,750 16,972 218 12,882 5,652 493 52,967
Suceava 36,307 36,307 875 25,404 9,070 895 108,858
Tulcea 10,246 10,435 70 7,608 3,175 427 31,961
Timiş 25,950 27,169 1,339 27,004 7,460 1,770 90,692
Teleorman 16,614 17,158 164 12,375 4,003 478 50,792
Vâlcea 17,077 17,877 162 16,601 4,523 529 56,769
Vrancea 16,450 16,289 209 11,326 3,787 763 48,824
Vaslui 24,749 22,721 380 15,118 7,004 231 70,203
Total 912,140 884,379 18,079 780,925 250,383 37,697
Source: National Institute of Statistics 2008.
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Table A1.2
Class Size by County and by Education Level
Primary Gymnasium Lyceum Vocational
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Alba 16.72 87.76 20.12 93.68 27.13 101.95 24.15 98.10
Argeş 18.07 94.83 20.38 94.88 27.41 103.02 23.27 94.54
Arad 19.23 100.90 21.58 100.46 26.87 101.00 23.80 96.68
Bucuresţi 22.73 119.27 24.69 114.97 27.79 104.45 23.78 96.59
Bacău 19.53 102.47 22.40 104.26 26.59 99.93 25.62 104.08
Bihor 17.84 93.64 20.08 93.49 27.39 102.95 25.67 104.28
Bistriţa-Năsăud 17.58 92.27 19.71 91.76 26.96 101.31 25.24 102.53
Brăila 19.14 100.42 21.46 99.89 26.26 98.69 21.04 85.45
Botoşani 18.44 96.74 20.43 95.10 26.14 98.24 26.61 108.11
Braşov 18.87 98.99 21.16 98.51 26.57 99.85 21.38 86.86
Buzău 17.63 92.51 20.48 95.33 26.62 100.05 24.45 99.31
Cluj 18.06 94.76 20.88 97.19 26.54 99.75 22.86 92.87
Călăraşi 20.07 105.31 23.25 108.22 24.86 93.44 26.51 107.67
Caraş-Severin 18.57 97.43 20.28 94.40 27.67 103.98 25.18 102.30
Constanţa 21.40 112.29 21.75 101.27 26.60 99.95 24.24 98.48
Covasna 16.01 84.01 17.97 83.66 22.54 84.70 22.76 92.45
Dâmboviţa 19.25 100.99 21.58 100.49 26.75 100.52 26.69 108.40
Dolj 19.41 101.86 21.21 98.76 25.91 97.37 25.01 101.60
Gorj 18.19 95.44 21.33 99.29 27.28 102.52 24.46 99.34
Galaţi 21.76 114.19 22.78 106.04 27.16 102.08 25.17 102.23
Giurgiu 20.10 105.45 22.38 104.20 27.46 103.20 23.74 96.44
Hunedoara 19.25 101.04 23.04 107.27 26.52 99.68 23.89 97.04
Harghita 15.81 82.96 19.13 89.05 22.68 85.25 23.94 97.25
Ilfov 19.57 102.69 22.88 106.54 26.68 100.27 20.40 82.85
Ialomiţa 21.46 112.59 24.03 111.89 26.54 99.75 25.81 104.83
Iaşi 19.51 102.40 23.16 107.82 26.50 99.57 26.00 105.60
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Primary Gymnasium Lyceum Vocational
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Mehedinţi 18.17 95.32 21.10 98.25 26.42 99.28 24.52 99.60
Maramureş 17.78 93.30 17.42 81.11 25.77 96.86 24.80 100.72
Mureş 15.99 83.93 18.66 86.87 25.22 94.77 23.95 97.30
Neamţ 19.19 100.68 24.13 112.33 26.70 100.35 25.17 102.25
Olt 18.75 98.38 20.54 95.65 26.90 101.08 24.93 101.26
Prahova 20.83 109.28 22.61 105.29 27.71 104.13 27.11 110.13
Sibiu 19.49 102.28 20.91 97.33 26.12 98.17 24.87 101.04
Sălaj 25.04 131.38 25.00 116.40 28.01 105.27 30.26 122.91
Satu Mare 17.58 92.24 20.43 95.13 24.70 92.82 23.48 95.36
Suceava 18.94 99.36 21.75 101.25 25.73 96.69 25.42 103.25
Tulcea 18.60 97.62 21.16 98.52 26.91 101.15 24.25 98.51
Timiş 19.67 103.22 21.74 101.23 26.80 100.73 23.95 97.31
Teleorman 19.31 101.31 21.00 97.76 25.47 95.71 24.64 100.11
Vâlcea 17.71 92.92 20.68 96.26 25.69 96.54 24.14 98.06
Vrancea 18.24 95.71 20.60 95.90 26.04 97.86 23.58 95.78
Vaslui 18.36 96.33 21.65 100.80 27.67 103.99 25.94 105.38
Total 19.06 100.00 21.48 100.00 26.61 100.00 24.62 100.00
214
P U B L I C  M O N E Y  F O R  P U B L I C  S C H O O L S
Table A1.3
 Personnel Spending per Student by County and by Education Level
Primary Gymnasium Lyceum Vocational
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Alba 8,037 115.12 10,552 120.84 10,237 95.37 9,222 121.06
Argeş 5,924 84.86 12,009 137.53 6,802 63.38 7,377 96.84
Arad 5,743 82.26 9,361 107.20 8,812 82.10 8,806 115.60
Bucuresţi 7,526 107.81 8,146 93.29 8,749 81.51 9,437 123.89
Bacău 8,163 116.93 8,163 93.49 8,162 76.05 8,183 107.42
Bihor 8,052 115.34 8,244 94.41 11,805 109.99 5,960 78.24
Bistriţa-Năsăud 9,600 137.51 9,603 109.97 11,243 104.75 4,035 52.97
Brăila 7,270 104.14 9,310 106.61 11,182 104.18 10,361 136.02
Botoşani 6,875 98.48 8,948 102.47 9,312 86.76 6,458 84.77
Braşov 8,392 120.21 8,337 95.47 14,874 138.58 2,187 28.70
Buzău 6,415 91.89 10,585 121.22 10,915 101.70 5,744 75.41
Cluj 8,113 116.21 10,359 118.63 9,281 86.47 8,663 113.73
Călăraşi 6,088 87.21 6,631 75.94 15,027 140.00 1,028 13.49
Caraş-Severin 5,940 85.09 8,349 95.61 11,141 103.80 7,500 98.45
Constanţa 5,002 71.65 8,862 101.49 9,394 87.52 10,156 133.33
Covasna 9,026 129.29 10,725 122.82 12,612 117.50 10,017 131.50
Dâmboviţa 7,859 112.58 8,162 93.47 9,462 88.15 8,473 111.23
Dolj 5,156 73.85 6,779 77.64 11,499 107.14 18,689 245.34
Gorj 6,655 95.33 8,344 95.55 9,214 85.85 7,868 103.28
Galaţi 6,320 90.52 8,264 94.64 8,809 82.07 7,608 99.87
Giurgiu 5,278 75.60 8,137 93.18 8,670 80.77 7,759 101.85
Hunedoara 8,103 116.06 9,979 114.27 9,201 85.72 8,242 108.20
Harghita 8,187 117.27 8,997 103.04 13,199 122.97 7,623 100.07
Ilfov 4,671 66.91 5,847 66.96 5,941 55.35 5,973 78.41
Ialomiţa 5,321 76.22 8,299 95.04 9,531 88.80 4,525 59.40
Iaşi 6,356 91.05 7,476 85.62 13,133 122.36 6,410 84.15
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Primary Gymnasium Lyceum Vocational
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Mehedinţi 7,110 101.85 9,871 113.04 11,363 105.86 7,221 94.80
Maramureş 6,364 91.16 7,871 90.14 13,997 130.41 4,323 56.75
Mureş 7,568 108.41 10,499 120.23 11,499 107.13 8,276 108.64
Neamţ 6,770 96.98 7,848 89.87 14,370 133.88 279 3.67
Olt 5,404 77.40 11,207 128.34 10,087 93.98 6,914 90.76
Prahova 7,903 113.21 7,903 90.51 7,903 73.63 7,903 103.75
Sibiu 8,721 124.92 8,308 95.14 11,100 103.41 9,068 119.04
Sălaj 8,647 123.86 8,077 92.50 11,759 109.56 13,177 172.98
Satu Mare 4,080 58.44 11,270 129.06 16,664 155.25 1,389 18.23
Suceava 7,524 107.77 7,744 88.68 17,605 164.02 13,930 182.86
Tulcea 7,855 112.52 8,535 97.74 12,088 112.62 8,816 115.73
Timiş 6,867 98.37 8,191 93.80 10,667 99.38 9,194 120.70
Teleorman 5,891 84.38 9,674 110.78 12,103 112.76 1,884 24.74
Vâlcea 8,133 116.49 7,955 91.10 16,967 158.07 6,837 89.75
Vrancea 7,819 112.01 9,254 105.97 9,248 86.16 8,691 114.09
Vaslui 6,570 94.12 8,702 99.65 8,342 77.72 5,112 67.11
Total 6,981 100.00 8,732 100.00 10,733 100.00 7,618 100.00
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Table A1.4
 Personnel Spending per Class by County and by Education Level
Primary Gymnasium Lyceum Vocational
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Alba 134.4 101.03 212.3 113.21 277.7 97.23 222.7 118.76
Argeş 107.1 80.47 244.8 130.49 186.5 65.29 171.7 91.56
Arad 110.4 83.00 202.0 107.70 236.8 82.92 209.6 111.76
Bucuresţi 171.1 128.59 201.2 107.26 243.2 85.13 224.4 119.67
Bacău 159.4 119.82 182.8 97.47 217.0 76.00 209.7 111.80
Bihor 143.7 108.01 165.5 88.26 323.4 113.23 153.0 81.59
Bistriţa-Năsăud 168.8 126.88 189.3 100.91 303.1 106.12 101.8 54.31
Brăila 139.1 104.58 199.8 106.50 293.7 102.82 218.0 116.22
Botoşani 126.7 95.27 182.8 97.45 243.4 85.23 171.9 91.65
Braşov 158.3 119.00 176.4 94.05 395.2 138.37 46.8 24.93
Buzău 113.1 85.02 216.8 115.56 290.6 101.75 140.4 74.89
Cluj 146.5 110.12 216.3 115.29 246.3 86.25 198.1 105.62
Călăraşi 122.2 91.84 154.1 82.18 373.6 130.81 27.2 14.53
Caraş-Severin 110.3 82.90 169.3 90.26 308.3 107.93 188.9 100.72
Constanţa 107.0 80.45 192.8 102.78 249.9 87.48 246.2 131.30
Covasna 144.5 108.61 192.7 102.75 284.2 99.52 228.0 121.58
Dâmboviţa 151.3 113.69 176.2 93.93 253.1 88.61 226.1 120.57
Dolj 100.1 75.23 143.8 76.67 297.9 104.32 467.5 249.28
Gorj 121.1 90.99 178.0 94.87 251.4 88.01 192.4 102.60
Galaţi 137.5 103.37 188.2 100.35 239.3 83.78 191.5 102.10
Giurgiu 106.1 79.72 182.1 97.10 238.1 83.36 184.2 98.22
Hunedoara 156.0 117.27 229.9 122.59 244.0 85.45 196.9 105.00
Harghita 129.4 97.29 172.1 91.75 299.4 104.83 182.5 97.32
Ilfov 91.4 68.71 133.8 71.34 158.5 55.50 121.8 64.96
Ialomiţa 114.2 85.82 199.5 106.34 253.0 88.58 116.8 62.27
Iaşi 124.0 93.23 173.2 92.32 348.0 121.83 166.6 88.86
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Primary Gymnasium Lyceum Vocational
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Mehedinţi 129.2 97.08 208.3 111.06 300.2 105.10 177.1 94.42
Maramureş 113.1 85.05 137.1 73.11 360.8 126.31 107.2 57.16
Mureş 121.1 90.99 195.9 104.44 290.0 101.53 198.2 105.71
Neamţ 129.9 97.64 189.3 100.95 383.7 134.35 7.0 3.75
Olt 101.3 76.15 230.2 122.75 271.3 94.99 172.3 91.90
Prahova 164.6 123.72 178.7 95.29 219.0 76.67 214.3 114.25
Sibiu 170.0 127.77 173.7 92.60 289.9 101.52 225.6 120.28
Sălaj 216.5 162.73 201.9 107.67 329.4 115.34 398.7 212.62
Satu Mare 71.7 53.91 230.3 122.78 411.6 144.11 32.6 17.39
Suceava 142.5 107.08 168.4 89.78 452.9 158.59 354.1 188.82
Tulcea 146.1 109.84 180.6 96.29 325.3 113.91 213.8 114.01
Timiş 135.1 101.54 178.1 94.95 285.9 100.10 220.2 117.45
Teleorman 113.7 85.48 203.1 108.30 308.2 107.92 46.4 24.76
Vâlcea 144.0 108.25 164.5 87.70 435.9 152.61 165.0 88.01
Vrancea 142.6 107.21 190.6 101.63 240.8 84.32 204.9 109.27
Vaslui 120.6 90.67 188.4 100.45 230.8 80.82 132.6 70.71
Total 133.0 100.00 187.6 100.00 285.6 100.00 187.5 100.00
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Table A1.5
 Non-personnel Spending per Student by County and by Education Level
Primary Gymnasium Lyceum Vocational
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Alba 878 53.99 1,407 65.34 1,752 63.86 1,225 72.18
Argeş 1,366 83.98 2,241 104.08 1,633 59.50 962 56.69
Arad 990 60.89 1,791 83.20 2,001 72.95 2,031 119.72
Bucuresţi 4,755 292.29 6,428 298.60 4,173 152.09 3,534 208.30
Bacău 2,252 138.46 2,252 104.63 2,252 82.08 2,258 133.09
Bihor 893 54.88 914 42.46 1,205 43.92 533 31.39
Bistriţa-Năsăud 1,500 92.23 1,501 69.72 3,247 118.34 986 58.11
Brăila 1,270 78.08 1,708 79.34 4,695 171.11 1,968 115.96
Botoşani 574 35.26 1,040 48.32 1,611 58.73 793 46.71
Braşov 2,181 134.07 2,167 100.65 3,913 142.62 568 33.49
Buzău 1,496 91.96 1,619 75.21 1,935 70.52 1,047 61.72
Cluj 1,828 112.37 2,390 111.04 3,715 135.38 4,116 242.58
Călăraşi 1,042 64.07 1,380 64.10 3,845 140.15 618 36.44
Caraş-Severin 614 37.75 1,087 50.49 2,281 83.12 1,219 71.87
Constanţa 1,990 122.32 2,194 101.91 2,258 82.28 1,920 113.14
Covasna 2,161 132.82 1,785 82.90 2,582 94.11 2,624 154.66
Dâmboviţa 1,490 91.61 1,626 75.52 2,529 92.19 1,967 115.95
Dolj 541 33.26 730 33.89 1,313 47.86 1,093 64.39
Gorj 1,214 74.66 1,804 83.81 3,042 110.86 1,524 89.84
Galaţi 1,180 72.54 1,666 77.40 2,501 91.16 1,870 110.22
Giurgiu 944 58.04 2,082 96.71 2,138 77.93 379 22.34
Hunedoara 1,988 122.19 2,514 116.78 2,482 90.45 2,005 118.18
Harghita 1,125 69.17 1,330 61.80 4,501 164.04 1,404 82.77
Ilfov 464 28.53 672 31.20 1,449 52.81 2,230 131.43
Ialomiţa 1,127 69.29 1,222 56.75 4,158 151.56 1,044 61.50
Iaşi 1,579 97.07 1,739 80.78 3,116 113.56 1,525 89.89
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Primary Gymnasium Lyceum Vocational
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Mehedinţi 761 46.76 1,176 54.61 2,661 96.98 1,298 76.50
Maramureş 769 47.29 832 38.67 2,989 108.93 647 38.12
Mureş 1,373 84.39 3,364 156.28 1,881 68.55 1,170 68.94
Neamţ 2,040 125.40 2,175 101.04 2,589 94.38 309 18.20
Olt 2,563 157.53 1,083 50.29 2,406 87.71 656 38.64
Prahova 1,863 114.55 1,863 86.56 1,955 71.25 1,957 115.36
Sibiu 1,456 89.53 1,387 64.45 2,071 75.49 1,967 115.94
Sălaj 1,227 75.45 1,291 59.99 3,618 131.87 1,788 105.37
Satu Mare 769 47.29 3,795 176.31 2,571 93.72 7 0.41
Suceava 2,360 145.10 2,605 121.02 2,443 89.04 2,931 172.76
Tulcea 1,362 83.74 1,823 84.69 3,302 120.35 2,906 171.25
Timiş 1,337 82.20 1,444 67.07 2,618 95.42 2,767 163.08
Teleorman 633 38.89 2,738 127.17 1,867 68.03 256 15.06
Vâlcea 1,416 87.07 1,631 75.79 3,233 117.82 986 58.12
Vrancea 2,343 144.04 2,607 121.09 3,765 137.23 2,266 133.53
Vaslui 599 36.84 934 43.37 1,819 66.29 974 57.38
Total 1,627 100.00 2,153 100.00 2,744 100.00 1,697 100.00
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How to properly ﬁnance public schools has long been 
a top concern of national and local governments. 
In the last two decades in South Eastern Europe, 
government entities have often competed for and 
shared funds within a legislative miasma of 
conﬂicting responsibilities and unfunded mandates, 
while also attempting larger reforms to decentralize 
government. At the core of this conﬂict are perplexing 
problems for decision-makers. How to ensure 
accountability and efﬁciency in managing schools 
and in the use of funds targeted for education? How 
to simultaneously give schools the freedom to choose 
the best strategies in terms of quality and equality 
while also facing geographic, economic, and ﬁnancial 
barriers? Inevitably, the answer is a balancing act of 
compromises and short-term solutions, not always 
conducive to transparency or optimization, and not 
even ensuring consensus and stability. 
This six-country anthology compares reforms and 
experiences in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Moldova, and Romania. An introduction by Casandra 
Bischoff reviews what changes have happened across 
South Eastern Europe and points to some changes 
that may offer more hope for the future of the 
education sector.
Compiled by a team of experts from across the region, 
Public Money for Public Schools goes on to discuss 
the complex makeup of local government and school 
budgets, the distribution of funds from national to 
local levels, the dilemmas of motivating an aging 
and unhappy teacher workforce, and the practical 
options for local governments and their constituents 
in managing and funding their schools. It also takes a 
broader look at the education system and government 
entities concerned with reform, decentralization, 
equality, and the overall national budget.
